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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT t
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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision in the Slaughter-House Cases liquidated the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Clause has
never been resurrected.' On the larger question of national protection
for civil liberties, the decision no longer means what it says because
much of the damage done by Slaughter-House has been corrected
under the Due Process Clause. Though the Slaughter-House decision
has been much criticized, it has never been overruled.
The Slaughter-House Cases faced a question that was at the heart
of the American experiment. It was a question that had been raised in
t (c) Michael Curtis
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University Schtml of taw. I owe special thanks to Akhil
Richard Ayi Yes, Man Curtis, Steven Heyman, David Logan, Alan Pahniter, Eugene Volokh, Ronald
Wright, and Michael Zucker'. for comments on an earlier d raft. Special thanks also to Steven
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83 U.S. 36 (1872).
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the Declaration of Independence, finessed in the Constitution of 1787,
deferred in the Bill of Rights, hotly debated as slavery became a central
national issue, and answered by the Reconstruction Amendments, par-
ticularly the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The question examines our constitutional soul. Was the Consti-
tution a system designed to protect slavery or guarantee liberty? While
it recognized the inevitable death of slavery, the Slaughter-House Cases
left the protection of liberty much as it had been under a Constitution
construed to protect slavery.
Ultimately, attempts to justify the contorted construction of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases (or to
offer some modern equivalent protective of state power to invade Bill
of Rights liberties) fail to come to grips with the constitutional and
historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment. A look at text, con-
text, history, ethical aspirations, precedent and constitutional structure
suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause was designed to make the Constitution what its preamble prom-
ised—a guarantee of liberty.
But burying this aspect of Slaughter
-House while reviving the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause has its own perils, particularly today when
many see the Unregulated Market as an ultimate good and the dollar
is winning the battle between man and the dollar. Our own era bears
a striking resemblance to the Gilded Age and the Roaring Twenties,
eras in which the original vision of the Fourteenth Amendment was
buried and replaced with an interpretation that did much to make it
a Magna Carta of corporate power. Can we resurrect the Privileges
or Immunities Clause and revive Slaughter-House without exhuming
Lochner, 2
 a case that too often left the worker and the small business
person to be regulated by massive combinations of corporate power?
Too often Lochner's legacy treated democratically enacted limits on
concentrated economic power as impermissible. The picture is com-
plex, of course. For concentrated power can also use regulation to
disadvantage the less politically powerful.
These questions are not theoretical. In December 1995, the Insti-
tute of Justice, a free market legal foundation, convened a conference
to consider overruling Slaughter-House. In calling the conference, the
Institute quoted Justice Scalia on the "urgent" need to find protection
for economic liberties in the Constitution. For many, revival of Lochner
is a fond hope. Here again, a look at the broader historical context of
2 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that, far from enacting Lochner,
the Amendment's vision of liberty does not require replacing one
system of concentrated economic power with another.
This article looks more intensively at the Slaughter-House Cases and
it examines recent scholarship suggesting that the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause was primarily a prohibition against certain forms of dis-
crimination.' In addition, it looks in more detail at the idea of resur-
recting Lochner's "liberty of contract" under the rubric of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. Further, it makes some observations on the role
of original intent or original meaning. Finally, it makes suggestions
about private attacks on free speech rights and the doctrine of state
action. In the end, I conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment and
its Privileges or Immunities Clause were designed to protect basic
constitutional liberties; left a broad sphere for state power; prohibited
(under the Equal Protection Clause) racial and similar discrimination
in many rights conferred by state law; should not be read to outlaw
worker safety, maximum hours, or the minimum wage; and should
allow federal protection of individual rights against certain types of
private attack.
The liquidation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and devel-
opment of the state action doctrine occurred at about the same time. 4
The state action doctrine suggested that much private conduct aimed
at destroying Bill of Rights liberties like freedom of speech and press
was beyond the reach of the federal government. As to both private
attacks on Bill of Rights liberties and state violations of Bill of Rights
3 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: TILE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT, Cll. 8 (1977); DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT:
'lire FIRST DUNDRF,D YEARS, 342-51 (1985); WILLIAM NELSON, Tint FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); Cf. John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALELJ. 1385 (1992). For my prior efforts, see MICHAEL KENT
Gowns, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1985) [hereinafter Cutups, No STATE SHALL Amonoal; Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights
as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. Rev. 45 (1980)
[hereinafter Curtis, A Reply to Professor Berger]; Michael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the
Nine-Lived Cat: A Response to, Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 Onto ST. Li. 89
(1982) [hereinafter Curtis, Further Adventures]; Michael Kent. Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. Ray. 237 (1982) [hereinafter Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment];
Michael Kent Curtis, Still Further Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Rebuttal to Raoul Berger's
Reply on Application of Me Bill of Rights to the States, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 517 (1984). For a recent
spirited attack on application of privileges in the Bill of Rights to the states, see Donald Dripps,
Akhil Amor on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Lau), "Here I Go Down that Wrong Road
Again," 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1571-92 (1996).
4 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1872).
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liberties, the Supreme Court initially found that the Fourteenth
Amendment had not changed things very much.
The destruction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the
development of an excessively broad state action doctrine had a pro-
found impact on American history. They represented a one-two punch
that did much to eliminate the Fourteenth Amendment as an effective
protector of individual rights and democracy. Both were motivated in
part by considerations of federalism, and in both cases the judicial
solution was far broader than necessary.
The story of the Fourteenth Amendment is part of the great story
of liberty. It reveals important patterns. It shows how guarantees like
those in the Bill of Rights have functioned holistically to protect politi-
cal freedom and how the absence of those guarantees has repressed
political liberty. It is a story well worth telling, particularly today, when
study of the history of liberty is neglected and when guarantees are
likely to be dismissed as mindless technicalities. For individuals, for
families, and for nations, the stories we tell about our past are impor-
tant ways of understanding our identity.' The best understanding
comes from looking at the bleaker as well as the brighter side of our
natures.
Today a striking phenomenon is reductionism—the attempt to
explain law by a single method, such as the theory that law is merely
economics, or the idea that the Constitution is to be understood based
on the narrowest reading of original intent or meaning. In fact, legal
decisions reflect a combination of methods. The task of the lawyer or
the judge is constructive—to give the best possible account of the
Constitution considering text, context, history, precedent, structure
and ethical aspirations, and also to use this understanding to resolve
particular controversies." Often the most accurate, purely historical
explanation recognizes cross currents and confusion—although, be-
cause of their own tradition, the needs of the human mind, and the
demands of tenure, few historians write in this way. The human mind
imposes patterns on an unruly world. Because of their different pur-
poses, seeing history as cross currents and confusion is not viable for
judges or political leaders. Usually they must provide a coherent mean-
ing, though coherence often comes at a cost.
5 See generallyJEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990); see also SAM KEEN, To A DANCING
GOD 83-105 (1990) (providing another discussion of story-telling).
6 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 HAttv. L. REV. 1189 (1987). Cf RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Phillip
Shaw Paludart, Hercules Unbound: Lincoln, Slavery, and the Intention of the Framers, in THE
CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE 1, 6-7 (Donald Neiman ed., 1992).
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Obviously, the idea that judges must construct constitutional
meaning from diverse sources and give the best interpretation has its
risks. It is tempting instead to look, for example, for the most specific
indication of original intent or for the plain meaning of the text and
to follow only that. So if the galleries of the Senate were segregated
when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, if Congress seemed to
accept segregated schools in the District of Columbia, and if many
states accepted segregation, state-imposed racial segregation could be
constitutionally acceptable. Since the First Amendment says Congress
shall make no law abridging freedom of speech, presidents and judges
could abridge free speech.
Often the nation and its judges have rightly rejected such a narrow
approach. Framers and ratifiers of constitutional provisions have broad
goals as well as specific understandings of how to apply their goals to
concrete facts. Like the rest of us, they often have inconsistent pur-
poses.
So, for example, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
wished to confer civil equality on Americans of African descent, at least
with reference to fundamental rights and interests. But many did not
see state-imposed racial segregation in education as incompatible with
that goal.? If a court finds the goals of civil equality and racial segrega-
tion in conflict, it must make a choice. It is tempting to pick the specific
view (segregation) over the general (civil equality), but such a choice
is not necessarily true to the framers' intent.
A purely historical interpretation based on the understanding of
1866 cannot always account for changes in the constitutional structure
since that time. For many framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1866, the right to vote, then denied to all women and most American
men of African descent, was not a fundamental right or interest of the
7 cf. CONG. Gtoin:., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (citing 1
KENr's COMMENTARIES 199 (1827)) on the Civil Rights Bill, belOre amendment:
What do [civil rights and immunities] mean? Do they mean that in all things civil,
social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race or color, shall be equal? By
no means can they be so construed. Do they mean that all citizens shall vote in the
several States? No; for suffrage is a political right which has been left under the
control of the several States, subject to the action of Congress only when it becomes
necessary to enforce the guarantee of a republican government. Nor do they mean
that all citizens shall sit on the juries, or that their children shall attend the same
schools. These are not civil rights or immunities 	  What are civil rights? I
understand civil rights simply to be the absolute rights of individuals, such as—"The
right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and.the right to acquire and
enjoy property. Right itself in civil society, is that which any man is entitled to have,
or to do, or to require from others, within the limits of proscribed law,"
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citizen8
 or within the equality the Amendment secured.° Senator Jacob
Howard said it was not "regarded as one of those fundamental rights
lying at the basis of all society and without which people cannot exist
except as slaves subject to despotism."'° With the passage of the Fif-
teenth Amendment (prohibiting denial of the right to vote based on
race), the Nineteenth (based on sex), and the Seventeenth (direct
election of Senators), there is strong reason to treat the right to vote
as fundamental.
The Constitution is a set of basic instructions from the people to
their agents in the judicial, legislative and executive branches." In the
law of agency, when specific instructions conflict with general pur-
poses of the employer or principal, the agent is sometimes expected
to follow broader goals—a reasonable interpretation of what the prin-
cipal would want, rather than the principal's more specific instruc-
tions.' 2
 That such cases are rare does not mean departure from more
specific instructions is never appropriate. Judges are agents interpret-
ing the commands of the sovereign people enshrined in the Constitu-
tion. But looking from the specific to the general has its obvious
dangers. Perhaps the best that can be said is that to the extent that
text, context, intent, history, structure and ethical considerations point
in the same direction, we can be more confident that a decision is
correct.
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. The Original Constitution and the Addition of a Bill of Rights
The original American Constitution of 1787 said that it was de-
signed to secure the blessings of liberty.'' It contained some important
8 See id. (statement of Rep. Wilson).
" See. CONG. Gam:, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
to
It See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). "flIn other words, the Constitution
ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents."
Id. The agency conception is a metaphor which highlights some of the aspects of the relation
and hides others.
12 See RESTAT•MENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 33 (1958). "P, the owner of a ffictory running on
half time for lack of orders, before leaving for his vacation, directs his purchasing agent to 'put
in our usual monthly coal supply of 1000 tons.' The following day a large order comes in which
will immediately put the factory on full running time." Id. at 115-16, illus. 2. If P cannot easily
be reached, Id t may be found that A is authorized to purchase sufficient coals to keep the factory
running, this depending upon whether or not P can easily he reached, the amount of discretion
usually given to A, the condition of P's hank balance, and other factors." Id.
' 3 U.S. CONST. preamble.
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guarantees of liberty such as the provision against ex post facto laws,
the provision for habeas corpus," and the clause limiting treason so
that simple political opposition to those in power could not be prose-
cuted as treason.' 5 It divided power between federal and state govern-
ments and within the federal government. Divisions of power are an
important mechanism for limiting its abuses.
But the document of 1787 contained basic imperfections. It rec-
ognized the existence of slavery,'6 and it gave slavery enhanced political
power through the clause that counted slaves as three-fifths of a person
for purposes of representation in the federal House of Representa-
tives.' 7 (At least that is so if one assumes slaves should not have been
counted at all in the basis of representation.) The three-fifths provision
also increased the power of the slave states in the electoral college. The
Constitution of 1787 protected the traffic in kidnapped and enslaved
human beings until 1808, 18 required Northern states to return escaped
slaves, 19 and committed the federal government to helping end domes-
tic violence in the states. 2° In the nineteenth century, many Americans
understood this to be a commitment to put down slave rebellions.
The framers of the Constitution of 1787, like most of us, had
inconsistent goals. They wanted liberty and union, protection for lib-
erty and protection for the institution of slavery. Time would prove
these to be impossible combinations.
The framers left a Bill of Rights out of the Constitution. When
challenged on that score in the ratification process, they responded
with a collection of arguments. They insisted, somewhat inconsistently,
that the Constitution already contained guarantees of liberty (a sort of
virtual Bill of Rights) and that the federal government lacked the
power to perform the invasions of liberty feared. (It had no delegated
power to interfere with the liberty of speech and press, for example.) 21
They warned that guarantees of liberty were dangerous because a
limitation on power implied the existence of power, much as the
provision that the government cannot take property for public use
14 U.S. CoNs•r. art. 1, § 9 (bill of attainder, ex post facto laws, habeas corpus); id. § 10 (bill
of attainder, ex post facto laws).
15 U.S. GONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
16 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
cl. 3; U,S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (protection of states against domestic violence).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
18 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1.
19 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § '2, cl. 3.
2° U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
21 See. TIRE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on
the. Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L. Rev. 647, 649 nn.10-11 (1996).
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without paying for it suggests that it can take property if it does pay
for it. And they argued that listing rights was dangerous because it
would imply that those rights not listed did not exist, an argument at
odds with the idea that the Constitution already contained a virtual Bill
of Rights. 22
The final argument against a Bill of Rights was based on popular
sovereignty. Bills of rights were devices needed to limit the power of
the King in favor of popular rights. In the United States, the people
were sovereign, and since the people would not invade their own
rights, a Bill of Rights was superfluous.23
 A quick historical flashback
will show why this argument is extraordinarily hollow. Fortunately, it
did not prevail.
American revolutionaries were the heirs of the English revolution-
aries of the seventeenth century and of those in England who followed
the tradition that they established. 24
 The radical wing of English revo-
lutionaries fought for religious toleration, broader suffrage, repre-
sentation in Parliament in accordance with population, and fought
against monopolies. Parliament was not sovereign, they insisted; the
People were sovereign, and Parliament was simply the agent of the
sovereign people. "We are your Principalls," one petition to Parliament
explained, "and you our Agents. . . . For if you . . . shall assume, or
exercise any Power, that is not derived from our Trust and choice
thereunto, that Power is no lesse then usurpation." 2' The oligarchy that
ruled England after the successful revolution against King Charles I
felt threatened by the ideas of these proto-democrats. 26 In brilliantly
loaded language, the oligarchs named the proto-democrats the "Lev-
ellers." Their charge was that political democracy would lead inevita-
22 See, e.g., JmnEs MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION or 1787,
640 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (Sherman); THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); 2
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1025, 1034 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)
(Jackson) [hereinafter 2 THE Btu, OF RIGHTS]; William Van Alstyne, Congressional Power and Free
Speech: Levy's Legacy Revisited, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094-97 (1986) (book review).
25 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (alluding to this argument but not
expressing it in so bald a form).
21 See David Mayer, The English Radical Whig Origins of American Constitutionalism, 70 WASH.
U. L.Q. 131, 204-08 (1992) (discussing views of Radical Whigs).
25
 Richard Overton, A Remonstrance of Many Thousands of . Citizens (1646), in TRACTS ON
LIBERTY IN THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1638-1647 1, 3 (William Haller ed., 1934).
2" See Michael Kent Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty: The Levellers and the American Bill of Rights,
8 CONST. Comm. 359, 377-86 (1991) [hereinafter Curtis, The Levellers]. For excellent discussions,
See HENRY NOEL BRAILSFORD, THE LEVELLERS AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION (1961); JOSEPH
FRANK, THE LEVELLERS (1955); PAULINE GREGG, FREE: BORN JOHN: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN LIL-
BURNE (1961).
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bly to equal division of property. The oligarchs also turned weapons
the King had used against Puritans and Parliamentarians against the
proto-democrats. So the parliamentary oligarchs used against the Lev-
ellers the very weapons the King had used against them: sedition laws,
treason laws reaching verbal attacks on government, broad power to
search, compelled self-incrimination and denials of other criminal
procedure guarantees. Eventually, the oligarchs suppressed the Level-
lers."
The Levellers invented (or at least espoused) what would become
some basic American ideas of liberty and popular sovereignty. They
proposed a written constitution that contained a list of powers denied
to government, something like a bill of rights. Because this constitution
came directly from the people, its authority would limit parliamentary
power. The sovereign people were the principal, Parliament was the
agent, and the constitution, the Agreement of the People, was a set of
limiting and binding instructions the people gave their agents. These
fundamental instructions, in turn, could not be changed by their
agents in Parliament. 28 Ideas of popular sovereignty contributed to the
gradual transformation of formal political power in America, and the
right to vote progressively expanded.
Their emphasis on agency principles and their own experience
with parliamentary power led the Levellers to simple but profound
insights, insights that showed the hollowness of suggestions that popu-
lar governments have less need for bills of rights. The Levellers saw the
basic problem with all agency relations—the danger that the agent will
use the power given by the principal to the advantage of the agent and
the disadvantage of the principal. 29 As they put it in explaining the
need to limit the power of government, the Levellers had "by woeful
experience found the prevalence of corrupt interests powerfully inclin-
ing most men once entrusted with authority, to pervert the same to
their own domination, and to the prejudice of our Peace and Liber-
ties."" Put another way, the claim that the people actually rule is a legal
fiction—useftil, instructive, partially true, but still a legal fiction. For
the governors and the governed are different, and the power the
people give to the governors may be used to the disadvantage of the
27 See Curtis, The Levellers, supra note 26, at 375-89.
' See id.
29 See id. at 367-68,387.
'3(1 An Agreement of the Free People of England, in THE LEVELLER TRACTS (1647-1653) 323
(William Haller and Godfrey Davies eds., 1960).
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people themselves. 3 ' Like all metaphors, the claim that the people rule
highlights one aspect of the truth, while leaving others in darkness. 32
While the Levellers were suppressed, many ideas remarkably simi-
lar to those of the Levellers were carried on by a small group of Radical
Whigs. The Radical Whigs, in turn, transmitted many of these ideas to
American revolutionaries."
The attacks on the United States Constitution of 1787 came in
part from those concerned about the lack of protection for individual
rights. But attacks also came from those concerned with preserving the
power of the states, and one of the chief reasons for that concern was
fear that the federal government might grow sufficiently powerful to
threaten slavery.
James Madison, of course, led the fight for a bill of rights in the
first Congress. A bill of rights, Madison said, would give legitimacy to
principles of liberty, help the people to internalize these values, and
provide a basis for rallying against abuses of power. It would also give
new power to the courts. Madison announced, with excessive opti-
mism, that "courts of justice" would form "impenetrable barriers"
against violations of the liberties in the Bill of Rights. 34
Madison also wanted some guarantees of liberty to be directed
against the power of the states. Specifically, he wanted protection for
the "invaluable privileges" of free press, freedom of conscience and
trial by jury." The proposal to limit the states' power in the interest of
liberty, a proposal Madison said was the most valuable part of his
guarantees of liberty, passed in the House but was defeated in the
Senate. 3"
In spite of Federalist assurances that the federal government
lacked power over speech and press, assurances that were re-enforced
by the First Amendment, it was not long before Federalists in Congress
exercised this allegedly non-existent and specifically prohibited power.
They made it a crime to make false and malicious criticisms of the
Federalist President, John Adams, or of the Congress. The law did not
protect Vice-President Thomas Jefferson, Adams' likely opponent in
31 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 282-84 (1988); Curtis, The Levellers, supra note 26, at 367-68, 371-74,
387-93.
32 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, MEIAPHORS WE LIVE BY 3-13 (1980).
ss See generally Mayer, supra note '24. For the Leveller legacy, see Curtis, The Levellers, supra
note 26, at 387-93.
34 2 THE BILL OF
	 supra note 22, at 1030-31. See generally Paul Finkelman, James
Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 Sul.. Cr. REV. 301 (1990).
35 2 THE BHA. OF RIGHTS, Supra note 22, at 1032-33, 1113, 1145.
se Id.
December 19961	 PR/V1LEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE	 11
the upcoming presidential election.r Federal prosecutors (appointed
by Adams) enforced the law. Soon jeffersonian newspaper editors and
a jeffersonian congressman were jailed for suggesting that Adams was
given to ridiculous pomp and favored a standing army."
There seems to be a pattern emerging here—the use of laws,
including sedition laws and other laws aimed at political expression,
the use of police, courts and the criminal justice system, to destroy or
hobble political opponents. Laws aimed at speech and press have
extraordinary potential for political abuse.
Of course, reality is paradoxical. Criminal laws are necessary to
protect basic rights. Protections against self-incrimination, unreason-
able search and seizure, jury trial and the other criminal procedure
guarantees of the Bill of Rights simply reflect a recognition, at least as
old as the Levellers, that the useful and necessary power to enforce
criminal laws also contains inherent threats to liberty and needs to be
carefully confined. The limits have costs, but the history of liberty
shows that jettisoning the guarantees has costs as well.
B. Slavery and Abolition Shatter a Constitutional Consensus
1. The Controversy over Slavery
The pattern of using the criminal justice system and laws aimed
at speech and press to silence political opponents reappeared in the
political battle over slavery. State laws to silence opponents of slavery
were not subject to federal judicial review. This was so because, in 1833,
as agitation against slavery began to convulse the nation, the Supreme
Court ruled that guarantees of liberty in the Bill of Rights did not limit
the states."
In the mid-1830s abolitionists launched a massive attack on the
continued legitimacy of slavery. They demanded immediate emancipa-
tion, though they admitted that Congress lacked power over slavery in
the Southern states. The Southern slave-holding elite, meanwhile, in-
sisted on increased security for slavery. Proposed security devices in-
37 Act for the Punishment. of Certain Crimes, 1 Stat., 596 (July 14, 1798).
35 See, e.g, United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 632 (C.G.D. Pa. 1800); United States v.
Callender, 25 F. Gas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800); United States v. Lyon, 15 F. Cas. 1183 (C.C.D. Vt.
1798). See generally LEONARD LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); JOHN MORTON
SMI'I'll, FREEDOMS FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
(1966); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); David
M. Rabban, The Ahislorical Historian, Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American
History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 785 (1985).
39 Barron V. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
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eluded more slave states, opening all federal territories to slavery,
banning from the mails anti-slavery literature sent to Southern states,
banning anti-slavery publications directed to slave holding states, ex-
traditing Northern abolitionists to the South to face trial for anti-slav-
ery statements sent to the South and suppressing abolition societies
and literature in the North. 4°
In the North, most of these proposed restrictions were not
achieved. 4 ' This was so because many Northerners held a broader and
more general view of free speech and press. They believed that aboli-
tionists could not be suppressed without delegating dangerous discre-
tion to suppress speech to public officials. A substantial block of North-
ern public opinion agreed, at least, that abolitionism was an evil and
the nation would be better off without it. How to get rid of abolitionist
speech without also undermining state and federal guarantees of free
speech and press was a more puzzling problem, and most Northerners
concluded that the puzzle was insoluble. 42 Rooting out anti-slavery
speech and press was hobbled by provisions for free speech and press
and for jury trials, by provisions against compulsory self-incrimination,
by provisions limiting search and seizure powers of government, and
by the federal system.
Why was it that so many Northerners and Southerners alike were
initially so hostile to abolition? There were two basic rationales. One
fear was that anti-slavery expression would eventually reach slaves and
lead to slave revolts, which the entire nation would be obligated to
quell. A second fear was that anti-slavery agitation would make slavery
a political issue, create sectional parties and eventually lead to civil
war." For the Southern slave-holding elite, abolition threatened their
wealth and power. They responded by suppressing anti-slavery expres-
sion. But, as Francis Lieber warned John C. Calhoun, a system that
refused to tolerate criticism was one that admitted it was based on
violence. Such a system could only come to a violent end."
By the 1850s, escalating Southern demands to protect and expand
slavery had produced a great political realignment. The Republican
party opposed the extension of slavery to new territories, insisting that
40 See M ichael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press,
and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. ItEr. 785, 796-817 (1995) [hereinafter Curtis, Curious
Histaty].
41 See id. at 866.
42 See id. at 786-849.
4S See id. at 802-04.
44 See id, at 846; FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 179 (Harold
L. Nelson ed., 1967).
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slavery in any federal territory was an unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. Republicans rejected slavery as
barbarism and demanded free speech and free press on the subject:*
The Southern slave-holding elite, and many Southerners who
followed it, found Republican ideas just as evil and criminal as those
of the abolitionists." In truth, Republicans shared many premises with
abolitionists, although they reached different conclusions. Like the
abolitionists, Republicans believed that slave-holding was evil, that it
should be banned from federal territories, that slavery in the states was
beyond the immediate power of the federal government, and that
open discussion of the issue in the South would lead to state-by-state
abolition. Most abolitionists, however, were committed to racial equal-
ity, a position many Republicans approached more gradually. 17
2. Irreconcilable Differences: The Liberty Model vs.
the Slavery Model
So, from the 1830s to the 1850s, two different models of the Fed-
eral Constitution emerged: the liberty model and the slavery model.
Advocates of the liberty model read the Constitution as ultimately
committed to the goals of liberty and equality in life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. For them, the Constitution was infused with the
purposes of the Declaration of Independence. Supporters of the lib-
erty model differed on how quickly those goals could and should be
achieved, as well as on the extent to which the Constitution was an
actively anti-slavery document.
Advocates of the slavery model saw the Constitution as a compact
between North and South, requiring the North to protect the institu-
tion of slavery where it existed and to allow it at least to compete with
free labor for dominance in the territories." Protection for slavery
required at least some extra-territorial effects for slave codes. These
included banning the reading and discussing of anti-slavery petitions
in Congress. Advocates of the slavery model believed that abolitionists,
and later, Republicans, should not be permitted to make anti-slavery
arguments in the South and, many said, not in the North either—be-
15 See CURTIS, No STATE Stim.t, AtouncE, supra note 3, at ch. 2.
16
 See GONG. GLOBE, 36th Cool;., 1st Sess. 281 (1860) (statement of Rep. Pryor); id. at 17
(statement of Rep. Clark); id. at 69 (statement of Rep. Davis); id. at 524 (snuentent of Rep.
Hi ndman).
47 See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis..
Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning (Ore First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
68 OIL- KENT L. REV. 1113, 1140-51, 1168 (1993) [hereinafter Curtis, The 1859 Crisis].
48 See Curtis, Ctaious History, supra note 40, at 8(18, 842, 860-61.
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cause newspapers from one section of the nation circulated in the
other. 49
Some attempted a middle course: attempting to protect the South
from anti-slavery literature without banning it in the North. Amos
Kendall, Postmaster General for Andrew Jackson, explained that in
many ways states were as independent as before the Constitution was
formed, and slavery was one of these areas of state independence:
No state obtained by the union any right whatsoever over
slavery in any other State, nor did any State lose any power
over it, within its own borders . . . . Nor have the people of
one State any more right to interfere with this subject in
another State, than they have to interfere with the internal
regulations . . . of a foreign nation. If they were to combine
and send papers among the laboring population of another
nation, calculated to produce discontent and rebellion, their
conduct would be good ground of complaint . . . 50
As Kendall saw it, the Constitution showed that one of its purposes
was to secure more perfect control over slavery to the Southern
states. Kendall did not claim the Constitution authorized the federal
government to suppress speech in the North to protect slavery, for
anti-slavery expression was legal there. But he was sure that, because
of the requirement that states be protected against domestic vio-
lence, abolitionist literature should be kept out of mail sent to the
South. IT] he United States have no right, through their officers
or departments, knowingly to be instrumental in producing, within
the several states the very mischief which the constitution com-
mands them to repress."5 '
Both those who saw the Constitution as a charter of liberty and
those who saw it as a compact that promised protection for slavery
could point to parts of the text of the Constitution and the history of
the nation to support their cases.• 2
 The Constitution had enfolded
within it radically divergent tendencies.
IS See id. at 796-863.
"WASH. Gronr., Dec. 14, 1835, at 2 (Report of Postmaster Kendall to first session of 24th
Congress).
51 Id. at 3.
5'2 For protections of slavery, see, for example, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (slaves swell slave
state representation in the House); id. art. II, § I, cl. 2 (the electoral college); id. art. IV, § 2, cl.
3 (fugitive slaves); id. art. IV, § 4 (protection against slave rebellions—"domestic violence"). For
protections of liberty, see, for example, id. preamble (to secure blessings of liberty); id. art. I, § 6,
cl. 1 (protection for speech and debate in Congress from being questioned In any other place");
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Protection for slavery required eradication of guarantees of politi-
cal liberty, implicit in popular sovereignty and explicitly contained in
state and federal constitutional guarantees for speech and press. It
required that a major political issue be kept off the agenda. Protection
for liberty required freedom to criticize slavery and to take political
steps for its eradication. Once slavery became a major political issue,
the Jeckyl-and-l-Iyde nature of the constitutional arrangement became
apparent. Lincoln was right in his "house divided" speech: the nation
could not endure half slave and half free," for slavery undermined
liberty, and liberty undermined slavery."
The Declaration of Independence was a central founding docu-
ment of the American nation. The dispute over the nature of our
constitutional arrangement focused in part on the meaning of the
Declaration. Those who saw the Constitution as a compact requiring
protection of slavery insisted that the Declaration in fact meant "all
[white] men" are created equal and are entitled to basic rights. Oth-
erwise, they insisted, slave holding founders like Jefferson would be
hypocrites."
Lincoln read the Declaration as setting out the basic purposes of
the nation, as a charter of freedom. Here is his numinous explication:
I think the authors of that notable instrument [the Declara-
tion of Independence] intended to include all men, but they
did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They
did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect,
moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with
tolerable exactness, in what respects they did consider all men
created equal—equal in "certain inalienable rights, among
which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This they
id. art, I, § 9, el. 2 (writ of habeas corpus may only be suspended in cases of rebellion or invasion);
id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (jury trial in criminal cases); id. art. III, § 3 (limited definition of treason);
id. art. IV, 4 (republican government); id. amend. I (freedom of speech, press, religion, and
petition); id, amend, IV (protection against unreasonable searches and seizures); id. amend. V
(criminal procedure guarantees including privilege against self-incrimination); id, amend. VI
(right to counsel, local trial, speedy and public trial, confrontation and right to present defense
witnesses); id. amend. VII (civil jury trial); id. amend. VIII (hail and no excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishments).
55 1 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES, LETTERS, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, THE LINCOLN
DOUGLAS DEBATES ( 1832-1858) 426 (Library of America ed. 1989).
54 See CURTIS, No STATE S/ IA LI. ABRIDGE, .supra note 3, at ch. 2; Curtis, The 1859 Crisis, supra
note 47, at 1141-77; Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and Limas on Constitutional
Change, 32 Ast.,1. Jufus. 1,17-20 (1987); Paludan, supra note 6, at 1-22.
55
 See, e.g., Speech of Stephen Douglas at Springfield, July 17, 1858, in Cutwrito LquAL: THE.
COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 62-63 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958),
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said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the
obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that
equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately
upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon.
They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforce-
ment of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.
They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which
should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked
to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly
attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the
happiness and value of life to all people of all colors every
where. The assertion "that all men are created equal" was of
no practical use in effecting our separation from Great Brit-
ain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that, but for
future use. Its authors meant it to be, thank God, it is now
proving itself, a stumbling block to those who in after times
might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths
of despotism. They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed
tyrants, and they meant when such should re-appear in this
fair land and commence their vocation they should find for
them at least one hard nut to crack. 56
In the 1830s and in following years, the constitutional paradigm
was that of the semi-sovereign state. The federal government had
power to pursue common objectives, but the great mass of day-to-day
governmental power was exercised by the states, sovereign within their
domain. Slavery could be explained by the semi-sovereign state para-
digm. It was one of the matters reserved to the states. As against state
and local governments (except for a few federal limitations, which did
not include the Bill of Rights), citizens of states and visitors from other
states got just as much liberty as state constitutions and laws provided.
How could Southern states arrest and jail people for criticism of slav-
ery? The problem was simply solved by the paradigm of the semi-sov-
ereign state.57
56 LINCOLN, SUPra note 53, at 398-99.
57 See Letter from Postmaster General Amos Kendall to Samuel L. Gouveneur, Esq. Postmas-
ter, New York, in From the New York Times, WASH. GwisE, Sept. 1,1835, at 2.
When those states became independent they acquired a right to prohibit the
circulation of such [abolitionist] papers within their territories; and their power
over the subject of slavery and all its incidents, was in no degree diminished by the
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With the founding of the Republican party, the semi-sovereign
state paradigm came under increasing strain. Here, after all, was a
national political party that was not allowed to campaign in one half
of the nation. As the Civil War approached, southern slaveholders
intensified demands to prohibit circulation of speeches by Congres-
sional Republicans in the South. Slavery was the overriding political
issue of the day, but one party was forbidden to speak or write about
it in much of the South.''' Laws limiting speech and political advocacy
were enforced by searches and seizures, and by the machinery of the
criminal justice system—at least when critics were not silenced by
in ohs . 5"
In 1859 and 1860, Republicans used Hinton Helper's anti-slavery
book The Impending Crisis as a campaign document in the North, and
a number of Republican congressmen endorsed a proposed abridge-
ment of the book and contributed funds for its printing.w Southerners
who circulated the book were indicted, tried and convicted. In Decem-
ber 1859, a grand jury in Wilson County, North Carolina, branded The
Impending Crisis treasonous to North Carolina and called on New York
Republican Governor Edwin Morgan to deliver Republican endors-
ers of the book "to indictment and punishment," including himself."
Of course, no trial followed the indictment because the defendants
were beyond the power of the court, Other Republican endorsers of
Helper's allegedly incendiary book included John Bingham and others
adoption of the Federal Constitution. It is still as undivided and sovereign as it was
when they were first emancipated from the dominion of the King and Parliament
of Great Britain. In the exercise of that power, some of those States have made the
circulation of such papers a capital crime; others have made it a felony ... and
perhaps there is no one among them which has not forbidden it under heavy
penalties,
Id.
See Curtis, The 1859 Crisis, supra note 47, at 1141-64.
• 9 As the RALEIGH WEEKLY STANDARD announced, after a University of North Carolina
chemistry professor was driven from the state after his support for the Republican presidential
candidate John C. Fremont became public, "[W]e now say, after due consideration . . . that no
man who is avowedly for John C. Fremont for President ought to be allowed to breathe the air
or Dead the soil or North Carolina." Me Hedrick Once More, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 5,
1856, at 1.
6t) Curtis, The 1859 Crisis, supra note 47, at 1143.
° See Governor Seward, Irrepressible Conflict, Speech (Oct. 25, 1858), in Collection of
Anti-Slavery Propaganda in the Oberlin College Library, at 2 (Microfiche Reprint SLB 1255) (1964);
Text Book of Revolution, N.Y. HERALD, Nov. 28, 1859, at 1; N.Y. WKLY. TRIR„ Dec. 24, 31, 1859, in
EARL. SCHENCK MIRES, INTRODUCTION TO HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF
TILE Souru 13 (1963).
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who later sat on the Joint Committee that framed the Fourteenth
Amendment.62
En these circumstances, opponents of slavery and, later, Republi-
cans began arguing that free speech and press and other constitutional
privileges were national rights that American citizens carried with them
wherever they went—even to Raleigh, North Carolina, or Charleston,
South Carolina. Southern laws suppressing political criticism of slavery
were despotism, they argued, and violated American citizens' right or
62 See Curtis, The 1859 Crisis, supra note 47, at 1174. My work on the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment has built on the work of those who have studied the question and the
general background of slavery and civil liberties. Deeply researched studies on freedom or speech
about slavery to which 1 am indebted include CLEMENT' EATON, FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE
IN THE OLD SOUTH (1940), which focuses on events in the Southern states, Russeta. B. NYE,
FrTTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL. LIBERTIES AND TI IF SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-1860 (1972) and W.
SH ERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DISTRIBuTioN OF ABOLITION LITERATURE 1830-
1860 (1968). For two fine studies that bear directly on the Worth case, see Clifton H. Johnson,
Abolitionist Missionary Activities in North Carolina, 40 N.C. Hts•r. Rev. 295,295-301 (1963) and
Noble J. Tolbert, Daniel Worth: Tar Heel Abolitionist, 39 N.C. HIST. Rev. 284,284-90 (1962).
A number of legal studies have focused on the historical background of the Fourteenth
Amendment with regard to guarantees of civil liberty. Typically these have built on prior work
and offered new evidence and interpretation as well. See RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR
FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY Poi,nics IN THE UNITED STATES 1837-1860 (1976) for an excellent
survey of the rise of the political antislavery movement. For a very important study of early
antislavery legal thought, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTION-
ALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977). Pioneering works on incorporation of the Bill of Rights
in the Fourteenth Amendment are Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) and William Winslow
Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History" and Constitutional Limitations on State. Authority,
22 U. Cm. L. Rev. 1 (1954).
My own work was heavily influenced by Crosskey and my understanding of the subject evolved
over time. See generally Curtis, A Reply to Professor Berger, supra note 3; Curtis, The Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 3; Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 3. For a critique of Mr. Berger's
work, see Avian) Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 651 (1979). For two important recent articles on incorporation, see Akin! Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALF. LJ. 1193 (1992) and Richard Aynes, On
Misreadinglohn Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE LJ. 57 (1993). For a book that
finds a strong case for incorporation of the Bill of Rights, but that reads the Fourteenth Amend-
ment narrowly on other issues, see EARL M. MAL1z, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CONGRESS, 1863-69 (1990).
For important scholarship denying application of the Bill of Rights to the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment, see generally RAOUL BERGER, TILE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
But or Rioirrs (1989), NELSON, supra note 3, and Jonathan Lurie, The Fourteenth Amendment:
Use and Application in Selected State Court Civil Liberties Cases, 1870 -1890,28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
295 (1984). For an analysis close to that of Charles Fairman (finding that some "absolute" liberties
like those in the Bill of Rights were protected, but not all), see generally James E. Bond, The
Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON
L. REV. 435 (1985) and James E. Bond, Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in North Carolina,
20 WAKE FOREST L. Rev. 89 (1984). See also JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM:
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming).
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"privilege" to free speech.° General searches for anti-slavery publica-
tions, compelling self-incrimination, etc., were equally affronts to the
Constitution.
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and, later, the Nineteenth
Amendments altered the constitutional plan in accordance with the
liberty-equality blueprint, a progression that the institution of slavery
had made impossible.14
 After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the question of what the Fourteenth Amendment meant moved
to the Supreme Court. In the Slaughter House Cases° the Court said
there was less to the Fourteenth Amendment than met the eye.
C. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment: A New Birth of Freedom?
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."°
There are well recognized methods of interpreting the Constitu-
tion.° We can look at the text, the plain or ordinary meaning of the
words used. We can look at the text contextually to see how similar
words are used elsewhere in the Constitution. We can delve into the
history giving rise to the provision. We can look at prior precedent. We
can explore the Constitution's overall structure, how it. is to work as a
whole—as an organism or a machine. Finally, we can consider wise
public policy, including moral and ethical concerns.
63 See Curtis, The 1859 Crisis, supra note 47, at 1147-59.
" For a careful analysis of the post-Civil War constitutional amendments in light of the
original Constitution and federalism, see generally Michael P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitu-
tion: The Fourteenth Amendment and Constitutional Rights, 22 Puisllus 69 (1992) and Michael P.
Zuckert, Completing the Constitution, The Thirteenth Amendment, 4 CONST. COMMENTARIES 259
(1987). See also Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment—The
Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 123 (1986). For a very fine
exposition of (lie two approaches described here, see Walter F. Murphy, supra note 54, at 17-20.
83 U.S. 36 (1872).
66 U.S. CONFr. amend XIV, § 1.
07 My colleague, Professor' Wilson Parker, first introduced me to these methods of legal
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There is, of course, little consensus about the weight to be given
to text, structure, history and precedent when they point in different
directions. When the tests point in the same direction, the case for a
particular interpretation is strong. Each approach can be seen as a
vector, and the correct decision as the resultant force. The incorpora-
tion issue is an example of how these methods of analysis can be used.
I will start with an argument for application of constitutional guaran-
tees of liberty to the states.
1. Textual Analysis
a. The Amendment as Explicated by a Modern Dictionary
After making persons born in the nation citizens, the Fourteenth
Amendment provides "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States."68
 Pretty clearly, the "no state shall" words are designed to limit
what states can do. The semi-sovereign state is obviously to be limited
in some respect. The Fourteenth Amendment says states may not
"abridge." According to Webster's Dictionary, "abridge" means "reduce
. . . lessen, diminish, or curtail." 69
 So the states are to face new restric-
tions: they cannot reduce, lessen, diminish or curtail "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States."" "Privilege," according to
Webster's Dictionary, is "a right, immunity, or benefit enjoyed by a
particular person or a restricted group of persons" or "the rights
common of all citizens under a modern constitutional government.""
This seems to fit. The restricted group seems to be "citizens of the
United States." The rights common to all citizens of the United States
included at least all the privileges and immunities in the Bill of Rights,
together with those set out elsewhere, such as Hamilton's virtual bill
of rights in the original Constitution—protection against ex post facto
laws, bills of attainder, the right of habeas corpus, and the limited
definition of treason, etc.
analysis when I began teaching Constitutional Law. At that time I began to apply them to teach
students about the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation debate. For an elegant use of this type
of analysis as a method ()I' understanding the incorporation issue, see Amar, supra note 62. I am
indebted to Professor Anuu's article as well as to Wilson Parker. For a discussion of these methods,
.see generally PHILIP BOBATIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) and CIIARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUC-
TURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
66
 U.S. Cos:yr. amend. XIV, § I.
69
 RANIIOM HOUSE WEASTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 49 (1991).
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
RAtquoNi HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1074 (1991).
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So a textual analysis seems simple enough. Privileges encompass
rights and immunities, and the rights described are those common to
all citizens of the United States, including at least those set out in the
Constitution. (In the case of free speech and press the privileges or
immunities have a rights dimension and a lack of power dimension—
lack of power to pass laws abridging free speech or press.) Whatever
may have been the case before (and the provision suggests that a
change was intended), the Privileges or Immunities Clause commands
that no state can lessen, diminish or impair these rights, privileges or
immunities. 72
This reading assumes the existence of basic Anglo-American lib-
erties declared, but not simply created, by the Constitution. The origi-
nal Constitution and Bill of Rights recognized and declared these
liberties and as a matter of positive law prohibited government from
abridging them." Initially, some of the positive prohibitions were
aimed only at the federal government (as was the case with the Bill of
Rights), some only at the states and some at both the states and the
federal government (as was the case with ex post facto laws). 74
The prohibitions have a reflex character." The Fourth Amend-
ment declaration that the right of the people to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, for example, both
recognizes or declares a right and contains a positive prohibition—
originally directed only at the federal government. A correlative of the
72 See Curtis, A Reply to Professor Berger, supra note 3, at 48; Curtis, Further Adventures, supra
note 3, at 89-91 (1982). The point that the most natural reading of the words "privileges or
immunities" is that they are equivalent to rights (including those in the Bill of Rights) has often
been made. See, e.g., acrls, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 2; Richard Aynes,
Constricting the Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 631 n.23 (citing Charles R. Pence, The
Construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 Am. U. L. REV. 536, 540 (1891) (noting that rust
eight amendments are privileges and immunities) and Russell W. Galloway, Slaughtering Slaugh-
ter-House, 7 CAL. L. Rev. 16, 18 (1987)); Michael Conant, Anti -Monopoly Tradition Under the
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY 14 785, 819
(1982); Crosskey, supra note 62, at 10; see also Amar, supra note 62 (offering particularly elegant
textual analysis).
75 The Resolution of Congress March 4, 1789 transmitting the proposed amendments to the
states described them as "declaratory and restrictive clauses." THE COMMISSION ON THE BICEN-
TENNIAL or THE UNITED Stales CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 20 (1991); see Curtis, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note
3, at 24, 91; Amar, supra note 62, at 1205-12; (1: Howard j ay Graham, Our "Declaratory' Fourteenth
Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3, 37 (1954-55).
74 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 9-10.
75 See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 464 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Tillie First
Amendment, although in form prohibitory, is to be regarded as having a reflex character and as
affirmatively recognizing freedom of speech and freedom of the press as rights belonging to
citizens of the linked States; that is, those rights are to be deemed attributes of national
citizenship ... ." Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
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right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is the govern-
ment's duty not to search and seize unreasonably. Although the Fourth
Amendment recognized a "right of the people," it did not apply a
correlative duty to the states. The declaration that Congress shall make
no law abridging freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the
right of the people to assemble and petition, both assumes or declares
rights (freedom of speech and press and the right of the people to
petition) and specifically declares that Congress lacks power to abridge
them.
One could, and some do, argue that the First Amendment is
merely a congressional disability. 76 The result, when it comes to incor-
porating the Amendment as a limit on the states, is that there is
nothing to incorporate since states could hardly force Congress to pass
a law abridging freedom of the press." This argument focuses merely
on the denial of power and ignores the recognition of an American
right to free speech, press and petition that the denial of power was
designed to secure. It also ignores the possibility that lack of power to
pass laws directly aimed at communication concededly within freedom
of speech and press—such as political speech—can be seen either as
a privilege or an immunity.
The purpose of the First Amendment, of course, was to protect
freedom of speech, assembly, petition and of the press. Freedom of the
press was, as the Continental Congress recognized in 1774, a "right"
that promoted the communication of thoughts among subjects and
checked abuses of governmental power. 78
 The colonists drew on the
Radical Whig tradition. Cato's Letters recognized free speech and press
as "great Bulwark [s] of Liberty." 79
76 See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1589 (1995). A very similar argument
was expressed in 1866 by Democratic opponents of the Civil Rights 13ill to explain why the bill
could not be justified as enforcing the Bill of Rights. As to the Bill of Rights, Representative
Michael Kerr explained, "[t] hey are not guarantees at all, except to protect the States against the
usurpations of the Congress anti the General Government." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1270 (1866) (statement of Rep. Michael Kerr). For a thoughtful discussion of incorporation and
the religion clauses, see Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of
the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) and Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption
of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. G. L. REV.
1106 (1994).
77
 Bybee, supra note 76, at 1589.
76 Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec (1774) in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 223 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
79
 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, 1 CATO'S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL &
RELIGIOUS 101 (Da Capo, 6th ed. 1971) (1755).
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The American constitutional arrangement recognized the privi-
leges and made federalist provisions for their protection. The First
Amendment protected the privileges in the case of federal action.
As against state action, protection for the constitutionally recognized
American privileges of "freedom of speech and of the press," the right
of the people to assemble and petition, and free exercise of religion
at first depended on state laws and constitutions.
In introducing the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, Congress-
man James Madison proposed that no state shall violate the equal right
of conscience or freedom of the press. Every government, he insisted,
"should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular
rights."" Madison thought of the rights as existing; he did not propose
creating a right of free press against the states. I-Ie saw the proposal as
providing "security" for the rights. As to the argument that such a
proposal was unnecessary, because some states protected the right to
free press, Madison responded that there was no good argument
against a "double security," and he implored his colleagues to join him
in "obtaining the security" for these rights. 8 ' Madison's perspective was
consistent with the American understanding that governments existed
to secure natural rights. In the end, the Senate did not concur in
Madison's plan for explicit limits on the states. 82 No security was pro-
vided to protect the right of free speech and press from state action.
But the basic recognition of the existence of Americans' "invaluable
privileges" or rights of freedom of religion, assembly, petition, speech
and of the press remained."
The first Congress, in transmitting the Bill of Rights to the people
of the states, described the amendments as "declaratory and restrictive
clauses."s4 As to the First Amendment, it declared an American right
of free speech, press, assembly, petition and free exercise of religion
but only restricted or provided security against federal action, Al-
though legally unenforceable against the states, the declaration of
Americans' First Amendment rights was not meaningless. It provided
a rallying point for the people against state and federal abuses of
power. The guarantees functioned in this way in the crusade against
slavery.
80 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra nate 22, at 1033.
8k Id .
82 See id. at 1145-46.
83 hi. at 1033.
$ 'I COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF 'I'M CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTION ot-"rutE
UNITED STATES AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 20 (1991); see also Akhil Reed Amur,
The Bill of Rights as a Consolation, 100 YALE 1131, 1154 n.109 (1991).
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Suppose the state of Virginia had first repealed its constitutional
guarantees for free speech and press and then had made it a crime to
advocate the election of anyone except incumbents or their chosen
successors. Can anyone doubt that this action would have been pro-
tested as a violation of the right of Americans to freedom of speech
and of the press? Would the answer that Americans had no such rights
have been regarded as a satisfactory answer? It is true that the privilege
would have been legally unenforceable, and the idea of an unenforce-
able right or privilege seems a contradiction in terms. But it is a mistake
to assume that Americans of the 18th and 19th centuries shared our
positivism. James Madison, for example, thought the Bill of Rights
secured natural rights.85
 Free speech and press are examples of such
rights.
In 1814 Thomas Jefferson wrote about a state court blasphemy
prosecution for the sale of a book: "1 am really mortified to be told
that, in the United States of America, a fact like this can become a subject
of inquiry, and of criminal inquiry too, as an offense against religion." 81 i
The prosecuting state was not Jefferson's Virginia. Jefferson did not
contend that the prosecution was barred by the First Amendment, but
he asked, "Is this then our freedom of religion?" 87
 As his italicized
"United States of America" and his reference to "our freedom of
religion" indicate, for Jefferson there was a freedom of religion for
Americans quite distinct from the question of whether state courts or
state law respected it. The privilege was distinct from the remedy for
its violation."
In this light, as a textual matter, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is clear and simple. The Ameri-
can privileges of free speech, press, petition, assembly and religion
(among others) would henceforth be legally protected, even if states
attempted to abrogate them. The years before the Civil War had proved
that the previous constitutional arrangement for protecting the privi-
leges was inadequate. The Fourteenth Amendment did not create new
85 Cf., 2 THE 111 LI, OF RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 1029. One might argue, to the contrary of
the understanding of "declaratory" set out above, that the absence of federal power over speech
or press was all that was being declared.
86
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to N.C. Dtdief (Apr. 19, 1814), in THOMAS JEFFERsoN,
WRITINGS 1334 (Library of America ed., 1984).
87 Id.
88 O n some occasions at least, Jefferson had a less protective view of libel of public officials
and thought. that while no federal remedy existed for such defamation, a remedy was available
at state law. See LEoNARD T EMERGENCE.—EVY, - HE    OF A FREE l'itcss 340-41 (1985).
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privileges. It created a new method of protecting old and inadequately
secured privileges.
The use of the words "privileges" and "immunities" as equivalent
to "rights in the Bill of Rights" and equivalent to denials of power is
so natural and reasonable that the Supreme Court has used the phrase
this way itself. It has done so even as it held that states could abridge
some supposedly non-"fundamental" rights—or "privileges or immuni-
ties" as the Court described them—in the Bill of Rights.
For example, some of the privileges or immunities in the Bill of
Rights, Justice Cardozo gravely explained in Palko v. Connecticut, 8" were
so fundamental that states had to obey them under the Due Process
Clause. Other privileges or immunities—at that time including jury
trial, double jeopardy and the privilege against self incrimination—
were less important, so states could disregard them. 9°
Raoul Berger has argued that a plain language argument is mean-
ingless because we deal with legal provisions, not "street terms!" If
one takes the idea of popular sovereignty seriously, this argument
cannot stand. The common understanding of words by ordinary peo-
ple should be at least part of what: counts, for it is their will, reflected
by framers and ratifiers, that ultimately legitimizes the Constitution.
Over the years I have asked a number of people who have not had
a legal education what the words "privileges or immunities" mean in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Almost all say that the privi-
leges of citizens of the United States that no state can abridge would
include rights in the Bill of Rights. Textual analysis suggests that many
Bill of Rights guarantees are also protected from state action by the
Due Process Clause.
Many guarantees of the Bill of Rights are process guarantees. They
tell what sort of process is "due" or required. Under a textual analysis,
the criminal procedure guarantees of the Bill of Rights (confrontation,
grand jury indictment, compulsory process to obtain witnesses, public
trial) are process guarantees that would be protected for all persons
under the Due Process Clause, as well as for all citizens under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 92
89 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
9" See id. at '326.
•1 Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, A Nine Lived
Cal, 42 011(0 Sr. L.J. 435, 436-37 (1981).
92 See Crosskey, supra note 62, at 6.
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b. Historical Linguistics
"Well," you may say, "you are using a dictionary copyrighted in
1991 to explicate a provision written in 1868. This, to say the least, is
a hit of an anachronism." Granted, but an older dictionary yields
similar results. 83
 But there is another answer, what Michael Conant calls
historic linguistics."
Consider the great documents in the history of liberty. From the
Levellers, through the Declarations of the Continental Congress,
through debates on whether the Constitution should have a bill of
rights, through the 1830s and up to the Civil War and during Recon-
struction debates, the word "privilege" or the words "privileges or
immunities" often appear as synonyms for rights of the sort found in
our Federal Bill of Rights. In the interest of time, I will list only three
of a great many examples. William Blackstone uses the words in this
way.95
 James Madison employs the word "privilege" this way in the
debate over the Bill of Rights: "The freedom of the press and rights of
conscience" are "choicest privileges of the people."`'" Later he describes
the Bill of Rights as "securing the rights and privileges of the people." 97
When Madison, in the debate over the Federal Bill of Rights, insists
that rights to free press, freedom of conscience, and to jury trial should
limit the states, he refers to these rights as "invaluable privileges.'" 8 In
1864 Congressman James Wilson, chair of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, complained that slavery had violated federal constitutional
rights. Among other outrages, it had "denied the privilege of free
discussion.'" The historic usage is congruent with the contemporary
usage.
"An 1851 law dictionary included, among other definitions of privilege, "a right peculiar
to sonic individual or 1.-,_dy." 2 A NEW LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 828 (1851).
94 Conant, Anti-monopoly, supra note 72; see also CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, St/pra
note 3, at 64-65 (exploring use by William Penn and Americans of the Revolutionary generation);
id. at 75-76 (exploring use of privileges and immunities by Blackstone to encompass liberties set
out in English antecedents of American Bill of Rights).
95 See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 74-76. For more use or historical
linguistics, see id. at 64-65. For application of the same methods to the Civil Rights Act, see, for
example, id. at 71-77.
96 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 1028.
97 id. at 1096.
"H Id. at 1033.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., lst Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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2. Contextual Analysis
As used here, a contextual analysis looks at the use of the same or
similar words elsewhere in the Constitution to illuminate how they are
used in the clause under consideration. When the Constitution seeks
to prevent states from abridging rights or privileges or immunities, how
does it do so elsewhere? It uses the "No state shall" form in Article I,
Section 10. "No state shall . . . pass any ex post facto law . . . ." So the
Fourteenth Amendment uses the very same language used by the
original Constitution to set limits on the states, and as Akhil Amar has
noted, uses the word "abridge" as used in the First Amendment, this
time applying it to states."'"
3. Precedent
The precedents of Barron v. Baltimore' and Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford102 provide an understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's pur-
poses. Barron held that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights did not
limit the states and that had the Framers intended such a limit they
would have prefaced the guarantees with the "no state shall" form.
John Bingham, primary drafter of Section 1, later explained that Bar-
ron provided his rationale and blueprint for using the "no state shall"
form."}3 Dred Scott held that all Americans of African origin were tainted
by slavery and could not be citizens of the United States. They were
entitled to none of the Constitution's rights or privileges. The drafters
designed the provisions that "[aill persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the
United States, and of the state wherein they reside" and that "[n]o state
shall make or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States" to overrule both aspects of Dred
Scott—that blacks could not be citizens and were entitled to no consti-
tutional privileges or rights—and also to overrule Barron's holding that
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights did not limit the states.'"
nin See CURTIS, No STATE SlIAI.I. ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 161; AII1111 1, supra note 62, at 1218,
1219-20.
101 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
112 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
I" See. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 161.
104 See Crosskey, supra note 62, at 4-6.
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4. History: Liberty and Equality
a. Bill of Rights Denials and Racial Discrimination
Two basic themes dominate the history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the themes are closely intertwined. The first was the prob-
lem of slavery and the status of the newly freed slaves. The second was
protection for civil liberties of American citizens. Slaves were not enti-
tled to guarantees of federal or state bills of rights, Indeed, according
to Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the Dred Scott case, even free blacks
suffered from the taint of slavery and could not be citizens of the
United States. Since all constitutional privileges, Taney said, including
rights in the Bill of Rights, belonged only to citizens, free blacks
received none of the protections for liberty set out in the Constitu-
tion. 105
Parallel to the citizenship, liberty, and equality problems of blacks
were the attacks on the civil liberties of whites who opposed slavery. As
we have seen, Southern state laws in effect made criticism of slavery a
crime. Republicans could not campaign in the South, and a Republi-
can campaign book produced indictments for Southerners who circu-
lated it and a North Carolina indictment for some Northern Repub-
licans who endorsed it. Endorsers of the book included over sixty
Republican congressmen. Among this group were members of the
Joint Committee who later reported the Fourteenth Amendment and,
notably, John Bingham, primary author of Section 1.'°'
Criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights were impor-
tant to Republicans because they had been targets of contemplated
Southern prosecutions. In this context, the suggestion that Repub-
licans who passed the Fourteenth Amendment planned to return lib-
erties like free speech and press, protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the privilege against self-incrimination, or the
immunity against cruel and unusual punishments to the unfettered
discretion of the semi-sovereign states appears very unlikely. It is par-
ticularly unlikely since those Republicans who framed the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly recognized the obvious—that state constitu-
tional guarantees for these rights could be changed from year to year. 1 "7
1 °5 Dred Scott, 50 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
106 See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 27-55; Curtis, The 1859 Crisis,
supra note 47, at 1143-45.
107 Senator Howard noted:
[The first eight amendments] do not come within the sweeping clause of the
Constitution authorizing Congress to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying
December 19961	 PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE	 29
Furthermore, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was pro-
posed, Congress had not required black suffrage, and it seemed that
Southern states might be readmitted after ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment. If so, Republicans recognized, Republican control of
Southern state governments would be doubtful at best. Guarantees of
liberty are always of crucial importance to those not in power, Many
Republicans suggested that under a proper interpretation, the Consti-
tution prohibited states from violating guarantees of the Bill of Rights
and other constitutional privileges even prior to the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and few, if any, challenged this interpreta-
tion. 1 "8
After the Civil War, Republicans in Congress complained that the
South was repeating its pre-Civil War assault on individual rights, in-
cluding free speech.'"" Both the prototype of the Fourteenth Amend-
out the foregoing or granted powers, but they stand simply as a bill of rights in the
Constitut ion without power on the part of Congress to give them full effect; while
at the same tittle the States arc not restrained from violating the principles CM-
braced in them except by their own local constitutions, which may be altered from
year to year. The great ottleet of the first section of this amendment is, therefore,
to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all tittles to respect these
great fundamental guarantees.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard); see CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, MPH/ note 3, at 88-99; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129
(1866) (statement. of Rep. Hotchkiss) (describing need firr constitutional amendment limiting
states and not. merely granting Congress legislative power).
Some Republicans did not embrace a uniformly libertarian interpretation of "freedom or
speech." During the Civil War Lincoln did exile a Democratic politician for making an anti-war,
anti-draft, anti-black speech, and in the immediate aftermath of the war, for example, General
Grant closed the Richmond Enquirer lor uttering disloyal sentiments. Lincoln insisted that wartime
was different and that such measures would not persist in peacetime. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON,
RAITLE CR4' OF FREEDOM: THE Clvll, WAR EitA 597-99 (1988); see also Lx Parte Mill igan, 71 U.S.
2 (1866); Cr eet. GLOBE, 39th Gettig., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (quoting
testimony of Major General Alfred H. Terry); CURTIS, No STATE SHALL AntuDGE, sutra note 3,
at 40.
108 See, e.g., Canals, No STATE S/ IA LI. ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at ch. 2.
109
 Petitions presented by lawmakers horn citizens demanded protection for rights of speech,
press, assembly, and the right to bear' arms. See CONG. GurriE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Sumner); id. at 494 (statement of Sen. Howard); see also id. at 402 (statement
of Rep, Baker) ("[Tfile American citizen shall no mote be degraded . . . by being required to
surrender his conscience as a peace-offering to . . all . . aristocracy of class."); id, at 1617
(statement or Rep. Moulton) (complaining of outrages against Union men and freedmen—
"id here is neither freedom of speech, of the press, or protection to life, liberty, or property . . . .");
id. at 1629 (statement of Rep. Hart) (insisting on need to ensure that rebel states have govern-
ment that respects guarantees in Rill of Rights); id. at 1837 (statement of Rep. Clarke) (proclaim-
ing need for "irreversible guarantees" of civil liberty including rights recognized and secured by
the Constitution). Representative Ward complained that freedom of speech in the South, as of
old, was a mockery. Id. at 783 (statement of Rep. Ward). For a Culler review, see Cuicris, No STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 34-91. Professor Fairman seems (grudgingly to be sure) to
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ment (which gave Congress power to secure privileges and immunities
and equal protection) and the final version (which contained an ex-
plicit limit on state power) were justified as keeping states within their
proper "orbits." The final version of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tected individual rights and secured equality. 110
Senator Howard spoke for the joint Committee that had produced
the amendment. He clearly said that the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States would include the rights in the Federal
Bill of Rights, "the first eight amendments of the Constitution," as he
put it.ffi Howard explained that the problem was that "these rights"—
most of which he read or paraphrased from the Federal Bill of Rights—
did not limit state legislation. States could violate the rights without
any restraint "except by their own constitutions which may be changed
from year to year."" 2
 The great object of Section 1 was to require the
states "at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees."" 3
Congressman Bingham wrote the crucial words of Section 1. He ex-
plained that it would allow Congress to protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of citizens and the inborn rights of persons
when the same were denied or abridged by any state, and he gave the
imposition of cruel and unusual punishments as an example of a
violation of the privileges of the citizen showing the need for the
amendment.'"
The main author of Section 1, then, and the senator who pre-
sented it to the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee, explicitly said
it was designed to require states to respect the liberties of American
citizens, including guarantees of the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of
speech. "5
 Protection for "all rights of citizens" and for liberty of speech
and press were often mentioned in the congressional election of 1866,
a sort of national referendum on the congressional plan for Recon-
struction, of which the Fourteenth Amendment was a centerpiece."'"
In the South, the newly freed slaves faced laws and ordinances
restricting their liberties—the Black Codes. They were denied the
acknowledge that freedom of speech was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Fairman opts
for selective incorporation in accordance with the Pal to approach. Fairman, The Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 62.
III'S& CURTIS, No STATE SIIALL ABRIDGE, Slip/ note 3, at 69.
111
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
112 /d. at 2766 (statement of Sen. Howard).
113 Id. (statement of Sen. Howard).
"4 Id. at 2542 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
115 1d. at 2765-66 (statement of Sen Howard); id. at 2542-43 (statement of Rep. Bingham);
see also CONG, GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
115 See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 131-53.
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rights to bear arms, to hold public meetings without prior approval, to
hold unauthorized religious services, etc. For violation of these provi-
sions they faced cruel punishments. 17 In addition, their freedom of
movement was limited and they were often denied the rights to testify
in cases to which whites were a party, to own property, to contract,
etc."" Both Unionists and blacks also faced private violence with politi-
cal purposes, just as opponents of slavery had faced private violence
before the Civil War. Indeed, many Republican complaints about vio-
lations of free speech involved mob action, not state action. While the
Black Codes have been cited as denying blacks equality, actually they
typically denied both liberty and equality, and many of them denied
Americans of African descent liberties referred to in the Bill of Rights.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 has figured prominently in discus-
sions of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and it figures
prominently in arguments against construing the Amendment as a
charter of national privileges that no state can abridge. It is also related
to claims for protection of economic liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. For those reasons, sections which follow will discuss the
Civil Rights Bill, arguments for it and its relation to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Then I will consider arguments—based on structure and
ethical considerations—for requiring states to obey fundamental privi-
leges such as those in the Bill of Rights. In the argument against such
application, I will look again at the debate surrounding the Civil Rights
Act. The discussion of the Civil Rights Act took place before final
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment and shows uncertainty on a
number of points. In general, it is consistent with reading the amend-
ment as encompassing privileges of citizens of the United States includ-
ing those in the Bill of Rights. When understood in terms of Republi-
can ideas, the Civil Rights Act, like the Fourteenth Amendment itself,
supports national guarantees for both liberty and equality.
b. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
One Republican response to the problem of the "Black Codes"
was the Civil Rights Act of 1866. After declaring persons born in the
country to be citizens, it continued:
Such citizens of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery ... shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
117 See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 279-81 (Wafter L. Fleming ed., 1906}.
1i
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enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and per-
sonal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens.''`'
One problem, of course, was exactly where in the Constitution
Congress found the power to pass this statute. It was a major departure
from the semi-sovereign state paradigm. Many Republicans argued that
allegiance and protection were reciprocal. Just as the nation could
claim the allegiance (and lives if necessary) of citizens, it had a duty
to protect citizens' rights.' 2 ' )
One more textual source of power was the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, seen by many Republicans as securing liberty to all citizens of
the United States and allowing Congress to remove badges and inci-
dents of slavery. 121 Democrats countered that many Northern states,
though they banned slavery, had discriminated against free blacks. The
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and others suggested that
the power to pass the law could be found in congressional power to
enforce the Bill of Rights, especially the Due Process Clause. Congress-
man James Wilson, Congressman William Lawrence, Senator Lyman
Trumbull and others also pointed to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2, but were met with the argument that it
applied only to give out-of-state visitors the rights a state generally
accorded to its own citizens. 122
119 Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added).
' 20 See Cow.. GunsE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson). See
generally Richard Aynes, Constitutional Responsibility and the Rig -hi Not to Be a Victim, 11 PEI.P. L.
REv. 63, 75-84 (1984).
121 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Seri. Trumbull).
122 See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL, ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 71-81; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1153 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer) (justifying Civil Rights Bill under power
of Congress ID enforce Bill of Rights, particularly Fifth Amendment); id. at 1833 (statement of
Rep. Lawrence) (asserting that Civil Rights Bill's rights arc incidental to Fifth Amendment right
to due process and suggesting Fifth Amendment as source of power to pass Civil Rights Bill); id.
at 1291 (statement of Rep, Bingham) (characterizing Civil Rights Bill as attempt to enforce
guarantees of Bill of Rights but going on to assert that constitutional amendment is necessary
for that purpose); id. at 1294 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (justifying Civil Rights Bill by power of
Congress to enforce Bill of Rights); id. at 1270 (statement of Rep. Kerr) (denying power of
Congress to pass Civil Rights Bill under its power to enforce Bill of Rights); id. at 474-75
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) (citing Article IV in conjunction with liberty protected by Thir-
teenth Amendment and Civil Rights Bill); id. at 1117-18 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (charac-
terizing Article 1V, Section 2 as guarantee of right. to liberty); id. at 1835-36 (statement of Rep.
Lawrence) (same); id. at 1269 (statement of Rep. Kerr) (denying power to pass Civil Rights Bill
under Article IV, Section 2).
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John Bingham pointed out that Barron held the Bill of Rights
amendments did not limit the states nor, he insisted, did the Constitu-
tion provide for congressional enforcement of the Bill of Rights against
state action. He insisted that a constitutional amendment was needed
to allow Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights by passing the Civil
Rights Bill.'" Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, but to be sure about
its power it also passed Bingham's protections in Section 1 and granted
congressional power to enforce them in Section 5. It then reenacted
the Civil Rights Bill after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'"
c. The Response of the Fourteenth Amendment to Threats to Equality
The Fourteenth Amendment dealt with the problem of equality
for Americans of African descent in two ways. Through the Equal
Protection Clause, it prohibited both many racially discriminatory laws
and racially discriminatory enforcement, as Senator Howard noted. 125
By making blacks citizens and guaranteeing all American citizens a
bundle of fundamental rights under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment ensured equality as to these rights.
(If every citizen gets the rights, then they are equal in that respect).
The guarantee of basic rights also provided a minimum standard of
rights for all Americans. In addition to protecting absolute rights, some
Republicans may have also read the original Privileges or Immunities
Clause as overlapping with the Equal Protection Clause—securing
some measure of equality at least with reference to fundamental inter-
ests under state law. v26
As to the application of "absolute" (used here as opposed to equal
but repealable) privileges of American citizens (including those in the
Bill of Rights) as a limit on state action, statements by leading Repub-
licans are relatively clear and crisp. 127 As to the nature of federal
protection of rights other than federal constitutional privileges or the
123 See. CONG. Gi.onr., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1093, 1291 (186(1) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
("1 am with him in an earnest desire to have the bill of rights in your Constitution enforced
everywhere."); id. at 1292 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (asserting lack of Congressional power
to pass the Civil Rights Bill—"1 have advocated here an amendment which would arm Congress
with power to ... punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights . . .").
124 See Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18 (1870).
125 Com;. CLom., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 08(16) (statement of Sen. Howard).
126
 Cf. Co e. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833-37 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence)
(interpreting Article IV, Section 2 prior to passage of Fourteenth Amendment).
127 At least this is so once one recognizes that many did not accept Supreme Court pro-
nouncements as a correct statement of the law.
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effect of those privileges on state law rights to hold property, contract
and testify, discussion in the Thirty-Ninth Congress is much less clear.
The problems revolve around rights that had been traditionally pro-
tected by state law and that were protected against discrimination by
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, such as the rights to contract and to testify.
The same areas of relatively greater clarity and uncertainty apply
to the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. To read it as pro-
tecting existing "absolute" constitutional rights or privileges of Ameri-
can citizens that states will no longer be permitted to abridge is a
relatively straightforward reading. To read it only (or partly) as a
protection of rights that states may fully eliminate is, as a purely textual
matter, less compelling, except to the extent that the clause incorpo-
rates other constitutional privileges or structural understandings that
produce this effect. I will consider the conundrum of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and state law rights
in a transitional section between arguments for and arguments against
application of absolute national privileges to the states.
5. Structure
Arguments from structure focus on a holistic analysis of the Con-
stitution—on how the Constitution must be construed to fulfill its
overall design and purpose.' 28 As we have seen, two models of consti-
tutional analysis rose out of the struggle over slavery. One was the
model of the constitutional compact designed to protect slavery. The
concept of the Constitution as a compact securing slavery required
strong, semi-sovereign states that were able to protect the peculiar
institution from political criticism. The other was a liberty model.
Federalism was an important value in the liberty model because it
contributed to liberty.' 29
 But under the liberty model, semi-sovereign
states needed to be restrained to keep them from destroying funda-
mental rights, like freedom of speech and freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures.'m
In accordance with the Declaration, a basic purpose of govern-
ment was to secure people their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit
128 See generally BLACK, supra note 67 (discussing structure and relationship as methods of
judicial interpretation). For a thoughtfill structural analysis of the problems raised by the post
Civil War amendments, see Murphy, supra note 54.
129 See, e,g., Cum:. Gi.oisE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham);
id. at 1832-33 (statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 1088 (statement of Rep. Woodbridge); id. at
app. 99 (statement of Rep. Yates); id. app. at 257 (statement of Rep. Baker); CURTIS, No STATE
SHALL. ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 42.
I"See Gowns, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 42.
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of happiness and their right to govern themselves. Keeping state gov-
ernment from destroying these values was therefore consistent with the
proper role of state governments and entirely consistent with federal-
ism. It did not undermine federalism to say that states could not do
what no government should do. 131
A basic purpose of the Constitution was to secure republican, or
representative, government. The Constitution specifically provides that
the United States "shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." 152 Laws like those of the Southern
states before the Civil War, which had made it a crime to advocate
peaceful legal change, were flatly inconsistent with the idea of repub-
lican government. Free speech is the system by which the people
consider issues, set the political agenda, reach consensus and decide
public policy. It is the essential means by which popular sovereignty is
effected. (Many Southerners, of course, read the constitutional guar-
antees for slavery as an implicit limit on the republican government
guarantee.)
The criminal procedure guarantees found in the Bill of Rights are
also safeguards for republican government. This is so because of the
unfortunate tendency of those in power to use the criminal justice
system in an attempt to crush their political enemies—as was seen in
the case of the Levellers, the Sedition Act prosecutions and the prose-
cutions for anti-slavery speech in the South before the Civil War. More
recently, the Watergate tapes showed that President Nixon had
planned prosecutions for his political enemies. 133 The motive for refus-
ing to apply the Bill of Rights and broader, vaguer liberties to the states
was also structural: a concern to preserve a version of federalism more
like the sort which existed before the Civil War.
6. Ethical Considerations
The Declaration of Independence appealed both to equality and
to basic rights. Indeed, protection of basic rights is essential for a
functioning representative government and to preserve human dig-
151 See id. at 41.
lss U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, g 4.
133j. ANTtioNY Lux As, NIGHTMARE,: THE UNDERSIDE. OE THE NIXON YEARS 490 (1976);
, JONATHAN SIIELL, THE TIME OF ILLUSION 188-92 (1975). It is worth recalling how we learned of
a Nixon White House burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office—a burglary designed to
get information to defame Ellsberg in the press so that he could be denied trial by an impartial
jury—all because Ellsberg let the public know what was in the Pentagon papers, We learned about.
it, at least in part, because of the exclusionary rule. See PrrEx SCHRAG, THE TEST of LOYAITY:
DANIEL ELLsBERG AND THE RITUALS or SECRET GOVERNMENT 329, 336 (1974).
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nity. The states' ability to eliminate such rights altogether for American
citizens (and the nation's inability to do anything about it) contra-
dicted the evolving ethical premise of the American nation.
D. The Conundrum of State Law Rights: What Was the Extent and
Nature of Protection for These Rights Under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Mare on the Civil Rights Act.
1. In General
At this point it is useful to return to a detailed discussion of the
Civil Rights Act. The Act is the focus of many arguments against
protection for absolute rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and
for a heightened federal protection for economic interests. The discus-
sion that follows is a natural transition between arguments for and
against application of absolute privileges as a limit on state power.
The nature of protection for state law rights of property and
contract under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment—as distinguished from the nature of the protection for
such rights under the Civil Rights Act or under the Equal Protection
Clause—is a difficult question. Typically, scholars who have attempted
to answer it have attempted to do so by looking at the Civil Rights Act
and the debates surrounding it, an act whose text and history are
somewhat different from Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment read
as a whole.
Many assume a correspondence between all the clauses of Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, on one hand, and the Civil Rights
Bill, on the other. They then attempt to move from that correspon-
dence to a full understanding of one of Section l's four clauses.
In reading what follows the reader should recall that many quoted
discussions are about the Civil Rights Bill, not the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The thesis advanced here
is simply that while most Republicans believed that racial discrimina-
tion in certain rights traditionally accorded by state law was not per-
missible, the pre-Fourteenth Amendment basis for this conclusion and
its relation to the subsequently enacted clause that protected privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States is a matter of consider-
able confusion. And this is so even though it is relatively clear that
leading Republicans believed that American citizens enjoyed "abso-
lute" rights including those in the Bill of Rights, and that these rights
would be among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States which no state may abridge.
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From a review of the Civil Rights Bill debate I will conclude that
Republicans believed in "absolute" rights that states should obey; that
they believed that racial discrimination in rights such as the right to
testify and to own property violated rights of American citizens of
African descent; and that they wished to protect a large role for the
states on matters like property, contract and testimony—provided that
racial, caste or similar discrimination would not be allowed. Republi-
can understanding of the relation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of Article IV to contract and property rights of persons who
were residents of a state is not clear. Many later read the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to outlaw racial and similar discrimination—including dis-
crimination in substantive rights such as the right to hold property.
Finally, many were entirely unwilling to totally federalize questions
such as the right to hold property or to make contracts. For all these
reasons, I conclude that locating the protection against racial and
similar discrimination as to substantive rights under state law in the
Equal Protection Clause, as the court has done, makes a good bit of
sense and there is little reason to switch anti-discrimination analysis to
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I
also conclude that while there is some support for a federal right to
hold property, testify, etc. in the debates, federalization of state prop-
erty or contract law was not supported by many who voted for the
Fourteenth Amendment. For many leading sponsors of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the equality to be guaranteed was limited, in the same
sense that it did not inhibit broad state power to classify on what. today
we see as non-suspect grounds.
While clear and crisp statements by a number of leading Repub-
licans indicated that states were obligated to respect fundamental ab-
solute privileges of American citizens, including those in the Bill of
Rights, the discussion is less clear as to the breadth of those protected
rights (beyond, for example, liberties explicit in the constitutional
text). The discussion is also less clear about the impact of the recogni-
tion of federally secured rights on federalism. To the extent that a
limited group of rights was secured, restriction of state power would
be correspondingly limited. To the extent that the Constitution di-
rectly guaranteed citizens the rights to life, liberty and property and
these rights were both broadly interpreted and interpreted as "abso-
lute," then Congress might essentially eliminate state power with pre-
empting federal laws. (There was no Republican consensus in favor of
such an approach.) John Bingham, for example, read an implicit
guarantee of equal protection into the Due Process Clause but con-
cluded that the equality required was limited and did not upset many
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state classifications dealing with property—such as the rights of mar-
ried women.
To confuse the picture further, before the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Republicans often said both that the national
government could protect the life, liberty and property of the citizen,
and that matters of contract and property were essentially state law
matters, subject to the reservation that states could not discriminate
based on race or national origin in granting such rights.' 34
 The idea
that property and contract were primarily state law matters repre-
sented, in the view of many Republicans, not a simple congressional
policy choice, but a desirable constitutional mandate. The idea that
economic liberties are part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that federal court scrutiny of regulations impacting
such liberties would typically be quite permissive, would also be con-
sistent with how many Republicans viewed the matter.
Some assume a total identity between rights in the Civil Rights Bill
read as only a right to equality under state law, certain rights under
state law, the Article IV Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Four-
teenth Amendment's protections for privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States. In fact, things are much more complex.
2. Some Arguments Republicans Made for the Civil Rights Bill and
Discussions of Article IV, Section 2
Senator Trumbull managed the Civil Rights Bill in the Senate. He
referred to the discriminatory Black Codes and said, "The purpose of
the [Civil Rights] Bill ... is to destroy all these discriminations and to
carry into effect the [Thirteenth] . . . amendment."'" He then said
that Congress could enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by securing
liberty to the slave.'" "[A]ny statute which is not equal to all, and which
deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens,
is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of
servitude."'" A law that did not allow a "colored person to hold prop-
141 Carrepare CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1837 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence),
with id, at 1151-55 (statement of Rep. Thayer), and id. at 1294 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
"Now, Mr. Speaker, if this section did in fact assume to confer or define or regulate these civil
rights, which are named by the words contract, sue, testify, inherit, &c.. then it would, as seems
to me, be an assumption of the reserved rights of the States and people." Id. at 1293 (statement
of Rep. Shellabarger).
195 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
136 Id. (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
197 Id. (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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erty, to teach, does not allow him to preach is certainly a law in violation
of the rights of a freeman" and could be declared void under the
Thirteenth Amendent. 138
Trumbull proceeded to consider the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2, which he identified with protecting
migrants from other states in liberty and in "fundamental rights which
belong to every free person."m Native born citizens of the state, Trum-
bull insisted, were much more entitled to these rights. 14" Rights of states
were not invaded by the Civil Rights Bill because states which did not
discriminate against nonwhite citizens as to the right to acquire prop-
erty, to come and go at leisure, to enforce rights in the courts, and to
inherit, etc., would be unaffected by these provisions."' "Each state,"
he said, "so long that it does not abridge the great fundamental rights
belonging under the Constitution, to all citizens, may grant or with-
hold such rights as it pleases. "142
Trumbull said he had cited cases under Article IV to show what
were "rights of a citizen of the United States," including the right to
liberty and to contract, to hold property and to maintain court actions.
Ele admitted the decisions were limited to the rights that a citizen "in
one state has on going into another State, and not to the right of the
citizens belonging to the State." 143 But he thought that because judicial
decisions under the Privileges or Immunities Clause had held "that the
rights of citizens of the United States were certain great fundamental
rights such as the right to life, to liberty, and to avail one's self of the
laws passed for the benefit of the citizen to enable him to enforce his
rights," that these rights would pertain to African-Americans made
citizens pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.' 44 The argument for
equality in the right to contract, hold property and testify is sometimes
more structural than bound to a particular clause, with particular
clauses often being used to explicate the underlying structure of equal-
ity. Equality can be produced either by a guarantee of equality or by
"absolute" rights, which are by their nature available to all—though
the degree of judicial protection could vary dramatically depending
on the nature of the right.
130 Id. at 475 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
1 " Id. at 474 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
140 GONG, GLotte, 39th Gong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
141 See id. at 475-76 (statement of Sen. Trumbull),
142
 Id. at 1760 (statement. of Sen. Trumbull).
143 Id, at 600 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
144 Id. (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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3. The Bill of Rights as Providing Power to Pass the Civil Rights Bill
Congressman James Wilson managed die Civil Rights Bill in the
House. He indicated that the Bill's prohibitions turned on racial dis-
crimination.'` 5 He justified passage of the Bill under the Thirteenth
Amendment."" If the state would practice the constitutional declara-
tion of Article IV, Section 2's Privileges or Immunities Clause and
enforce it as meaning the right to protection of the government, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, and the protections set out in Garfield,
there would be no need for the Civil Rights Bill."' Wilson had pre-
viously interpreted Article IV, Section 2's Privileges and Immunities
Clause to include freedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. 1 '8 He believed the rights in the Civil Rights Bill
were encompassed or implied in the rights to life, liberty and property
in the Federal Bill of Rights together with the rights necessary to make
those rights meaningful. He insisted Congress could enforce guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights, specifically, the Due Process Clause, and that
such power justified the Civil Rights Bill. 149
"[C]itizens of the United States, as such," Wilson insisted, "are
entitled to certain rights . . . [and] being entitled to those rights it is
the duty of the Government to protect citizens in the perfect enjoy-
ment of them."'"" He emphatically denied that "the little state of Dela-
ware has a hand stronger than the United States; that revolted South
Carolina may put under lock and key the great fundamental rights
belonging to the citizen, and we must be dumb; that our legislative
power cannot be exercised; that our courts must be closed to the
appeal of our citizens." 151
What are the great civil rights to which the first section of the
[Civil Rights] bill refers? I find in the bill of rights which the
gentleman [John Bingham] desires to have enforced by an
amendment to the Constitution that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." I understand that these constitute the civil rights belong-
ing to the citizens in connection with those which are neces-
145 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1St Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
146 M. (statement of Rep. Wilson).
147 See id. at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilson),
148 CONC, GLom, 38th Cong., lot Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
meow.. GunsE, 39111 Cong., lot Sess. 1294 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
150 a (statement of Rep. Wilson).
151 Id. (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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sary for the protection and maintenance and perfect enjoy-
ment of the rights thus specifically named, and these are the
rights to which this bill relates, having nothing to do with
subjects submitted to the control of the several States.'" 2
Representative Lawrence also cited the Due Process Clause from
the Bill of Rights to establish the existence of "certain absolute rights
which pertain to every citizen . . . and of which a State cannot consti-
tutionally deprive him."''3 There were incidental rights necessary to the
enjoyment of "absolute" rights—such as the right to make and enforce
contracts and to have the benefits of laws for the security of person
and property. He cited the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2 for the proposition that "citizens of each State" if they
remove from one state to another "'shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens' of the United States 'in the' State to which
they remove."'" From this Lawrence concluded that "fundamental civil
privileges" were "equal for all citizens." 1 "5 For Lawrence and Wilson,
the equality guaranteed by the Civil Rights Bill derived from equal
entitlement of citizens to certain "absolute" rights—like due process—
which the state must respect and cannot abrogate, from the fact that
certain rights such as the right to testify are incidental to such rights
and from the fact that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Article
IV implied equality in fundamental rights among citizens. Lawrence
and Wilson read Article IV, Section 2 to support the equality of rights
for blacks. For example, for people of different colors, there are certain
rights states could not abrogate for anyone, like due process, and
certain incidental rights they could not totally deny like the right to
testify and bring court actions. Whether the equality conies from the
national nature of the right shared by all or from a mere guarantee of
equality is not always clear, but for Lawrence, Wilson and others the
former seems, at least in part, to be the case. Leading Republicans
often suggested that the degree of permissible state regulation of
economic rights and other state law rights was large and federal judicial
scrutiny quite limited, but some invasions of such rights—like those
based on color—were so unreasonable as to he impermissible. In this
respect, the views of these Republicans are similar to current law.
Denying Americans of African descent the right to testify and
bring court actions denies due process in its most basic sense—the
152 Id. (statement of Rep. Wilson),
153 Id. at 1833 (statement. of Rep. Lawrence).
154 Comi. GttmE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866) (statement or Rep. Lawrence).
155 Id. (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
42	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 38:1
right to invoke the protection of the laws, a right long associated with
due process or its earlier equivalent, the law of the land clause of the
Magna Carta.' 56
 In 1859, Congressman Bingham had objected to the
admission of the Oregon Territory as a state because its constitution
excluded free blacks from the state and denied them the right to sue
in the courts of the state. This, Bingham had insisted, violated the right
to "'privileges or immunities of citizens in the several states.' Not to
the rights and immunities of the several States, not to those constitu-
tional rights and immunities which result exclusively from State legis-
lation; but to 'all privileges and immunities' of citizens of the United
States in the several States." 157
 As American citizens, the persons ex-
cluded from Oregon were entitled to "all the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, amongst which are the rights to life,
liberty and property, and their due protection in the enjoyment thereof
by law."' 5" Still, while Republicans made statements about federal power
to protect life, liberty and property, several suggested that for Congress
to define the right to testify or hold property, as opposed to prohibiting
discrimination in these matters, would invade the rights of the states.' 5"
Speeches like those of Representative Lawrence, Senator Trum-
bull and Representative Wilson are often difficult to understand. These
men were lawyers, making a legal as well as a political case. But in
attempting to secure liberty and equality for Americans of African
descent, they faced difficulties. Some questions presented by the Civil
Rights Bill, Representative Wilson candidly noted, "are not entirely free
from difficulties. Precedents are in sharp conflict concerning them."
The old view of the semi-sovereign state, their own adherence to fed-
eralism and a mass of judicial precedent all raised obstacles which were
particularly acute with reference to property law, rules of evidence and
other matters traditionally within the sphere of the states. Precedent
also blocked the way for protecting Bill of Rights liberties against states.
Representative Lawrence relied on Article IV, Section 2 to establish the
equal rights to testify, contract, etc., rights he seems to relate to the
Due Process Clause. But he cited James Kent, who says that if citizens
"remove from one State to another they are entitled to the privileges
156 See id. at 1292; CONG. Cri.oliE, 35th Cong,, 2d Sets. 984 (1859) (statement of Rep.
Bingham); Steven Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE U. 507, 558-59 (1991).
157
 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
158
 See id. (tenement of Rep. Bingham).
' 59 See, e.g„ CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabteger).
' 0 ' Id. at 1115 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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that persons of the same description are entitled to in the State to
which the removal is made." 161 The language from Kent raised poten-
tial problems for Lawrence. For example, might not color be within
Kent's qualification that a migrant was only afforded rights accorded
to people of the same description? Lawrence insisted that permissible
distinctions included age, sex and insanity, but not color. John Bing-
ham expressed similar ideas in his discussion of the prototype of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which allowed Congress to pass laws to secure
equal protection in life, liberty and property. Equal protection, Bing-
ham thought, was implicit in the Due Process Clause. Still, Bingham
assumed that the mass of state law property distinctions, including
those disadvantaging married women, could not be disturbed, but that
racial discrimination could be reached." 12
4. Confusion and Clarity
It is hardly surprising that the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not fully resolve all these difficulties—protection against
discrimination for African-Americans, securing constitutional liberties
to all Americans that states could not abridge, preserving the role of
the states from total absorption by the federal government, and pro-
viding a neat explanation of how all this was to be done. They had
done quite a lot in a few years. They abolished slavery, secured a strong
measure of equality for Americans of African descent, and protected
some basic constitutional liberties from state denial. They left some
problems to the future—such as a theory of how the major objectives
could be accomplished consistent with their determination to protect
the basic role of the states with reference to many common law rights.
The neat explanation suggested by some scholars that Republicans
preserved federalism by fashioning the Privileges or Immunities Clause
to protect against discrimination but not to secure any "absolute" rights
that states could not abridge is one possible solution to the conun-
drum. But it is not one that fits the goals or statements of leading
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress or that has strong support in
the historical record or in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Lawyers and judges must address the problems of individual rights,
discrimination and federalism—recognizing that while many value
16 i Id. at 1835 (statement or Rep. Lawrence).
ai2 See id. (statement of Rep. Lawrence). For Bingham on property, due process and equal
protection, see id. at 1089 (statement or Rep. Bingham). For Stevens, see id. at 1064 (statement
of Rep. Stevens).
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choices have been made by the framers, a resolution of all tensions is
itself a value choice they did not make. There is no "only equality"
lowest common denominator for the Privileges or Immunities Clause
that accurately reflects the understanding of most of the framers. Nor
is there any interpretation that can easily reconcile all the views Re-
publicans expressed in the Thirty-Ninth Congress on questions such
as the right to contract and own property.
But while some things are quite murky, others are comparatively
clear. It is hardly surprising that immediately after the Civil War the
nation, guided by the Republican party, chose the liberty model of
the Constitution—federalism bounded by nationally guaranteed basic
rights plus a guarantee of equality—over the semi-sovereign state
model of a pro-slavery compact. Nor is it surprising that the Republi-
cans rejected the alternative of a unitary government with the states
immediately or potentially reduced to administrative units of the cen-
tral government. Nor is there any indication of a plan to vest federal
courts with generally supervisory power over all state social and eco-
nomic legislation. Both slavery and the extreme version of states' rights
were in bad repute after the carnage of the Civil War, and most
Republicans still saw an improved federal system as protecting liberty.'"
E. Arguments Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the
States—The Amendment as Only a Guarantee of Equality
There are three basic arguments against incorporation of the Bill
of Rights, and other guarantees of liberty, as limits on the states under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
L The Mere Equality or Anti-Discrimination Reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause: A Contextual Argument
The first argument is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment were intended only to guarantee equality
in whatever basic rights a state chose to give or withhold. By this view,
states could abridge free speech so long as they did so equally for all.
The best argument for this position is one that relies on a contex-
tual argument plus precedent. The phrase "privileges and immunities"
appears in Article IV, Section 2. That clause, by the current orthodox
view and by a widely held view in 1866, merely guaranteed out-of-staters
163 See id. at 1825, 18311, 2526, app. at 144; CURTIS, No STATE SHALL AHRIDGE, supra note 3,
at 41.
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equality of fundamental interests with in-staters. Fundamental interests
are much broader than explicit constitutional guarantees of liberty and
include the right to pursue the common occupations of life, to contract
and to own property. By this proposed reading, the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required equality in
fundamental interests and rights that had their source in state law. But
states could eliminate the rights so long as they did so for whites as
well as blacks.
Many Republicans rejected a mere equality reading of Article IV,
Section 2. These insisted on a reading of the original Privileges or
Immunities Clause much like the one I suggest as the proper reading
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause—as
including privileges and immunities explicit in the text. Some also
apparently believed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Article
IV encompassed a larger and less textual body of fundamental rights
and interests belonging to citizens of the United States and which states
could not simply eliminate. Some emphasized that the Constitution
envisioned equality in basic state law rights to be enjoyed by all similarly
situated citizens, though not all agreed on the textual source of' the
right to equality. As to the state law rights to own property and to con-
tract, a measure of equality was required. As Representative Lawrence
put it, "equality of civil rights is the fundamental rule that pervades
the Constitution and controls all state authority." 164 Though sonic dis-
crimination in connection with such rights was permitted, discrimina-
tion based on race, national origin or religion was not.'"5
164 CONG. GI,011E, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
165 See id. at 1835 (statement of Rep. Lawrence). On the issue of absolute and anti-discrimi-
nation rights, see CONu. GLOBE, '39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1629 (1866); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1202, 2290, 1369 (1864); GONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong.. 241 Sess. 982-84 (1859). See Cr4.)sskey,
supra note 62, at I 1-20; Curtis, A Reply to Professor Berge?, supra note 3, at (10-64; ,see also CONG.
GLOISF., 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1832-35 (1866) (noting that Civil Rights Act left questions of
regulation of property and testimony to suite law "subject only to the limitation that there are
some inherent and inalienable rights, pertaining to every citizen, which cannot be abolished or
abridged by State constitutions or laws"). Many Republicans apparently interpreted Article IV,
Section 2 as guannueeing some absolute rights and !nit simply equality in rights stales chose 14)
allow to citizens. See, e.g., CONG. Gtoim, 39th Cong., 1st SOS. 1117-18 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Wilson). Wilson, however, emphasized that the Civil Rights Bill was aimed at guaranteeing equality
of rights to blacks. Id. (statement of Rep. Wilson). Some Congressmen, no doubt, 1 -earl Article
IV, Section 2 more conventionally as limited to protection of out-of-staters from discrimination.
Senator Trumbull assumed that American citizens had absolute rights which states could not take
away, "the right to personal security, the right of personal liberty, arid the right to acquire and
enjoy property" and that "these [rights] are declared to be inalienable rights, he longing to every
citizen of the United States, as such, no matter where he mity be," Id. at 1757 (statement or Sen.
Trumbull). Still, Trumbull also emphasized that "[Olds [Civil Rights] bill in no matter interferes
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By the "equality only" view, the Fourteenth Amendment's Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause guaranteed in-state citizens equality only
in those fundamental interests under Article IV, Section 2 which pre-
viously a state could not deny to out-of-staters if it granted them to its
own residents—such as the right to contract, own property and insti-
tute court actions in state courts. Equality, by this view, was secured to
those within the state. The state could deny rights provided it denied
them to all its residents.
I find this argument unsatisfactory as a full explanation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Republicans were deeply concerned about
denials of free speech, both those before the Civil War and those they
saw recurring during Reconstruction. The orthodox reading of Article
with the municipal regulations of any State which protects all alike in the rights of person and
property. It could have no operation in ... most States of the Union." Id. at 176! (statement of
Sen. Trumbull). Representative Lawrence insisted:
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right to personal security,
personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These are rights of
citizenship, As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there are others, as the
right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy property, and to
share the benefit of laws for the security of person and property.
Id. at 1833 (statement of Rep. Lawrence). States could deprive citizens of these rights by prohibi-
tory laws or by failure to protect the citizen. See id. (statement of Rep. Lawrence). The examples
of deprivations given by Lawrence included invidious class based discrimination, for example,
against naturalized citizens. Id. (statement of Rep. Lawrence). Lawrence suggested that the
question of direct national power to punish offenses against liberty was a question for another
day. Id. at 1835 (statement of Rep. Lawrence). He insisted that "Congress has the incidental power
to enforce and protect the equal enjoyment in the States of civil rights which are inherent in
national citizenship." Id. (statement of Rep. Lawrence). Lawrence read Article IV as protecting
some limdamental rights, though he cited a commentary indicating it secured "to citizens who
remove from one state to another . . . the privileges that persons of the same description are
entitled to in the State to which remora] is made." Id. (statement of Rep. Lawrence). Distinctions
of "sex, age, insanity, &c., arc recognized as modifying conditions and privileges, but mere race
or color, as among citizens, never can.' Id. (statement of Rep. Lawrence). Constitutional privileges
were of two kinds—"those that arose from state law and those ... inherent in every citizen of the
United States." Id. at 1836 (statement of Rep. Lawrence). Senator Trumbull denied that the Civil
Rights Bill consolidated power and took it from the states. Id. at 475-76 (statement of Sen.
Trumbull). It prohibited discrimination in the right to contract, hold property, etc. He admitted
that cases under Article IV, Section 2 related entirely to "rights a citizen in one State has in going
into another state, and not to the rights of citizens belonging to the State." Id. (statement of Sen.
Trumbull). He insisted, however, that such rights were a reasonable way of ascertaining the right
to freedom secured to slaves under the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 600 (statement of Sen.
Trumbull). In short, he seems to have believed that after the Thirteenth Amendment a state
could not secure fundamental interests of the Article [V, Section 2 sort to its own citizens but
deny them to blacks. The liberty of the Thirteenth Amendment secured the same sort of equality
to blacks that Article IV, Section 2 secured to out-of-staters. Today Article IV leaves states with
broad power to classify citizens even if those classifications affect fundamental interests. But the
classification can not be based on the fact that the person excluded from protection came from
out of state.
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IV guaranteed equality in certain basic rights and interests to classes of
persons—in-staters and out-of-staters. But a state, by the equality argu-
ment, could deny basic rights if it denied them to all residents of the
state also.
In the South, the ideal solution to the problem of speech about
slavery was compelled silence. Although the slave holding elite pre-
ferred that no one discuss the problem, the next best thing was to
punish antislavery expression. Those solutions, of course, treat in-stat-
ers and out-of-staters alike—no one can talk about the issue or engage
in antislavery speech. They also treat all in-state residents equally in
the sense that none can engage in the forbidden conduct. None can
engage in antislavery speech. Silencing antislavery speech is formally
equal for both whites and blacks—neither can attack slavery.
Of course, by another understanding, free speech could often he
squeezed into an anti-discrimination analysis. If one defines those who
want to talk about slavery and those who do not want any discussion
of slavery as the two classes, a general law prohibiting discussion of
slavery that applies to all citizens is in fact discriminatory. But the
primary Republican complaint was not simply about discrimination. It
was about the denial of the precious American right to free speech and
press.
2. A Second Textual and Contextual Argument: Reading "Abridge"
in Section 1 to Mean "Discriminate with Reference to." This
Reading is Allegedly Compatible with the Use of "Abridge" in
Section 2
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.' 66 One
argument that could support a mere equality reading of the amend-
ment focuses on the words "abridge" and "privileges or immunities."
This argument is that "abridge" means only to discriminate with refer-
ence to race or caste. So, racial discrimination with reference to free
speech would be an abridgement, but, a generally applicable state
denial of free speech or infliction of cruel or unusual punishments
would not be an abridgment. A privilege or immunity by such a reading
is basically a right created by the state with respect to certain funda-
mentals: the right to contract, to own property, to freedom of move-
ment, etc. But the state, the argument goes, could eliminate the right
altogether. So, by this reading, what the Fourteenth Amendment is
U.S. Coms-r. amend. XIV, §
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really saying is that no state may discriminate on certain proscribed
bases with reference to certain fundamental matters which are other-
wise entirely within the control of the states. To the extent that this is
proposed as the exclusive reading of the word "abridge," it is a rather
odd way to read the words, "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States."
A model of this meaning of "abridge," the argument could con-
tinue, would be the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment
which provides:
when the right to vote [for President or Vice President, Mem-
bers of Congress, state executives, judges, or legislators] .
is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state [who
are United States citizens and twenty-one or older] . 	 or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be re-
duced in the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-
one years of age in such State. 167
The right to vote appears to be a "right whose substance is under
the states' control,"'" so this seems to be an example of a right the
state could totally abrogate but not "abridge."
The historical context of Section 2 provides the classic instance of
abridgment: restriction based on race .... The concept of abridg-
ment reflects the Republican notion of equality, which distinguishes
between laws that set out the content of rights and laws that take
rights away from a class of individuals. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of abridgement [sic] depends on the distinctions
between laws that define rights and laws that determine who shall
have them, such as a Black Code.'"
157 	§ 2 (emphasis added).
L65 Harrison, supra note 3, at 1420. Although 1 cite Mr. Harrison in connection with this
argument, the argument set out is not intended to be identical to the one that he makes. Mr.
Harrison's argument may amount to no more than saying a right may be diminished or abridged
when it conies from the state legislature and can be repealed by it, and that the reduction of (for
example) the right to contract for blacks would abridge the right. Rights like free speech that
come from the Federal Constitution and are not subject to state legislative repeal, could also be
abridged by caste legislation: one might give African-Americans more constricted free speech
rights than whites. In short an "absolute" right could be abridged by caste legislation as well as
by shrinking the right for everyone, as was the case with Southern laws passed before the Civil
War against anti-slavery speech.
169 Id. at 1421.
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It is worth noting some qualification to this insight. Since the
United States "shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republi-
can form of Government," 170 it is doubtful that the states were free to
take the right to vote away from everyone. Many Republicans in 1866
denied that states had such a right. 171
Nor was the penalty for abridging the right to vote under Section
2 triggered only by racial discrimination or caste legislation. If a state
denied African-American males the right to vote, the representation of
that state in the House would be reduced proportionally. In that case,
exclusion from the right to vote would be based on caste legislation.
But almost any other basis for exclusion, from illiteracy to property
qualifications to random selection, was penalized as well. States were
not left to regulate the right to vote free from penalty: almost all
limitations of manhood suffrage would trigger a penalty.
Nor is it clear that the penalty under Section 2 would not be
triggered by total elimination of the right to vote. Suppose that, for
example, a state abolished its state legislature and legislative elections.
Suppose, instead, it placed the legislative function with the President
of the state university who should choose "his" successor. There is a
powerful argument that the state would then lose its representation in
the House, because the right to vote has been denied to all males
twenty-one years of age and older. A penalty triggered by the denial of
the right to any seems triggered by the denial of the right to all. The
interpretation is inconvenient because it would mean that the demo-
cratic rights of 1866 were a floor below which states could not fall. It
is hard to evaluate as a matter of history because blatant violations of
Section 2 have been systemically ignored throughout American history.
But it is a natural reading of the text.
The term "abridge," in Section 2 then did not merely mean dis-
criminate in reference to caste. "Abridge," according to Senator
Howard, was simply an intensive form of the prohibition of any denial,
so the concept reached partial denials as well as total denials.
A State in the exercise of its sovereign power over the ques-
tion of suffrage might permit one person to vote for a mem-
ber of the State's Legislature, but prohibit the same person
from voting for a Representative in Congress. That would be
an abridgement [sic] of the right of suffrage; and that per-
17" U.S. CoNsT. art. 1V, § 4.
171 See, e.g., CONG. Giamw, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
"[S]uffrage is a political right which has been left under the control of the several States, subject
to the action of Congress only when it becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of a republican
form of government." Id. at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilton).
50	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 Wok. 118:1
son would be included in the exclusion, so that the repre-
sentation from the state would be reduced in proportion to
the exclusion of the persons whose rights were thus
abridged.' 72
Some African-Americans and whites might be permitted to vote
because they met an educational test that applied to all voters. Others,
unable to pass the test, might be excluded. In that case, the state would
be penalized by reduced representation only as to those blacks (and
whites) who could not vote because they could not pass the test. One
might see such an arrangement as defining the content of the right to
vote, a right limited by literacy, or as excluding certain individuals—the
illiterate.
Section 2 limits reduction of suffrage (a right created by state law
or by an interaction of state law and the Federal Constitution), to a
right specifically identified as the right to vote. As a general rule, to
remain free of the penalty of reduced representation, states could not
deny the right to males over twenty-one nor could they abridge the
right. "Abridge" meant reduce by almost any means, not just by caste
discrimination.
So in Section 2, as in the First Amendment, "abridge" meant
diminish or lessen. Such a meaning of "abridge" is consistent with an
absolute prohibition in Section 1 against state legislation that denied
or abridged liberties such as free speech. Differences in Sections 1 and
2 do not turn on different meanings of the word "abridge."
3. A Mere Equality Argument from History: Statements by Framers
and Arguments from the Civil Rights Act
A third mere equality argument against treating liberties in the
Bill of Rights as limiting the states is historical. By this view, the evil the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was designed to prohibit was discrimi-
nation against blacks in rights to contract, give evidence, own property,
etc.—the rights in the Civil Rights Act read narrowly. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment merely reiterated the protections of the Civil
Rights Act, narrowly understood.
a. Problems with the Argument Based on the Civil Rights Act
This argument ignores the catch-all phrase in the Civil Rights Act
giving all citizens "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
L 72 /d. at 2767 (statement of Sen. Howard).
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for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens."'" It fails to note that the phrase "laws for the security of person
and property" can be and often had been used to cover constitutional
liberties as well as common law or statutory rights. It had been used in
Dred Scott and elsewhere as a shorthand summary of Bill of Rights
liberties.' 74
 Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment cited Chancellor
Kent for the proposition that the inalienable rights of citizens included
the right to personal security, the right to personal liberty and the right
to acquire and enjoy property. Kent explicitly equated the right to
personal security and liberty with many guarantees included in bills of
rights, rights he describes as "privileges." For Kent, many of these rights
were enshrined in state law and in the Federal Constitution. In the
1827 edition of his Commentaries, Kent noted that "[t] he right of
personal security is guarded by provisions which have been transcribed
into the constitutions of this country from Magna Carta, and other
fundamental acts of the English Parliament, and it is enforced by
additional and more precise injunctions."'" Kent proceeded to list
guarantees such as grand jury indictment, the protection against dou-
ble jeopardy, the provision that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself, and the guarantees of speedy and public trial,
confrontation, compulsory process, right to counsel, and against ex
post facto laws. Kent explicitly noted the dual nature of laws and
provisions for the security of person: "[T] he personal security of every
citizen is protected from lawless violence, by the arm of government,
and the terrors of the penal code; and . . . it is equally guarded from
unjust and tyrannical proceedings on the part of government itself, by
the provisions to which we have referred." 176
The argument that the Civil Rights Act's guarantee of full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
1 " 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1094).
174
 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at. 449-50; CuR-ris, No STATE Sf1A1.1, ABRIDGE, ,cupra note 3, at 72. In
Dred Scott, Taney noted that Congress could make no law respecting the establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech and of the press, or
the right to bear arms. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 449. These powers, he said, limit the power of the
federal government over the "person or property" of the citizen:
'These powers, and others, in relation to rights of person . . . are in express and
positive terms, denied to the General Government; and the rights of private prop-
erty have been guarded with equal care. Thus the rights of property are united with
the rights of person, and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to
the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
Id. at 450.
175 2 p.m Es KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 9-11 (1827).
176 Id. at l 1; see CuNG. Groux, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson)
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excludes the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and is limited to rights
under state law disregards the fact that many Republicans thought,
contrary to Barron v. Baltimore, that a correct reading of the Constitu-
tion made liberties in the Bill of Rights a limit on the states even before
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 77 The argument for limiting
the Fourteenth Amendment to equality under state law also entirely
ignores the suppression of free speech and other civil liberties in the
South before the Civil War. And most of all, it misses the fact that
virtually identical language appeared in the Freedman's Bureau Bill
and that an amendment adding "including the constitutional right of
bearing arms" to "full ... benefit of laws for the security of person and
property" was accepted by Senator Trumbull, the sponsor of the bill,
with the remark that it did not change the meaning of the phrase. 178
The point is simply this: we know that many Republicans thought
that under the proper construction of the Federal Constitution states
were or should be limited by the provisions of the Federal Bill of
Rights. We know that Bill of Rights liberties were often described as
provisions for the security of person and property. At the very least, for
many Republicans, references to full protection under laws for the
security of persons and property would include Bill of Rights liberties.
For example, Senator Dixon, a Republican from Connecticut who
eventually broke with the party over its failure to more promptly re-
store the rebellious states, said:
One Congress cannot bring about the millennium . . . For
this time we have reason to be content; for we have put down
armed resistance to the laws, and Congress has given us, in
the civil rights act, a guarantee for free speech in every part
of the Union. It is our own fault if, having thus secured the
right to argue, we do not enlighten prejudice and mere op-
position, and show that equal liberty is the best for all. 179
(citing 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 199): id. at 1757 (statement of Sen,
Trumbull) (also citing Chancellor Kent); Robert Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in
the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.V.U. L. REv. 863, 923, 932 (1986).
177 See CURTIS, No STATESUIALL ABRIDGE, Supra note 3, at 49-56; see also 21 Hum, LAw
FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 292, 342, 352-53 (photo. reprint 1968) (1858-
62); Kaciorowski, supra note 174, at 932.
7N See Cuwris, No STATE SHALL AtutinGE, supra note 3, at 72, 104.
175
 CONC. Gt.ottE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2332 (1866) (statement of Sen. Dixon); cf id. al 2465
(statement of Rep. 'Mayer); id. at 2468 (statement of Rep. Kelly) (suggesting that provisions of
Section 1—which include requiring states to accord due process—may already be in Constitu-
tion); td. at 2539 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth) (suggesting that all provisions in Section 1
except equal protection are in Constitution already, which would include Due Process Clause as
a limit On states).
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It is a mistake to assume that Republicans would understand the
phrase "security of person and property" as limited to common law
and statutory rights under state law or even to such rights plus state
constitutional rights. Furthermore, it is incorrect to interpret the
phrase to exclude federal rights including those in the Bill of Rights.
Of course, to enforce limits on the states based on the Federal Bill
of Rights required a constitutional amendment, as John Bingham
never tired of pointing out.
Finally, the historical argument based on the Civil Rights Act
points out that some congressmen said that the Act covered the ground
of Section 1. From such evidence, Lambert Gingras argued that while
key framers intended to apply the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to
the states, their purpose was not generally understood by their con-
gressional colleagues or by the ratifiers. 18 °
140 Lambert Gingras, Congressional Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers' Understanding: The
Case of the Fourteenth Amendment, XL Am. J. LEGAL HIS T. 41 (1996). Mr. Gingras cites statements
from Congressmen Wilson, Thayer, Windom and Raymond indicating that the Civil Rights Bill
guaranteed equality and indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Civil Rights
Bill. Id, at 56-60. At least Wilson and Thayer believed the states were already required to obey
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Gingras points out that Wilson read the word "immunity" as
a guarantee of equality. Id. at 57. He believes several scholars supporting incorporation (including
myself) have distorted meaning by omitting important sentences. For example, he says, "No take
another example, note how Curtis quotes a speech delivered on February 28, 1866, by Repre-
sentative Frederick Woodbridge." Id. at 52. At this point, I include the full quote, putting the
sentence I omitted in italics,
What is the object of the proposed amendment? It merely gives the power to
Congress to enact those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States the
natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship. It is intended to enable
Congress by its enactments when necessary to give to a citizen of the United States
in whatever State he may be, those privileges and immunities which are guaranteed
to him under the Constitution of the United States. It is intended in enable
Congress to give to all citizens the inalienable rights of life and liberty, and to every
citizen in whatever State he may he that protection of his property which is extended to
citizens of the State.
CONG. GLonE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Woodbridge). To me the
passage (from a debate on a prototype of Section 1) seems to indicate both congressional
protection for both constitutional rights and equality under state law for protection of property.
That makes quotation on the first point appropriate. That equal protection for property for blacks
was also secured is not controversial, although some modern scholars locate the protection
against racial discrimination and property rights in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. At any
rate, the reader may reach his or her own conclusion. Thaddeus Stevens said the claim that the
Rill and the Amendment. covered the same ground was only partly true and that a bill was
repealable by a majority. CONG. GLotiE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). Fessenden said that in
the Joint Committee the Fourteenth Amendment was placed on entirely different ground from
the Civil Rights Bill. Id. at 2896. The equality argument appears in two forms. One suggests the
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause only guaranteed equality in certain
privileges secured by state law, Another suggests that such an equality meaning was at least part
of the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but that the Clause also secured some
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From statements about correspondence or identity between the
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, the reader is ex-
pected to read the Civil Rights Act as failing to include any of the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.' 8' But for many Republicans who
thought Bill of Rights guarantees already limited the states, the Civil
Rights Act's guarantee of full benefit of laws for the security of person
and property would have encompassed the provisions in the Bill of
Rights. Because the Civil Rights Act included none of the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights, the argument goes, neither did the Fourteenth
Amendment.
But if the Civil Rights Act was the exact equivalent of Section 1,
then somehow the Civil Rights Act included a prohibition of state
denial of a federal standard of due process. The general phrase of the
Civil Rights Act could include due process easily enough. Due process,
after all, is simply a law or provision for the security of person and
property. It requires more than equality under state law. But if one Bill
of Rights guarantee meets this definition, why don't the rest? If the rest
do, then the argument from the Civil Rights Bill against finding fun-
damental rights in the Fourteenth Amendment self-destructs.
Nor is it likely that most literally believed the Civil Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment were entirely identical. The Act only pro-
tected citizens while Section 1 protects both citizens—as to privileges
or immunities—and persons—as to due process and equal protec-
tion. 182
 Finally, as Dean Aviam Soifer has noted, the Civil Rights Bill
refers to "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security
of person and property." 183 A state law which prohibited public meet-
ings of more than 100 people within a state would give state citizens
equal benefit of the laws, including constitutional provisions, but
would not give them full benefit of the right to free speech and
absolute national privileges from violation by the states. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 1465.
Harrison is apparently unsure whether these absolute guarantees actually imposed any new limits
on the states. Id. at 1465.
181 See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866) (statement of Latham) ("[T)he
'civil rights bill' which is now law ... covers exactly the same ground as this amendment. . . .").
If the two are exactly the same, then the Civil Rights Act prohibited states from denying any
person due process of law. See also id. at 2535.
182 See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 109-05, 107. The point that the
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be identical because the Act only covered
citizens while the Amendment also protected persons was pointed out to me by Akhil Amar in a
telephone conversation. For the reason for including persons as well as citizens in the Fourteenth
Amendment and for Bingham's concern that the Civil Rights Act extended no protection to
aliens, see, for example, id. at 107.
185
 Soifer, supra note 62, at 683-84.
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freedom of assembly. Throughout the debates on the Civil Rights Bill,
virtually every speaker spoke about liberty and equality. To collapse
these statements into a mere equality of rights under state law leaves
out half of what Republicans were asserting.
Still, cryptic remarks of some congressmen in 1866 can be read as
indicating that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is merely a guaran-
tee of equality. For example, Congressman Eliot, speaking in 1866,
said:
I support the first section because the doctrine it declares is
right, and if, under the Constitution as it now stands, Con-
gress has not the power to prohibit State legislation discrimi-
nating against classes of citizens or depriving any persons of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying
to any persons within the State the equal protection of the
laws, then, in my judgment, such power should be distinctly
conferred.'"
There are indications that some congressmen who debated on the
Fourteenth Amendment believed that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 had an equality component as well
as an absolute rights component. What is far less clear is the nature
of the equality component. For example, Congressman Bingham
had the following to say in a debate on the prototype of the final
version of Section 1:
What does the word immunity in your Constitution mean?
Exemption from unequal burdens. Ah! say gentlemen who
oppose this amendment we are not opposed to equal rights;
we are not opposed to the bill of rights that all shall be
protected alike in life, liberty, and property; we are only
opposed to enforcing it by national authority .. . . 185
Of course, guaranteeing absolute rights to all citizens ensures equal-
ity as to those rights. The Fourteenth Amendment also limited
discrimination by state law under the Equal Protection Clause and,
for American citizens from out-of-state at least, the inter-state privi-
leges of Article IV, Section 2 would be among the privileges of
citizens of the United States. The final version of the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause was changed from the
prototype which had used the language of Article IV, Section 2. The
I " GONG. Gunn:, 39th Gong., 1st Sess, 2511 (1866) (statement of Rep. Eliot).
I" Id. at 1089 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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new version protected "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States."
b. Recent Scholarship and the "Nothing but Equality" Reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause
Some claim that, except for equality, no new limitations were
imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The idea is that
the amendment, supposedly like the Civil Rights Act, extended only to
equality and did not give substantive protection.'"'' This view is asserted
in a recent book on the Fourteenth Amendment. The book has done
much to sharpen our understanding of the issue:
The simplest explanation, which was repeated continually
during the congressional and state ratification debates, was
that the amendment did not protect specific fundamental
rights or give Congress and the federal courts power to inter-
fere with state lawmaking that either created or denied rights.
The only effect of the amendment was to prevent states from
discriminating arbitrarily between different classes of citi-
zens. '87
The evidence offered, however, fails to support the assertion. State-
ments of the sort described are made in connection with the Civil
Rights Act debate with reference to the right to contract, testify, etc.
It is absolutely true that Republicans were unwilling to destroy state
governments or the federal system.'" They did not assume, however,
that requiring states to obey basic protections for individual liberty
like those in the Bill of Rights would destroy state governments or
federalism. James Madison supported federalism and also advo-
cated an explicit limit on state power in favor of freedom of the
press and the rights of conscience. Application of the Bill of Rights
to state and local governments has not annihilated federalism. In
contrast to congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the
Bill of Rights is a more discrete and easily contained limit on the
power of the states. On the other hand, to the extent that Republi-
cans believed the Amendment secured "absolute" rights to liberty
and property, with no state action limit, and these terms are read
I He Cf., e.g., NELsoN, supra note 3, at 115, 117; Harrison, supra note 3, at 1388,1393-97,1412
& n.97-98.
I H7 NEt.soN, supra note 3, at 115-18 (emphasis added), cited with approval in Harrison, supra
note 3, at 1465 n.304.
1148 See CONe. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-65 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale); id. at
1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss); id. at 1082 (statement of Rep. Stewart).
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broadly, then the survival of state power would be essentially a
political decision for Congress.
At any rate, one argument claims that Republicans were willing to
embrace equality but not new "absolute" limits on the states in favor
of individual rights. 189
 (Here "absolute" is used simply to refer to rights
states may not eliminate even if the elimination is general and equal.)
To support the alleged unwillingness of Republicans to secure absolute
rights rather than only equality, some insist that Republicans did not
want to see state and local power substantially curtailed, citing state-
ments from Republicans in the 39th Congress.'" At first glance, these
statements seem impressive indeed: Congressman Hale said there were
"other liberties as important as the liberties of the individual citizen,
and those [were] the liberties and rights of the States." 191 Congressman
Woodbridge said that an earlier version of Section 1 "would not destroy
the sovereignty of a state" or even "affect its sovereign rights."' 92
 John
Bingham said that the amendment took from "no state any right that
ever pertained to it."'" Remarks by Representative Lawrence and Sena-
tor Howard allegedly provide further support. 194
Placed in context, these statements do not support the nothing-
new-but-equality argument or show Republican unwillingness to re-
quire states to obey absolute guarantees of liberty. In fact, they support
the opposite conclusion. The quotation from Woodbridge that the
amendment would not affect the sovereign rights of a state is taken
from his speech about a prototype of the Fourteenth Amendment that
gave legislative power to Congress but failed explicitly to limit the
states. The prototype was one that Congressman Bingham repeatedly
described as giving Congress the power to enforce the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights.'`'`'
Woodbridge asked:
What is the object of the proposed amendment? It merely
gives the power to Congress to enact those laws which will
give to a citizen of the United States the natural rights which
' 89 The word "absolute" is slippery and has different meanings. Here I use it simply to refer
to rights that may not be eliminated by a state even when the elimination applies to all within its
jurisdiction. For example, an absolute federal standard of due process would outlaw trial by ordeal
or without notice and the opportunity to be heard, even if such a trial were prescribed for all of
a state's citizens or for all its citizens in certain types of cases.
190 See NELSON, supra note 3, at 114.
' 91 Id. at 115-18.
192 Id. at 115 n.13.
195 1d. at 115 n.14.
1114 See id. at 115 n.13; see also Harrison, supra note 3, at 1465 n.304.
" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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necessarily pertain to citizenship. It is intended to enable
Congress by its enactments . . . to give to a citizen of the
United States those privileges and immunities which are guar-
antied to him under the Constitution of the United States. It
is intended to enable Congress to give to all citizens the
inalienable rights of life and liberty, and to every citizen in
whatever State he may be that protection to his property
which is extended to the other citizens of the State.
Sir, is there anything anti-republican in this? . . . Is there
anything that interferes with the sovereign power of a State
that adheres to a republican form of government? Is there
not rather in this a tendency to keep the States within their
orbits and insure and secure forever to every citizen a repub-
lican form of government? There is nothing more . . . in this
proposition.
It does not destroy the sovereignty of a State, if such a thing
exists. It does not even affect its sovereign rights, but merely
keeps whatever sovereignty it may have in harmony with a repub-
lican form of government and the Constitution of the country.'"
The context of Woodbridge's remarks is widened by looking at
contemporary usage of the phrases "republican form of govern-
ment" and "privileges and immunities." Leading Republicans in-
sisted that a republican government required states to respect rights
set out in the Federal Bill of Rights.' 97
 They read the words "privi-
leges or immunities" as including Bill of Rights liberties.' 98
The remarks by Representative Hale about the importance of the
states' liberties also allegedly support Republican unwillingness to have
states limited by "absolute" guarantees of liberty as opposed to guaran-
tees of equality. 19" Hale spoke in the context of Bingham's prototype
that allowed Congress to secure to all citizens equal protection in the
rights to life, liberty and property. Hale's objections to this proposal
related to congressional power to control the ordinary civil law of the
states. He gave as an example the danger that Congress could, under
Bingham's prototype, grant equal property rights to married women. 200
Hale considered such a change a serious violation of federalism. Con-
196 Id. at 1088 (statement of Rep. Woodbridge) (emphasis added).
197 See, e.g., id. at 1629 (statement of Rep. Hart); id. at 1075 (statement of Sen. Nye).
198 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson); id.
at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard).
199 See NELSON, supra note 3, at 115.
291
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale).
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gressmen Stevens did not agree that the provision allowing Congress
to secure equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property
might allow Congress to secure equality as to property ownership to
women, as well as blacks. He seems to have believed the equal protec-
tion power was limited to unreasonable classifications like race, and
Stevens viewed the gender classification as reasonable. 2"' The cited
Hale speech actually shows that Hale's concern was not about absolute
Bill of Rights liberties limiting the states, but was about congressional
power to legislate on equality with reference to ordinary state civil law
matters. While Hale was concerned about new legislative power being
given to Congress, he was not disturbed that states would have to obey
the "absolute" requirements of the Bill of Rights. Hale thought that
the Bill of Rights already limited federal, state and local government.
He insisted that courts would enforce the Bill of Rights, and nothing
more was required. 212 John Bingham cited Barron v. Baltimore to Hale
to prove that he was wrong in assuming that the liberties of the citizen
were adequately protected by the existing Constitution as interpreted
by the Court.'"
The objections by Hale actually prove that his concern was differ-
ent from the supposed Republican limited equality position. He was
upset about guarantees of equality under an equal protection provision
that he thought granted general legislative power over ordinary sub-
jects of state civil law; he was not at all concerned with the idea that
states should be required to obey the limits set out in the Federal Bill
of Rights because he thought that was already the law.
Further support for the mere equality argument is allegedly found
in a statement of Congressman Bingham, the main author of Section
1. Congressman Bingham is quoted as saying the amendment took
"from no State any right that pertained to it." 24
 Once again, the
context gives a different impression. The amendment, Bingham in-
sisted, provided:
[T]he power in the people, the whole people of the United
States, by express authority of the Constitution to do that by
congressional enactment which hitherto they have not had
the power to do, and have never even attempted to do; that
is, to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of
all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every
201 Id. (statement of Rep. Stevens).
202 Id. at 1064-65 (statement of Rep. Hale); see Orosskcy, supra note 62, at 32-33.
205
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
201 See NELSON, SION/ note 3, at 115 n.14.
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person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be
abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.
Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing to say that this amend-
ment takes from no state any right that ever pertained to it.
No State ever had the right, under forms of law or otherwise,
to deny any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to
abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the
Republic, although many of them have assumed and exer-
cised that power, and that without remedy. 205
Bingham did not accept a positivist view of law. He distinguished
between the rights states had and the power they were allowed to
exercise. The statement is consistent with Bingham's view that states
were obligated to respect fundamental rights including Bill of
Rights liberties, but that under the Constitution as interpreted the
obligation was unenforceable.'"" Bingham had earlier cited Barron
v. Baltimore, a case holding that the Bill of Rights does not limit the
states, to support his claim of the need for an earlier version of the
amendment.207
 His speech on the final version of the Fourteenth
Amendment also referred to liberties in the Bill of Rights. The
amendment was necessary, Bingham said, because of "flagrant vio-
lations of the guaranteed privileges of citizens of the United States"
such as "cruel and unusual punishments" that had been inflicted
under state law. 218
Congressman Lawrence is also cited in recent scholarship for the
proposition that Section 1 would not impair state sovereignty. He is
cited again in support of the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment.
provided no absolute rights. In Lawrence's case, the citations are to his
discussion of the Civil Rights Bill. 209
 Lawrence noted that the Civil
Rights Bill provided that all citizens would have the same rights to
contract, sue, give evidence, and have full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property. The bill,
Lawrence con tin tied,
does not declare who shall or shall not have the right to sue,
give evidence, inherit, purchase, and sell property. These
questions are left to the States to determine subject only to the
limitation that there are some inalienable rights, pertaining to
" CONG. GLOI•, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
206 Id. at 1090 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
"Id. at 1089-90 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
" Id. at 2542 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
2()9 See NELSON, supra note 3, at 115 n.13.
December 1996]
	 PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES GLA USE
	 61
every citizen, which cannot be abolished or abridged by Slate con-
stitutions or laws. 21 "
Legislative power existed "to protect, not to destroy, the inalienable
rights of men." Citizens had "absolute rights," including the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of clue process. "Without further authority
I may assume, then, that there are certain absolute rights which
pertain to every citizen which are inherent, and of which a state
cannot constitutionally deprive him."'"
Congressman Lawrence's statement also refutes the claim it is
cited to support: that subjecting states to "absolute" Bill of Rights
liberties was incompatible with state sovereignty. Lawrence was consis-
tent in his view that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed "absolute"
limits on state power and required states to obey Bill of Rights guaran-
tees "absolutely." Speaking in 1871, he insisted that the Due Process
Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause both required states to
provide civil jury trials in eminent domain proceedings. 212
A major shortcoming in the mere equality argument is its assump-
tion that "[p]rior to the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, no
one doubted that states could legislate to restrict rights granted by God
or inherent in the nature of a free society." 213
 In a sense the statement
is true. But in fact, many Republicans assumed that states were already
required to respect the fundamental rights of American citizens prior
to the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, though for some the
constitutional obligation was not enforceable. 2 " "Freedom of religious
opinion, freedom of speech and press, and the right of assemblage for
the purpose of petition belong to every American citizen, high or low,
rich or poor, wherever he may be within the jurisdiction of the United
States," said Representative James Wilson in 1864. 2 '' "With these rights
no state may interfere without breach of the bond which holds the
Union together."216
 Two years later, in 1866, Wilson was Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee in the 39th Congress.
211
' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (emphasis
added). Mr. Harrison relics on Professor Nelson's work. Harrison, supra time 3, at 1412 & n,102.
211 CONG. Gt.oRE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
212
 2 CONG. REG. 384-85 (1871) (statementr Rep,o. Lawrence). Lawrence continued to
adhere to the view that the Seventh Amendment, properly interpreted, would have limited the
states prior to the passage o1 the Fourteenth Antentlifient.
212 NELSON, supra note 3, at 1 15.
20 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152, 1270 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer);
CONG,. GLoisE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson); id. at 2290 (statement
of Rep. Ingersoll) (showing little sympathy for free speech claims by supporters of "rebels");
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982-84 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
212
 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
216 Id. (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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The claim that Republicans were willing to require states to treat
citizens equally as to certain fundamental interests to contract, own
property, etc., but found it intolerable that they should, for example,
be required to obey absolute rights like those in the Bill of Rights, is
refuted by the statements marshalled as prologue and support for the
argument.
In 1871 Bingham explained that he followed Chief Justice Mar-
shall's suggestion in Barron v. Baltimore. Marshall had said that if the
framers had intended Bill of Rights guarantees to limit the states, they
would have followed the example of the framers of the original Con-
stitution and used the "no state shall" language of Article I, Section 10.
So "imitating their example and imitating it to the letter," Bingham
said, In] o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States."217 Those
privileges and immunities, Bingham said, "are chiefly defined in the
first eight amendments to the Constitution." 2 's He then read word for
word each of the first eight amendments. 219
Sir, before the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, the
State could deny to any citizen the right to trial by jury, and
it was done. Before that the State could abridge the freedom
of the press, and it was so done in half the States of the Union
. . . [B]y the force of the fourteenth amendment no State
hereafter . can . . . ever repeat the example of Georgia and
send men to the penitentiary, as did that State, for teaching
the Indian to read the lessons of the New Testament . . . . 220
In his speech on the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Bingham said the Amendment made it possible to protect "by national
law the privileges and immunities of all citizens of the Republic and
the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the
same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any
State."22 ' The amendment protected citizen and stranger from uncon-
stitutional state enactments. 222
Senator Howard indicated the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
two-fold. It protected the type of fundamental interests described in
CoNG. GLotm, 42d Cong., 1st Sess, app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
21K Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham).
.41 " Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham).
22" Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham). By 1871, Bingham seems to have bowed to Supreme
Court interpretation and to have abandoned his abolitionist reading of the original Privileges
and Immunities Clause. See id. (statement of Rep. Bingham).
221 GONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542-43 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
2'22 See id. (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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Corfield v. Coryel1223 and provided absolute protection for "the personal
rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments of
the Constitution" such as "freedom of speech and of the press; the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government
for a redress of grievances ... the right to keep and to bear arms . .
the right to be exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures . .
[the] right [of the accused] to be tried by an impartial jury" etc.224
[These rights] do not operate in the slightest degree as a
restraint or prohibition upon State legislation. States are not
affected by them, and it has been repeatedly held that the
restriction contained in the Constitution against the taking
[of] private property for public use without just compensa-
tion [a reference to Barron] is not a restriction upon State
legislation, but applies only to the legislation of Congress ....
The great object of the first section of this amendment is,
therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel
them at all times to respect these great fundamental guaran-
tees. 225
These statements are a problem for the nothing-hut-equality argu-
ment. One response deals with the problem head on. American states,
the argument goes, in their state constitutions provided their citizens
with most of the protections contained in the Bill of Rights including
those mentioned by Jacob Howard in his presentation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Senate.226 But the southern states and a few
others "had failed to give the rights to their black citizens." 227 Section
1, read only as securing equality, would allow Congress to legislate
equality with respect to state constitutional guarantees "and thus en-
able Bingham to declare that Congress would have power to enforce
the Bill of Rights." 228 Under Section 1 a state could still, by the recon-
structed Bingham-Howard view, abrogate Bill of Rights protections so
long as it did so for all its citizens. The amendment, the argument
insists, did not impose the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights on
the states. 229
Senator Howard, Congressman Bingham and most who spoke in
the 39th Congress, however, had absolute protection for liberty plus
223 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C. Wash. 1823) (No. 3230).
224 CONG. Gum, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
225 Id. at 2765-66 (statement of Sen. Howard).
226 See NELsoN, supra note 3, at 118-19; Harrison, supra note 3, at 1465 n.304.
227 NELSON, ,supra note 3, at 118.
2'28 Id. at 118-19.
229 See id. at 118; cf. Harrison, supra note 3, at 1465.
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equality in mind. Howard read the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States to include the rights in the Federal Bill of
Rights, "the first. eight amendments of the Constitution," as he put it. 23°
Howard explained that the problem was that "these rights"—most of
which he read or paraphrased from the Federal Bill of Rights—did not
limit state legislation. 23' States could violate the rights without any
restraint "except by their own constitutions which may be changed
from year to year-"!32 The great object of Section l was to require the
states "at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees."233
The object was to protect these guarantees from being abridged by the
states, not to ensure that abrogation of them would apply to all citizens.
Like Howard, Bingham and others read the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to protect national rights including those in the Bill of Rights.
A mere equality approach replaces substantial liberty with formal-
ism. By the mere equality argument, a state that abrogated the right
to jury trial for all its citizens would not violate Section 1. If the state
bans all publications with the bad tendency to produce evil results, for
example, it does not seem to have offended the equality rationale. If
it prohibits all residential political signs, eliminates the public forum,
or prohibits all persons from going door to door for political causes,
it does not seem to have violated the equality rule—and certainly not
one that merely forbids discrimination based on caste or race. The Due
Process Clause itself seems to belie the suggestion that the Fourteenth
Amendment was merely an equality provision. As a mere equality
provision, the Due Process Clause would mean that states could not
provide different processes, for example, based on color or caste, but
any process generally applied would be sufficient. Generality is one
aspect of due process—that the same law applies to all and that deci-
sions are made according to law, not whim—but it is only one aspect.
As Daniel Webster said in the most widely quoted pre-Civil War defini-
tion of law of the land under Magna Carta (the equivalent of due
process):
By law of the land is most clearly intended, the general law;
a law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning
is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and
230 CONG. GI.OBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
231 Id. at 2765-66 (statement of Sen. Howard).
192 Id. (statement of Sen. Howard).
2" Id. (statement of Sen. Howard).
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immunities, under the protection of the general rules which
govern society. 234
4. A Very Technical Argument About Rights of American Citizens
A third argument against applying Bill of Rights and other consti-
tutional liberties to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment is
technical. Americans may have thought that the Constitution guaran-
teed them freedom of speech or protection from unreasonable
searches, but that is not the case. Actually, Americans had no federal
constitutional right to free speech at all. They had simply a positive
prohibition that the federal government would not abridge free speech
or engage in unreasonable searches. The Fourteenth Amendment
could not secure such rights against state denial by forbidding states
from abridging privileges or immunities, because no such privileges of
citizens of the United States existed. The discussion above about the
declaratory nature of Bill of Rights guarantees is one response to this
argument. 235
 A second response is to ask whether such technical argu-
ments are appropriately directed against protections of liberty which
should be generously interpreted. 236
 Should constructions designed to
restrict guarantees of liberty be permitted to defeat popular under-
standing in a system allegedly justified by popular sovereignty?
The argument concedes that some Republicans were determined
to secure absolute protection for Bill of Rights liberties, but, it tells us,
if Republicans had such plans they used the wrong words. So, when in
the Fourteenth Amendment Republicans protected the absolute privi-
leges of Americans against state denial, they really protected only those
federal constitutional privileges already protected against state denial.
That is because, the argument insists, the privileges of citizens of the
United States must be read not as a reference to the right referred to,
but the right must be read as limited by the scope of protection
accorded by the Constitution before the Fourteenth Amendment. 257
"4 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 581 (1819); Heyman, supra note 156,
at 559.
235 See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text; see atso United States v. Cruiks hank, 92 U.S.
542,551,55'3 (1875) (where the declaratory nature oldie rights did not prevent them from acting
as an effective limit on the federal government).
23  See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (finding that guarantees of liberty should
be liberally construed and that strict, narrow, and technical constructions should be avoided).
Boyd has been departed from both as to its holding and as to this proposition. See, e.g., Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391,407-09 (1976).
°John Harrison nicely sets this out as one of two possible readings. Harrison, supra note
3, at 1465-66.
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This is a very odd way to read a guarantee designed to take existing
privileges and expand the scope of the protection with reference to
them. For example, the Fifth Amendment contains a provision that
"no person . . . shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."238 The Fourteenth Amendment provides "nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."23`I The right is virtually the same as that referred to in
the Fifth Amendment. What is added is new scope for the protection
accorded to it. A privilege from the Fifth Amendment is protected
against state action in the Fourteenth by use of the "[n]t) state shall"
formula. In the Privileges or Immunities Clause a similar operation has
occurred, except that the rights to be protected by the clause have
been referred to by the word "privileges" instead of quoting all the
constitutionally guaranteed privileges. Such a list would be quite long
and would include, at least, Bill of Rights guarantees, guarantees in the
original Constitution, and, now, rights added after the Fourteenth
Amendment. The "In] o state shall" language expands the scope of the
protection that previously existed for these privileges.
In light of the violations of civil liberties by the states before the
Civil War, a wide Republican consensus that such violations infringed
what should be rights of American citizens, the text of the Bill of Rights
that assumed Americans had such rights, and statements by leading
proponents that the amendment would require the states to obey the
federal Bill of Rights, to hold privileges and immunities such as free
speech and press unprotected is strict construction with a vengeance.
It ignores the rule of construction urged by some decisions, but now
apparently badly out of fashion, that guarantees of liberty should be
liberally construed.
Some argue Section 1 protects only some Bill of Rights liberties—
those that are fundamental or correspond to natural rights. These
rights could include free speech, press, and freedom of religion. James
Madison implies that some Bill of Rights liberties secure natural rights;
others, like jury trial, he says, were essential to protect natural rights. 240
Both the Levellers, who were at the libertarian end of the spectrum,
and Thomas Hobbes, who was at the statist end, agreed that the
privilege against self-incrimination was a natural right. 24 ' Fundamental
238 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
239 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
240 See 2 THE Btu, OF RIGHTS, 4upra note 22, at 1029.
241
 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Everyman ed., 1914) (1651), in JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND
READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OE I.Aw 414 (George C. Christie and Patrick H. Martin eds., 1995);
,JOHN LILRURNE, A WORKE OF THE BEAST (1638), reprinted in 2 TRACTS ON LIBERTY IN THE
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or natural rights formulations could include many basic Bill of Rights
liberties.
Advocates of total incorporation of Bill of Rights liberties as limits
on the states, those who argue for selective application, and opponents
of any application read the historical record in different ways. They
place different interpretations on contemporary general descriptions
of what the amendment would do. Supporters of the amendment said
it would protect all rights of citizens or all constitutional rights. 242
Opponents of application can point out, correctly, that if one disre-
gards these general statements as too general to be of much use, and
disregards statements that focus on particular guarantees like free
speech as too specific to indicate general incorporation, then there are
few statements saying the amendment will require states to obey the
Bill of Rights. Those who advocate substantial or total incorporation
read the general descriptions of what the Fourteenth Amendment will
do in light of a broadly held Republican view that privileges and
immunities in the Bill of Rights were liberties of American citizens that
limited or should limit the states even prior to the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Some, like Congressman Bingham, believed
the guarantees were morally binding but legally unenforceable, an
interpretation that paralleled the way the Court had read some guar-
antees of Article IV. 2"
F. Conclusion to Part II
The Fourteenth Amendment was designed and should be under-
stood to protect fundamental constitutional rights, including those in
PURITAN REVOLUTION 1638-47, at 3, 7-8 (William Haller ed., 1934); Curtis, The Levellers, supra
note 26, at 362.
542 See Cow:. GLonE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess, 741, 868, 1032, 1586 (1866) (stating goals as to
what. new amendment should do); id. at 2542 (noting that amendment would allow Congress to
protect by national law all privileges and immunities of citizens when they are denied by uncon-
stitutional act of any state); id. (statement of Rep. Bingham) (mentioning specifically cruel and
unusual punishments); id. at 3167 (statement of Rep. Windom) (suggesting that amendment will
protect all the rights of citizenship"); id. at 3201 (statement of Rep. Orth) (stating that all rights
of American citizenship would he protected); id. at app. 255-56 (statement of Rep. Baker) (stating
that amendment would protect citizen in rights thrown around him by supreme law of land); id.
at 3038 (statement of Sen. Yates) (saying rights of citizens shall not be abridged by any state); see
N.Y. DA ti,v Dux., Sept. 4, 1866, at A col. 4 (quoting Andrew Hamilton at Southern Loyalist
Convention, referring to "Constitutional rights of every citizen" and "rights of citizen enumerated
in the Constitution" in call for convention of Southern loyalists); see also SPRINGFIELD DAILY 11,L.
ST. J., Sept. 21, 1866, at 2 col. 6 (referring to "constitutional rights" and making specific reference
to free speech). See generally CURTIS, No STATE SHALL. ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 131-53.
'415 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1861); CoNG. CLOISE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Bingham).
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the Bill of Rights, from state denial. That is the best reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment based on text, context, history, policy, and
structure.
What about rights less explicit in the text, particularly those inter-
ests deemed fundamental for Article IV, Section 2 interstate privileges
and immunities purposes—rights to contract, to own property, etc.? To
the extent that equality in such interests is protected under privileges
and immunities secured in Article IV, Section 2 or by a structural
reacting of the rights of Americans, equality in such rights would be
one privilege of American citizens. Various views appear in the debates.
In addition to racial classifications, other equally invidious ones, like
national origin and religion, would be prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause.
As to the broader Article 1V group of basic common law interests
as absolute or relative privileges or immunities within the Fourteenth
Amendment, Senator Howard says:
[W]e may gather some intimation of what probably will be
the opinion of the judiciary by referring to a case adjudged
many years ago in one of the circuit courts of the United
States by judge Washington; and I will trouble the Senate but
for a moment by reading what that very learned and excellent
judge says about these privileges and immunities of the citi-
zens of each State in the several States. It is the case of Garfield
v. Coryell, found in 4 Washington's Circuit Court Reports,
page 380. Judge Washington says: "The next question is
whether this act infringes that section of the Constitution
which declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States? The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in
confining these expressions to those privileges and immuni-
ties which are in their nature fundamental, which belong of
right to the citizens of all free Governments, and which have
at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States
which compose this Union from the time of their becoming
free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
principles are it would, perhaps, be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all compre-
hended under the following general heads: protection by the
Government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right
to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
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and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such
restraint as the Government may justly prescribe for the gen-
eral good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to
pass through or to reside in any other State, for purposes of
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise: to
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take,
hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal, and an
exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by
the other citizens of the State, may be mentioned as some of
the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are
clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental, to which may be added the elec-
tive franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or
constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These,
and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly
speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of
them by the citizens of each State in every other State was
manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble
of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confed-
eration) the better to secure the perpetuate mutual friend-
ship and intercourse among the people of the different States
of the Union. 7244
Howard seems to have thought of the protection of Article IV,
Section 2 as encompassing more than a right of out-of-staters not
to be discriminated against as to these fundamental interests. Some
read the provisions of Article IV, Section 2 as including some abso-
lute rights of the sort Justice Washington described, together with
a right to equality with in-staters in other rights like the right to own
property and to maintain court actions. For Judge Washington, of
course, the rights or interests can be regulated for the general
good. 245 Howard very clearly says that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would require states to ad-
244 CONG. Gun:, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-65 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
115 See id. at 1629; CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202,1369,2999 (1864); CONG. GLOBE,
35th Cong,, 2d Sess. 983-44 (1859). Each says, suggests, or implies that liberties in the Bill of
Rights are privileges or immunities that American citizens carry with them wherever they go in
the nation. See Crosskey, supra note 62 at 14; Curtis, A Reyy to Professor Berger, supra note 3, at
61-64. On the equality in civil rights among members of the state, see, for example, CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833-37 (1866) (statement of Rep Lawrence).
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here to the limits of the Bill of Rights in addition to those rights
listed by Justice Washington.""
Speaking in 1871, however, Congressman Bingham suggested that
the broad orthodox understanding of Article IV-type interests was
different from what was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment:
Mr. Speaker, that decision in the fourth of Washington's Cir-
cuit Court Reports, to which my learned colleague [Mr. Shel-
labarger] has referred is only a construction of the second
section, fourth article of the original Constitution, to wit,
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States." In that case
the court only held that in civil rights the State could not
refuse to extend to citizens of other States the same general
rights secured to its own ...
Is it not clear that other and different privileges and immu-
nities than those to which a citizen of a State was entitled are
secured by the provision of the fourteenth article, that no
State shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, which are defined in the eight articles
of amendment, and which were not limitations on the power
of the States before the fourteenth amendment made them
limitations?
Sir, before the ratification of the fourteenth amendment,
the State could deny to any citizen the right of trial by jury,
and it was done. Before that the State could abridge the
freedom of the press, and it was so done in half of the States
of the Union. 247
On the Bill of Rights point, Congressman Bingham, Senator
Howard, and some who thought all state citizens were entitled to
equality in Corfiehi type Article IV rights concurred. The privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States included privileges in the Bill
of Rights.
There is no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment secured some
measure of equality to American citizens, including African-Americans,
in state secured rights to hold property, to testify, etc. that were listed
in the Civil Rights Act. The historical evidence that the Civil Rights Act
refers only to rights that states created and could destroy is thin. So is
Life
	 Howard's statement on the Bill of Rights, see Cos:. CionE. 311th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765
(1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
217 CONG. CLONE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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evidence that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than the
Equal Protection Clause, was understood to be the only or even the
primary source of protection for equality in these state law substantive
rights. There is substantial evidence for protection for a set of funda-
mental national rights including Bill of Rights liberties. Still, in the
Slaughter-House Cases,248 the Privileges or Immunities Clause suffered a
wound from which it has not yet recovered.
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EN THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
The story of the Slaughter-House Gases is a familiar one.249 The
Louisiana legislature created a corporation and authorized it to estab-
lish a slaughter-house in New Orleans and several additional counties.
Butchers who had been slaughtering elsewhere could use the newly
created slaughter-house on payment of a fee. But the slaughter-house
was to be the only slaughter-house in the area. In this respect it was
granted a monopoly. No other slaughter-houses were permitted in the
counties in which the monopoly had been granted.
The measure was justified as a health measure and as an exercise
of the police powers of the state. There is no doubt as to the health
and environmental problems caused by the prior approach to slaugh-
tering animals or as to the advantages of a new facility. In the nine-
teenth century, states had often given monopoly privileges to encour-
age capital investment in new enterprises. Butchers attacking the act
claimed it violated the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Privileges or
Immunities, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This article will focus only on the Court's destruc-
tion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Justice Miller wrote For the Court. He began his discussion with a
recapitulation of the history of the post-Civil War amendments. He
insisted, curiously, that a very superficial investigation was all that was
248 83 U.S. 31i (1872).
249 A major recent re-evaluation of the Slaughter-House Cases appears in Richard L. Ayncs,
Constrkting the Law of Freedom: justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House
Cases, 70 CI 11.-KENT L. Rev. 627 (1995). The most novel and powerful aspect of Dean Apes'
important analysis is his historical attempt to explain why the majority reached the conclusion it
did. A run discussion of the Court's transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment including a
fine discussion of the Slaughter-House Cases appears in W. W CROSSKEV, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 1 1 19-58 (1953). For a novel, but 1 think ultimately unpersuasive, suggestion that
Miller in Slaughter-House did read the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the Bill of Rights,
see generally Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House,
Cruikshank, and The Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. 1t.t.. L. Rev. 739 (1984).
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required. The "most cursory glance at these articles discloses a unity
of purpose."25° Again, he announced that:
on the most casual examination of the language of these
amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one
pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation
of each, and without which none of them would have been
even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the
security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited
dominion over him. It is true that only the fifteenth amend-
ment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color
and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other
articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and
designed to remedy them as the fifteenth. 25 '
Justice Miller's "most casual" and "cursory" analysis finds the pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment in the abuses of the Black Codes.
The newly freed slaves, he tells us, were in some states forbidden to
appear in the towns in any other character than menial servants. They
were required to reside on and cultivate the soil without the right to
purchase or own it. They were excluded from many occupations of
gain, and were not permitted to give testimony in the courts in any
case where a white man was a party. 2"
All of this is true enough, though it is radically incomplete, ex-
tremely "casual," and appallingly "cursory." justice Miller leaves out the
entire history of suppression of civil liberties of white opponents of
slavery, including Republicans, in the South before the Civil War.
Justice Miller tells nothing about the suppression of free speech or the
fact that many in the South viewed Republican congressmen who had
sponsored an anti-slavery book, including some who were later mem-
bers of the committee that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, to
be felons. He fails to note-that Black Codes abridged privileges includ-
ing free speech, the right to hold religious meetings and the right to
bear arms, and that there were complaints about such deprivations in
the 39th Congress. He neglects to report that the slogan of the Repub-
lican party in 1856 and 1860 demanded free speech, free soil, free
labor and free men.253
2 ''" Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 67.
251
 Id. at 71-72.
2 ' 2 See id. at 70.
253 See. RICHARD SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM 28 ,1 (1976).
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The failure to mention the history of suppression of free speech
in the South is puzzling since the issue is raised in Justice Bradley's
dissent:
The mischief to be remedied was not merely slavery and its
incidents and consequences; but that spirit of insubordina-
tion and disloyalty to the National government which had
troubled the country for so many years in some of the States,
and that intolerance of free speech and free discussion which
often rendered life and property insecure, and led to much
unequal legislation. The amendment was an attempt to give
voice to the strong National yearning for that time and that
condition of things, in which American citizenship should be
a sure guaranty of safety, and in which every citizen of the
United States might stand erect on every portion of its soil,
in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging
to a freeman, without fear of violence or molestation. 254
Having completed his historical exegesis, Justice Miller proceeded
to a constitutional one. The Fourteenth Amendment, he noted, made
all persons born in the country and subject to its jurisdiction both
citizens of the United States and of the states in which they reside.
These distinct citizenships had different characteristics and different
privileges attached to each. Only privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States were placed "under the protection of the Federal
Constitution."'" As Miller's opinion progressed, he announced that
the great mass of civil rights and civil liberties are privileges and
immunities of state citizenship. These he identified with the fundamen-
tal rights of Article IV, Section 2.
[The Article IV, Section 2 Privileges or Immunities Clause]
did not create those rights, which it called privileges and
immunities of citizens of the States [sic]. It threw around
them in that clause no security for the citizen of the State in
which they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to
control the power of the State governments over the rights of
its own citizens.
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that
whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your
own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions
on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be
254 Slaughter-HOUSA 83 U.S. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 74.
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the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within
your jurisdiction. 256
Justice Miller then asked a loaded rhetorical question:
Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the
simple declaration that no State should make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States, to transfer the security and protec-
tion of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the
States to the Federal government? And where it is declared
that Congress shall have the power to enforce that article, was
it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire
domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the
States?257
Of course, the correct answer to that question is "No!" Most
Republicans did not intend to eliminate or threaten all jurisdiction
exercised by the states with preempting national laws. They did not
intend to federalize the entire domain of state law and turn supervision
of virtually all questions of state law over to federal courts. They
thought the federal system had virtues, and they wanted to preserve its
positive features and to rid it of what they saw as abuses. 258 Even on this
point, however, candor demands recognition of ambiguity. There were
some ardent nationalizers among Republicans. 259
 Goals of individual
256 Id. at 77.
257 ht
258 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088-89, 1292, 1832-33, 2526, 2904, app. at 99,
app. at 257 (1866); see eLsa CURTIS, No STATE, SHALL ABRIDGE:, supra note 3, at 69, 95. Of the
prototype, Representative Hale said: "I submit it is in effect a provision under which all State
legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the individual
citizen, may he overridden and the law of Congress established instead." CONG. GLOM, 39(/1
Cong., lit Sess. 1063-64 (1856) (statement of Rep. Hale). Hale was not upset with a plan that
required states to obey the Bill of Rights, because he thought (mistakenly) that existing law
already made the Bill of Rights a limit on the states. Id. (statement of Rep. Hale). For more on
Hale's concern for federalism, see id. at 1065 (statement of Rep. Hale). Giles Hotchkiss had two
objections to the prototype. It failed permanently to secure the rights it sought to protect, because
it left the matter up to Congress, and what the present Congress passed a subsequent one could
repeal. Id. at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss). Second, he objected because he understood
"the amendment as now proposed by its terms to authorize Congress to establish uniform laws
throughout the United States upon the subject name, the protection of life, liberty, or property.
1 am unwilling that Congress shall have any such power." Id. (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss). He
agreed with the object of the clause, "that no State shall discriminate between its citizens and
give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another." Id. (statement of Rep.
Hotchkiss). Senator Steward suggested that the prototype would "obviate the necessity of ... any
more State Legislatures." Id. at 1082 (statement of Sen. Steward).
259 cf. Cora:. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118, 1294 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson)
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rights, non-discritnination, state rights, and popular sovereignty are in
tension with each other.
Having proved to his satisfaction that Republicans did not intend
to nationalize all law and all civil rights by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Justice Miller unintentionally proceeded to imply that in fact
the clause did nothing at all. He established this point in the course
of an unsuccessful effort to show that, by his analysis, the clause had
some independent meaning. "Lest it should be said that no such
privileges and immunities are to be found if those we have been
considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe their
existence to the federal government, its National character, its Consti-
tution, or its laws."2'4 '
What, then, were the privileges or immunities so crucial to Ameri-
cans of African descent, the persons for whom Miller incorrectly sug-
gested the Amendment was exclusively fashioned? Behold the result:
citizens could travel to Washington, D.C. to transact business with the
national government; they had free access to the seaports, and to the
sub-treasuries; they could demand the care and protection of the
federal government when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction
of a foreign government. They had the right to use the navigable
waters. They had the right to peaceably assemble and petition the
national government. In short, they had exactly the same bundle of
enforceable privileges they would have had without the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or, for Americans of African descent, as
they would have had if the Fourteenth Amendment consisted solely of
the Citizenship Clause. I assume, as Republicans did, that African-
(justifying Civil Rights Bill based on congressio nal power to enforce Thirteenth Amend m ent and
also power to enforce Due Process Clause). Citizens had certain basic rights and Congress had
the right to enforce the rights. Read broadly and with the assumption that this understanding
was incorpiwated into the Fourteenth Amendment, this idea wottld make possible total pre-emp-
tion of state law. But. of course:, we know that many Republicans would have Ilrund total federal
power unacceptable. Wilson himself suggested that "the entire structure of [the Civil Rights Bill]
rests on discrimination relative to civil rights and immunities." Id. at 1118 (statement of Rep.
Wilson); sre also id, at I 117 (statement of Rep. Wilson). The cross currents in the debates and
multiplicity of views mean that a court cannot simply transcribe the original intent of- the framers
on the full extent of congressional power. Instead it mnst use the history or the Amendment
constructively to create the best account possible. The construction diet the Court has reached
with reference to the Equal Protection Clause—that heightened scrutiny is reserved for racial
classifications and others that are markedly similar—is a construction that is a reasonable inter-
pretation of the broad and sometimes conflicting goals of the framers. As in the case of rights
for woolen or racial segregatio II, the broad goals and the specific understandings of the framers
are often in conflict, and such a conflict also means that courts must sometimes construct and
cannot always simply transcribe the purposes of the framers.
scar Slaughler-House, 83 U.S. at 70,
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Americans became citizens by the passage of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment:26u
These privileges have some common characteristics. All of them
are implied by the very nature of the federal government and can be
derived by structural arguments, even before the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment. By this reading of "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States," the Fourteenth Amendment added noth-
ing to the Constitution as it existed before its enactment.
Second, significantly, most of these "privileges" hardly relate to
pressing problems of the newly freed slaves. In the premier guarantee
of Section I, Republicans have protected newly freed slaves both on
their trans-Atlantic cruises to Paris, and once they arrive in the French
capital. As Justice Swayne noted in his dissent, the Slaughter-House
majority performed a judicial miracle: they turned bread into a
stone.262
 The miracle was performed in the name of federalism—hold-
ing "with a steady hand the balance between State and Federal
power. "263
The shortcoming of Justice Miller's Slaughter-House decision was
not that it rejected the butchers' invitation that the Court set itself up
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the supreme arbiter of
the reasonableness of economic legislation, 264
 an invitation the Lochner
Court later accepted under the Due Process Clause. The great failure
of the Court was that its rationale deprived the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of its central core. It left protections of Bill of Rights liberties
to the tender mercies of the very states that had so recently made
mincemeat of them.
Very soon the Slaughter-House dissenting Justices once again exer-
cised their proposed charter to judge the reasonableness of economic
legislation. They did so in the case of Myra Bradwell, a married woman
who had been denied admission to the Illinois Bar because of sex and
marital status. 21i"' Mrs. Bradwell insisted that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause protected her right to practice law. 266 The Slaughter-House
majority, having deprived the Privileges or Immunities Clause of any
significant meaning, quickly disposed of Mrs. Bradwell's claim by a
citation to Slaughter-House. 2"7
See id. at 78-80; CLING. CLonti, 391h Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Wilson).
2112
 83 U.S. at 129 (Swayne,	 dissenting).
2 ' 31 Id. at 82.
"See Slaughter-House Cases Brief for Defendants, in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS 587-601.
" Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 130-31 (1872).
264i
 See id. at 135.
267 Id. at 139.
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The matter was not so easy for the Slaughter-House dissenters.
Three of the four Slaughter-House dissenters found it reasonable for a
state to deny a woman, even a single woman, the right to practice
law—a view they shared with some framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Indeed, these Slaughter-House dissenters announced that it was
positively desirable to keep women out of the profession. The Creator
himself had set the rule: the "paramount destiny and mission of woman
are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. "268
Chief Justice Chase dissented alone and without opinion. 269 The con-
curring opinion in Bradwell suggests some of the uncertainty inherent
in the Slaughter-House dissenters' broad view of the power to strike
down economic state legislation under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
IV. EVALUATION OF SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
A. The Majority
If Justice Miller was partly wrong in his Slaughter-House decision,
then what did the Privileges or Immunities Clause mean? It protected
mainly rights, privileges, and immunities set out in the text of the
Constitution itself." These included basic rights such as free speech,
press, freedom of religion, and the right to petition, and others such
as the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to jury trial, and
the immunity against cruel and unusual punishments. These basic
rights were recognized, but not created by, the Bill of Rights and were
protected by it against federal interference. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment extended the protection against state interference.
These privileges set out in the Federal Constitution would include
the prohibiton of state discrimination against non-residents as to fun-
damental rights and interests—the protection against discrimination
set out in Article IV, Section 2. It also included the protection against
ex post facto laws and other rights set out in the body of the original
Constitution. For at least some Republicans, the Constitution, even
before the Fourteenth Amendment, combined protection of these
absolute national privileges together with some type of equality in basic
258 1d. at 141.
268 Id. at 142 (Chase, J., dissenting without opinion).
270 Courts of all persuasions have found some rights that are less explicit in the text, such as
the right to travel. I believe that some acceptance of less textually explicit rights is necessary to
effectuate the Constitution's purposes. Still, if such rights are too broadly construed, the doctrine
of non-textual rights threatens the basic purpose of representative government. Much of the
modern controversy in constitutional law is generated by this tension.
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civil rights regulated by state law. This understanding overlaps with a
core understanding many Republicans had of the Equal Protection
Clause. Some probably envisioned a larger body of fundamental na-
tional interests, many of which were subject to broad state regulation.
Why should the framers use the words "privileges or immunities"
instead of simply "rights in the Bill of Rights?" Why include pre-existing
constitutional protections? The phrase "rights in the Bill of Rights"
would leave out constitutional guarantees of liberty such as habeas
corpus, the prohibition against ex post facto laws and the protection
for migrants from one state to another under Article IV, Section 2.
Court decisions had suggested that other provisions of Article IV,
Section 2 represented obligations that were not enforceable against
state officers. 27 ' By including in the Privileges or Immunities Clause
271 See, e.g., Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 107-08 (1861) (holding that constitutional
requirement to return fugitives from justice did not contain judicially enforceable limit on state
officers), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
539 (1842) (holding that state officers could not be compelled to enforce fugitive slave clause).
The 1871 Report of the Judiciary Committee on the Memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull asking
Congress to grant suffrage to women under the Privileges or Immunities Clause is (to say the
least) puzzling but raises concerns as to whether limits in Article IV, Section 2 were enforceable
against the states.
The [Privileges or Immunities Clause of the] fourteenth amendment, does not in
the opinion of the committee refer to privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States other than those privileges embraced in the original text of the
Constitution, article 4, section 2. [Bingham and other Republicans had read this
clause as making Bill of Rights guarantees at least a moral limit on the states.] The
fourteenth amendment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities
before mentioned, but was deemed necessary for their enforcement as express
limitations on the powers of the States. It had been judicially determined that the
first eight articles of amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on the
power of the States, and it was apprehended that the same might be held of the
provision of the second section, fourth article.
H.R. REP. No. 22, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1871) (majority report presented by Rep.
Bingham).
Two months later, Bingham spoke on a bill to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against
Klan terrorism. After saying that the privileges or immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment were
chiefly set out in the Bill of Rights, Bingham said:
[The decision of Justice Washington in Weld] is only a construction of the second
section, fourth article of the original Constitution, to wit, "The citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all privileges or immunities of citizens in the several States." In
that case the court only held that in civil rights the Stale could not refuse to extend
to citizens of other States the same general rights secured to its own ... .
Is it not clear that other and different privileges and immunities than those to
which a citizen of a State was entitled are secured by the provisions of the fourteenth
article, that no state shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, which are defined in the eight articles of amendment, and which
were not limitations on the power of the States before the fourteenth amendment
made them limitations.
CONG. GLoiw, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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constitutional rights beyond those in the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly gave Congress power to enforce these guarantees.
Some of the abuses that came from slavery and continued after the
Civil War involved discrimination against non-residents as to funda-
mental interests of the conventional Article IV type.
The interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment suggested here
is much like that held by many Republicans before the Civil War. They
thought that the original Privileges or Immunities Clause had both an
equality component for out-of-staters and separate protection for fun-
damental rights recognized by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
They read the clause to say "the citizens of each state shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens [of the United States] in
the several states." 272 justice Bradley, in his Slaughter-House dissent,
captured this aspect of the Amendment.
It is pertinent to observe that both the clause of the Consti-
tution referred to, and Justice Washington in his comment
on it, speak of the privileges and immunities of citizens in a
State; not of citizens of a State. It is the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens, that is, of citizens as such, that are to be
accorded to citizens of other States when they are found in
any State; or, as Justice Washington says, "privileges and im-
munities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which be-
long, of right, to the citizens of all free governments."
It is true the courts have usually regarded the clause re-
ferred to as securing only an equality of privileges with the
citizens of the State in which the parties are found. Equality
before the law is undoubtedly one of the privileges and im-
munities of every citizen. I am not aware that any case has
arisen in which it became necessary to vindicate any other
fundamental privilege of citizenship; although rights have
been claimed which were not deemed fundamental, and have
been rejected as not within the protection of this clause. Be
this, however, as it may, the language of the clause is as I have
stated it, and seems fairly susceptible of a broader interpreta-
tion than that which makes it a guarantee of mere equality of
privileges with other citizens.
But we are not bound to resort to implication, or to the
constitutional history of England, to find an authoritative
declaration of some of the most important privileges and
272
 CuuTts, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, St1Pra note 3, at 60-61; see Crosskey, supra note 62, at
13-15.
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immunities of citizens of the United States. It is in the Con-
stitution itself. The Constitution, it is true, as it stood prior to
the recent amendments, specifies, in terms, only a few of the
personal privileges and immunities of citizens, but they are
very comprehensive in their character. The States were
merely prohibited from passing bills of attainder, ex post facto
laws, laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and perhaps
one or two more. But others of the greatest consequence were
enumerated, although they were only secured, in express
terms, from invasion by the Federal government; such as the
right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free
exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a
free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion
of public measures, the right to be secure against unreason-
able searches and seizures, and above all, and including al-
most all the rest, the right of not being deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. These, and
still others are specified in the original Constitution, or in the
early amendments of it, as among the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States, or, what is still stronger
for the force of the argument, the rights of all persons,
whether citizens or not. 273
Justice Bradley's analysis of Section 1 as applying Bill of Rights
liberties to the states was later espoused by Justice Field,'" Justice
Brewer and Justice Harlan, 275
 and much later by four twentieth
century Justices of the Supreme Court—Justices Black, Douglas,
Murphy and Rutledge."'
B. Justice Field's Dissent
In his Slaughter-House Cases dissent, Justice Field interpreted the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, in good part at least, as an equality
guarantee. Just as Article IV, Section 2 protected citizens of other states
against arbitrary and discriminatory legislation with respect to funda-
mental interests such as those specifically listed in the Civil Rights Act,
the Privileges or Immunities Clause extended a protection against
discrimination in these rights to citizens of the same state. 2" To the
273
 83 U.S. at 117-18 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
274
 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (Field, J., dissenting).
275 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S, 581, 605 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Humid° v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (Harlan,,[., dissenting)
276 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
277 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 100-01 (Field, J., dissenting).
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extent that this interpretation reaches only discrimination as to com-
mon occupations of life based on color or on some equally suspect and
arbitrary basis such as national origin or religion, it interprets the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as Senator Howard, a leading framer
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and others seem to have interpreted
the Equal Protection Clause. 278 If one interpreted the Privileges or
Immunities Clause only as containing a prohibition on discrimination
based on race and closely analogous discrimination such as national
origin, religion, and political affiliation, it would not be sufficient to
void the slaughter-house monopoly.
Divergent statements in the debates leave unanswered questions.
If one insists on a national body of fundamental economic interests
Now, what the clause in question does for the protection of citizens of one State
against the creation of monopolies in favor of citizens of other States, the fourteenth
amendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States against
the creation of any monopoly whatever. The privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, of every one of them, is secured against abridgment in any
limn by any State. The fourteenth amendment. places them under the guardianship
()I' the National authority. All monopolies in any known trade or nmonfitcture are
an invasion of these privileges ... .
Id. For a modern attempt to read the Privileges or Immunities Clause as such a guarantee of
instate equality, see Harrison, supra note 3, at 1388, 1412 n.103.
278 Cosre.. Glom, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from
depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he
may he, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to
him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation
in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to
a code not applicable to another. It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a
crime for which the white man is not to he hanged, It protects the black man in
his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws over the
white man. Is it not time, Mr. President, that we extend to the black man, 1 had
almost called it the poor privilege of the equal protection of the law? Ought not
the time to be now passed when one measure of justice is to be meted out to a
member of one caste while another and a different measure is meted out 10 the
member of another caste, both castes being alike citizens of the United States, both
bound to obey the same laws, to sustain the burdens of the same Government, and
both equally responsible to justice and to God for the deeds done in the body?
Id. (statement of Sen. Howard). After quoting the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,
which he saw as embodying the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, Senator Poland said:
Notwithstanding this we know that Stale laws exist, and some of them of very recent
enactment, in direct violation of these principles. Congress has already shown its
desire and intention to uproot and destroy all such partial State legislation in the
passage of . . . the civil rights bill. The power of Congress to do this has been
doubted	 It certainly seems desirable that no doubt should be left existing as
to the power of Congress to e»force principles lying at the very foundation of all
republican government if they be denied or violated by the States, and I cannot
doubt but that every Senator will rejoice in aiding to remove all doubt upon this
power of Congress.
Id. at 2961 (statement of Sen. Poland).
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beyond those in the Bill of Rights, or even on a right to general equality
of all citizens in fundamental economic interests created by state law,
then under the Enforcement Clause, the federal government could
preempt most areas of state law. Most Republicans seemed quite un-
willing to authorize this. On this point, it is simply impossible to fully
harmonize all the conflicting strands of the debates. A limited, but not
entirely textual, class of individual rights plus a limited right to equality
probably comes as close as possible to capturing the major motivations
of the framers to protect fundamental constitutional rights, outlaw
racial and similarly invidious discrimination, and preserve a large role
for the states.
1. A Critique of Recent Scholarly Support for Justice Field
John Harrison in an elaborate article argues that Field's analogy
to Article IV, Section 2 was at least one, and perhaps the only, proper
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. He further sug-
gests that the Equal Protection Clause did not proscribe racial clas-
sifications conferring and withholding substantive rights but instead
referred to "the mechanisms through which the government secured
individuals and their rights against invasion by others."279
 Elsewhere
Harrison notes that it "is likely that the [Equal Protection] Clause also
governs the content of protective laws. "280
 "[O]ne way of depriving
someone of the benefit of a law would be to pass another that took the
benefit away . . . "281
 Still, he suggests the Clause was focused on equal-
ity in protection of existing rights, not on entitlement to substantive
rights such as the ownership of real property. That, as he sees it, was
the work of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. There are parts of the
framing debates that some read as consistent with this view of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 282
Still, a number of members of Congress in 1866 read "equal
protection" to proscribe at least some irrational classifications in the
allocation of substantive rights, such as those related to property. Many
also read the Clause to require protection for existing fundamental
rights and interests. The prototype of the Equal Protection Clause
279 Harrison, supra note 3, at 1435, 1450.
299
 Id. at 1448.
291 Id.
282 See id. at 1447; see also CONG. Gi.oisE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Bingham); cf. Phillip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate Abrntt
Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 Sup. Or. REV. 295, 378-92; Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth
Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am, j. LEGAL 1-11.sT. 305, 325-29 (1988); Earl M.
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allowed Congress to secure "to all persons in the several states equal
protection in the rights to life, liberty, and property."2" Representative
Hale objected that the Clause would allow Congress to provide what
property rights should belong to married women. This, Hale insisted,
should be a matter of state law. Thaddeus Stevens interrupted and
disagreed with Hale. He accepted Hale's assumption that "equal pro-
tection" reached substantive rights like property. He seemed to believe,
however, that the classification was not irrational. "When a distinction
is made between two married people or two femmes sole, then it is
unequal legislation; but where all of the same class are dealt with in
the same way then there is no pretense of inequality."
For Stevens, equal protection required that similarly situated peo-
ple be treated equally. Blacks and whites were similarly situated with
reference to property and contract rights; married women and men
were not. Senator Howard said the Equal Protection Clause:
abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with
the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to another. It prohibits hanging a black man for a
crime for which a white man is not to be hanged. It protects
the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the
same shield which it throws over the white man. 2"
For a number of Republicans who spoke in 1866, equality of
protection encompassed equality in substantive rights like the right to
own property and to inherit. Indeed, at times Harrison notes a sig-
nificant overlap between his reading of the Equal Protection and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses. The greater the overlap, the greater
the possibility that the interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause limiting it to equality in substantive state law rights has reduced
it to a purely redundant provision. 28" In light of all this history, the
Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws—A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
499 (1985).
283
 CON6. CLORE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
284 Id. at 1064 (statement of Rep. Stevens).
285
 Id, at 2766 (statement of Sen. Howard).
286
 See id. at 1064; id. at 2961 (statement of Sen. Poland); see also id. at 2459 (statement of
Rep. Stevens) (summarizing first section as "prohibiting states from abridging the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, or unlawfully depriving them of life, liberty, or
property, or of denying to any person within their jurisdiction the 'equal' protection of the laws").
After emphasizing the word "equal" in the Equal Protection Clause with quotation marks, Stevens
went on to describe Section 1. Id. at 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens). Although it is not entirely
clear, Stevens seems to have read the Equal Protection Clause as fbrbidding racial classifications
with reference to a wide range of laws, including laws touching interests that are fundamental in
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Court's current construction of the Equal Protection Clause as reach-
ing some types of discrimination in allocation of substantive rights is
quite reasonable.
the Article IV sense. While he emphasized "equal" in his summary of Section 1 with quotation
marks, in his statement that "the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon
all," he again emphasized "equally," this time with italics. See id. at 2459 (statement of Rep.
Stevens). Section 1, he said,
allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law
which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all. Whatever law punishes
a white man for a crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same wily and
to the same extent. Whatever law protects the white man shall afford "equal'
protection to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall he
afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in court shall allow the
man of color to do the same.
Id. (statement of Rep. Stevens). One possibility is that the Equal Protection Clause "governs the
administration or execution of the laws rather than their content. But if protection refers only
to application and not to substance, the clause is not all encompassing and could not generate
the Civil Rights Act of 1866." Harrison, supra note 3, at 1434. The problem is that in Congress
in 1866 protection seems as often to have been spoken of as encompassing equality in the
substance of the right (to contract or to own property) as in this more limited fashion. Repre-
sentative Shellabarger insisted, except to the extent that it involved citizenship, that the Civil
Rights Bill simply outlawed racial discrimination:
It does not prohibit you from discriminating between citizens of the same race, or
of different races, as to what their rights to testify, to inherit, &c., shalt he. But if
you do discriminate, it must not be "on account of race, color, or former condition
of slavery." That is all. If you permit a white man who is an infidel to testify, so must
you a colored infidel.
Self evidentlythis is the whole effect of this first section. It secures—not to all
citizens, but to all races as races who are citizens—equality of protection in those
enumerated civil rights which the States may deem proper to confer upon any
races.... It does seem to me that that Government which has the exclusive right
to confer citizenship, and which is entitled to demand service and allegiance, which
is supreme over that due to any State, may, nay, must protect those citizens in those
rights which are fairly conducive and appropriate to the attainment of his "protec-
tion" as a citizen. And I think those rights to contract, sue, testif inherit, &c., which
this bill says the races shall hold as races in equality, are of that class which are fairly
conducive and necessary as means to the constitutional end, to wit, the protection
of the rights of person and property of a citizen.
Who will say that Ohio can pass a law enacting that no man of the German race
and whom the United States has made a citizen of the United States, shall ever own
any property in Ohio, or shall make a contract in Ohio, or ever inherit property in
Ohio, or ever come into Ohio to live, or even to work? If Ohio may pass such a law
. then you have the spectacle of an American citizen admitted to all its high
privileges, and entitled to the protection of his Government in each of these rights,
... and yet that citizen is not entitled to either contract, inherit or own property....
If each one of these rights is necessary to secure that which must, as we have seen,
be within the powers of the Government, to wit, the securing of the "protection of
an American citizen," then the bill is constitutional.
Coml. GLOM, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293-94 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); cf. id. at
1088. The idea that States could deny aliens the right to own real property, by the understanding
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Since all legislation classifies and much legislation affects property
and contract, Justice Field's approach potentially opened a wide field
of state economic regulation to judicial scrutiny. Since the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce its provisions by
appropriate legislation, state systems of classification would be subject
to congressional revision and preemption. To the extent that judicially
suspect classifications are limited to race and closely analogous groups
like national origin, religion, political affiliation, and (today) gender
and other invidious bases, the threat to the role of the states is greatly
reduced. Today, with the greatly expanded effect of the Commerce
Clause, in part as the result of an increasingly integrated national and
international economy, broad federal power is commonplace. It was
not commonplace in 1866.
2. Justice Field and Lochner
The majority in Slaughter-House viewed the statute as a plausible
health measure. Justices Field and Bradley saw health as a pretext. They
agreed that state police powers could limit economic rights, but re-
served the right to judge the rationality of the statute for themselves. 2'7
In his insistence that laws regulating economic rights be generally
applicable and in his willingness to subject claimed health benefits to
searching scrutiny, Justice Field's dissent anticipates Lochner era juris-
prudence. The immediate application by Justice Field was less extreme.
To the extent that his decision could be limited simply to prohibiting
state-granted monopolies in the common occupations of life, it reaches
a desirable, though debatable, result. 258 To the extent that the reach is
far broader, it delegates questions of reasonableness of much economic
of 1866, but had to protect them in the right to life, etc., is said to support the limitation of the
Equal Protection Clause to equality in matters other than substantive rights. For many in 1866,
however, the problem was solved not. by this distinction, but by the idea of reasonable classifica-
tion. See CONG. Ca.otsx, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens); id.
(statement of Rep. Hale); Harrison, supra note 3, at 1442-43; cf. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess, 1293 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger) (suggesting that under Civil Rights Act States
could deny married women right to testify and contract, but could nut deny those rights to other
races). The problem of reasonable classification recurs under an interpretation which limits
equality in funchunental interests to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. One is then forced to
explain why some Republicans in 18116 thought married women, who were citizens, could he
denied the right to contract or own and control property. For Harrison on the "significant"
overlap, see Harrison, supra note 3, at 1450.
287 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. 36, 87-88, 107, 109 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 112 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
288 Cl Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. Ct, for Trial of Impeachments and
Correction of Errors 1812).
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legislation to the judiciary. As decisions from the Lochner era show,
enthusiasm for what such a system produces depends on one's eco-
nomic situation and whether one shares the ideology of the judge
making the decision.
V. CASES FOLLOWING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE
The Slaughter-House Cases majority invoked the paradigm of the
semi-sovereign state, modified to prevent denial of certain rights to
blacks, and insisted that almost all a citizen's basic rights were created
and protected by state law. 289
 So, the majority, implicitly at least, re-
jected the idea that any Bill of Rights liberties limited the states. After
all, it would hardly be necessary to dredge up "privileges" such as the
right to visit seaports, to seek the protection of the federal government
on the high seas and in foreign nations, to visit sub-treasuries, and to
travel back and forth to Washington, D.C., if Bill of Rights liberties
were examples of such privileges. In the cases that followed Slaughter-
House, the implication became explicit.
A. United States v. Cruikshank and the State Action Syllogism
In United States v. Cruikshank, 29" the defendants were indicted for
conspiring to deprive Americans of African descent of privileges or
immunities allegedly secured by the Constitution, including the right
to assemble and to bear arms. The Court cited the Slaughter-House
decision to establish the limited nature of rights protected by the
Federal Constitution. The federal government, the Court noted, "can
neither grant nor secure to its citizens any right or privilege not
expressly or by implication placed under its jurisdiction." 291 The right
to assemble was not created by the Constitution. "It was not, therefore,
a right granted to the people by the Constitution. The government of
the United States when established found it in existence, with the
obligation on the part of the States to afford it protection."292
The Court cited the rule of Barron v. Baltimore?'" as settled doc-
trine. Eight years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court said it was "now too late to question" the idea that states
were free to violate liberties in the Federal Bill of Rights. 294
289 Slaughter-Huusc Cases, 83 U.S. 36,62-66,71-72 (1872).
29(1 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
291 Id. at 550.
292
 Id. at 550-51.
291/ 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
2' 04
 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
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The particular amendment now under consideration assumes
the existence of the right of the people to assemble for lawful
purposes, and protects it against encroachment by Congress.
The right was not created by the amendment; neither was its
continuance guaranteed, except as against congressional in-
terference. For their protection in its enjoyment, therefore,
the people must look to the States. The power for that pur-
pose was originally placed there, and it has never been sur-
rendered to the United States. 295
Had the indictment alleged a conspiracy to interfere with a petition
to the national government, the Court said, federal power to protect
the petitioners would have existed. 296 That would have been so even
if the Fourteenth Amendment never had been enacted.
Consistent with this view, the federal government also lacked
power to protect African-Americans in their right to bear arms.
This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than
to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the
people to look for their protection against any violation by
their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes, to [state police
powers] . . . "not surrendered or restrained" by the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 297
In short, contrary to the popular understanding and the under-
standing of leading Republicans in the 39th Congress, the argument
claims American citizens did not possess any of the privileges or rights
set out in the Bill of Rights as a protection against action of their states.
The claim to protection against individual violence was weaker still.
American citizens had no right to free speech, to free press, and no
general right to assemble. They simply had a protection against federal
interference with such rights, and would actually enjoy the rights if
they happened to exist by state law and if the state chose not to
terminate them. The pre-Civil War paradigm of the semi-sovereign
state, free to deprive all its citizens of fundamental rights set out in the
Bill of Rights, was resurrected largely intact by the Supreme Court.
Of course, overt racial discrimination, at least as to certain rights,
was forbidden. 298 By 1896 the Court said that state-mandated racial
295
296 Id. at 553.
297 Id.
2" See, e.g., Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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segregation of railroads did not violate any constitutional obligation of
the states to its citizens. 29"
The idea that the federal government had to create a personal
liberty before it could protect it is odd. By natural rights views widely
held in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, governments did not
create rights to free speech or press or the right to bear arms. Govern-
ments simply recognized them and were established to protect them.
Cruikshank itself recognized that the federal government could protect
the right to petition Congress—even though the right to petition was
not created by the Constitution. This was so for structural reasons—the
right was inherent in republican government."' The Constitution also
provides that the United States shall guarantee to each state a repub-
lican form of government"' a fact not discussed in Cruikshank.
In any case, the Cruikshank Court adhered to the state action
syllogism. The Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of the states;
individuals are not states; therefore the federal government lacks
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to reach private action."'
Power in the federal government to protect rights in the Bill of
Rights against individual invasion raises the problem of a limitless
federal jurisdiction that could fully absorb the powers of the states. If
the federal government could enforce rights to life, liberty and prop-
erty against all private invasions, the separate sphere for the states
would disappear. A prototype of the Fourteenth Amendment had given
Congress power to secure to all persons equal protection in the rights
to life, liberty and property. It encountered substantial opposition
because of the fear that it could make virtually the entire domain of
state law subject to federal preemption."'
29)
 Messy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3m See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53.
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning
Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers
or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship,
and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by the United States. The
very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to
petition for a redress of grievances. If it had been alleged in these counts that the
object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case
would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the
United States.
Id.
"I U.S. Corqs -r. art. IV, § 4.
3")2
 For possible qualifications, see Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553-54.
3(13
 Of the prototype, Representative Hale said: "I submit it is in effect a provision under which
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The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wanted both to pro-
tect individuals' fundamental rights from invasion and also to preserve
federalism. Accomplishing both objectives requires accommodation
and judicial creativity, but accommodation would hardly have been
beyond the power of a Court genuinely interested in preserving both
individual rights and federalism. The Court could reasonably have held
that only those private actions undertaken with the specific intent of
depriving persons of constitutional rights would be within the power
of Congress. For example, murder or burglary deprives a person of life
or property without due process, but the object of the action is not to
do so. In contrast, lynching a prisoner before trial to punish him for
an alleged crime is specifically designed to deprive a person of a
constitutional right. Again, assault or murder is ordinarily a matter of
state law. An assault in 1872 in North Carolina, for example, for the
purpose of punishing a person for espousing Republican party doc-
trine would be something Congress could make a federal crime. In
such cases, the private party seeks to exercise what is exclusively a state
power for the purpose of depriving a citizen of a constitutional right."'
all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the
individual citizen, may be overridden ;111d the law of- Congress established instead." Com:. Cd.onE,
39th Cong., lst Sess. 1063-64 (1866) (statement. of Rep. Hale). Hale was not upset with a plan
to require states to obey the Bill of Rights, because he thought (mistakenly) that existing law
already made the Bill ()I' Rights a limit on the states. Id. (statement of Rep. Hale). On Hale's
concerti for federalism, see id. at 1065 (statement of Rep. Hale). Giles Hotchkiss had two
objections to die prototype. It failed permanently to secure the rights it sought to protect, because
it left the matter up to Congress, and what the present Congress passed a subsequent one could
repeal. Id. at 1095 (statement of Rep. •otchkiss). Second, he objected because he understood
"the amendment as rum proposed by its terms to authorize Congress to establish uniform laws
throughout the United States upon the subject named, the protection of life, liberty, or property.
I ant unwilling that.CAntgress Shall have any such power." Id, (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss). He
agreed with the object of the Clause, "that no Slate shall discriminate between its citiz.ens and
give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another." Id. (statement of Rep.
Hotchkiss). Senator Steward suggested that the loot( aype would "obviate the necessity of ... any
more State Legislatures." Id. at 1082 (statement. tit' Sen. Steward).
501-1 -he state action question is complex, and the discusskilk here is incomplete. Of course,
die Fourteenth Amendment debates highlight Republican concern with preserving Federalism.
Advocates of a strung state action limit point to the change in the form of the Fourteenth
Amendment from one giving Congress power to legislate generally to secure equal protection,
etc., to one establishing citizenship, putting limits on states, and providing power to enforce these
provisions. liven advocates of a stronger state action limit might concede that state inaction—fail-
ure to protect—might trigger congressional power.
Abolitionist legal theorist Joel TifIliny argued (before the Fourteenth Amendment) that the
provisions of the Bill of Rights limited the suites and that Congress had power to enforce the
guarantees, if slates by positive enactments had :tuthorized a violation of basic rights. Join.
TIFFANY, TREATISE ON TIIE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY or SLAVERY 55-57,85 (1849).
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At the very least, the guarantee of republican government coupled with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments should be sufficient to reach
all private violence aimed at political speech, press, and association.
Something like this solution seems to have been reached on one
occasion by Republicans in Congress who were concerned with Ku
Klux Klan atrocities, constitutional limitations and preserving the role
of the states. The Enforcement Act of 1871 punished those who "shall
conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway or upon
the premises of another for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of
depriving a person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws." 305 By this ap-
proach, most crimes would have remained exclusively state matters.
Those crimes specifically designed to deprive a person of constitutional
rights would have been subject to both state and federal prosecution.
Nor should one conclude that such power would necessarily allow
preemption of state laws protecting against private violence aimed at
free speech. The nature of the federal system could broadly protect
such traditional state activity from federal preemption, provided the
state remedy did not seek to nullify the federal one.
B. The Decimation of the Bill of Rights as Applied by the
Fourteenth Amendment
After the Slaughter-House Cases, rejections of Bill of Rights guaran-
tees as limiting the states came thick and fast. The rights to bear arms
and to assemble were rejected in Cruikshank as was the right to a civil
jury trial in Walker v. Sauvinet,"' grand jury indictment in Hurtado v.
California,m7 and criminal jury trial in Maxwell v. Dow."'
Maxwell involved a gunfighter convicted of bank robbery by a jury
of eight. 3°9 In an opinion written by Justice Peckham, the Court held
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of jury trial required a jury of twelve
in federal prosecutions, but the Sixth Amendment did not limit the
states in a similar fashion. 31 "
Protection of the rights of life and personal liberty within the
respective states, rests alone with the states. But if all these
rights are included in the phrase "privileges and immunities"
of citizens of the United States, which the states by reason of
303 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (emphasis added).
3°6 92 U.S. 90 (1876),
3°7 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
3°8 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
3°9 Id. at 582.
310 Id. at 604.
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the Fourteenth Amendment cannot in any manner abridge,
then the sovereignty of the state in regard to them has been
entirely destroyed, and the Slaughter-House Cases and
United States v. Cruikshank are all wrong, and should be
overruled.'"
Justice Peckham cited a host of cases rejecting application of the
Bill of Rights to the states." 1
As to Maxwell's due process challenge, the Court announced:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere
with the power of a state to protect the lives, liberty, and
property of its citizens, nor with the exercise of that power in
the adjudications of the courts of a state in administering
process provided by the law of the state. 3 ' 3
The Court further announced that "due process of law, within the
meaning of the Constitution, is secured when the laws operate on
all alike, and no one is subjected to partial or arbitrary exercise of
the powers of government.'"
As the Fourteenth Amendment shrank as a protection for liberties
in the Bill of Rights, it grew as a protection for liberty of contract. In
Maxwell, Justice Peckham had been extraordinarily solicitous to pro-
tect state power and the ability of the electorate to chart its own course
by eliminating rights like jury trial and others set out in the Bill of
Rights. Justice Peckham intoned:
It is emphatically the case of the people by their organic law
providing for their own affairs, and we are of opinion they
are much better judges of what they ought to have in these
respects than anyone else can be . . . . [T]tle people can be
trusted to look out and care for themselves.'''
C. Lochner: Slaughter-House Revised and Meyer:
Slaughter-House Rewritten
But in Lochner v. New York, ' 6
	Peckham held that a New
York law, limiting bakers to working ten-hour days and no more than
sixty hours per week, violated liberty of contract protected by the Due
311 Id. at 593.
112 Id. at 591-98.
313 Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 603.
314 Id.
315
 Id. at 604-05.
316 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Process Clause. The New York legislature had justified the statute as a
health measure. For Peckham, however, "limiting the hours in which
grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere
meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual" unless the
Court was satisfied of a substantial danger to health. 317
 The very sub-
stantial evidence of health problems produced in Justice Harlan's
dissent did not satisfy justice Peckham.s's In Maxwell, Justice Peckham
had indicated that laws that did not operate on all alike, or that were
partial or arbitrary, could violate the Fourteenth Amendment. He
seems to have thought the Lochner case met this test.
Justice Peckham believed that the real motive for the legislation
was to equalize bargaining power between employer and employee. In
such a case, "the freedom of master and employee to contract with
each other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same,
cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal
Constitution."319 Justice Peckham made no mention of the Slaughter-
House Cases he had cited so extensively in Maxwell, or of dual sover-
eignty, or of the ability of the people to take care of themselves in the
state legislative process.
Lochner used free labor rhetoric—the right of grown "men" to
make contracts as they pleased and to decide whether and how to sell
their labor. On a formal level, the rhetoric resonates with some anti-
slavery free labor rhetoric. Contract rights had been denied to slaves,
and abolitionists and later Republicans had complained about the
denial. But by using the free labor logic to treat the individual laborer
and the giant corporate enterprise as equal bargaining agents, the
approach spawned by Lochnergenuflected to the form of the free labor
ideology while ignoring its substance. It provided the shell of the idea
without the kernel.
One assumption behind Lochner era jurisprudence was that gov-
ernment redistribution of wealth was a constitutionally impermissible
objective. Whatever merits this idea may have had have been under-
mined by the Sixteenth Amendment, giving Congress a broad power
to levy a progressive income tax. This power is coupled with the power
to spend to promote the general welfare. Furthermore, virtually any
government action, including court decisions on "freedom of con-
tract," channels the distribution of wealth.
The substantive liberty of contract the Court found in the Due
Process Clause began to grow into a broader protection for per-
m 7 ./ii. at 61.
318 Id. at 65, 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'31" Id. at 64.
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sonal liberties. In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska,32° the Court struck down
a Nebraska statute that made it a crime to teach the German lan-
guage below the eighth grade in the public schools. The Court found
the statute violated personal liberty, but it did not cite the as yet
unincorporated First Amendment. The Slaughter-House Cases, which
had insisted that citizens must look to state governments for protec-
tion of basic rights, was mustered into combat on behalf of a broad
reading of individual liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is
one of the most extraordinary uses of precedent in the history of the
Court:
Without doubt, [liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to ac-
quire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men. 321
D. Palko and Selective Application of Bill of Rights
Guarantees to the Stales
By the time Palko v. Connecticut was decided, some liberties in the
Bill of Rights, such as free speech and free exercise of religion, had
been held to limit the states. Others, such as the right to a jury trial,
the privilege against self-incrimination and the immunity from double
jeopardy, had not. Justice Cardozo, with apparently unconscious irony,
proceeded to explain why some, but not all, Bill of Rights liberties were
protected from state action under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The exclusion of these immunities and privileges [jury trial, the
privilege against self-incrimination, etc.] from the privileges
and immunities protected against the action of the States has
not been arbitrary or casual. It has been dictated by a study
and appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications,
of liberty itself.
320 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
321 Id. at 399 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 351 (1886) arid Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1872)).
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We reach a different plane of social and moral values when
we pass to the privileges and immunities that have been taken
over from the earlier articles of the Federal Bill of Rights and
brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of
absorption. These in their origin were effective against the
federal government alone. If the Fourteenth Amendment has
absorbed them, the process of absorption has had its source
in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed. This is true, for illustration, of freedom of
thought and speech. 322
The reader will recall that the Fourteenth Amendment also uses the
words "privileges or immunities." It provides, "No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." 323
Justice Cardozo made no use of the Slaughter
-House Cases and its
progeny in Polka. This is hardly surprising. Decisions holding that
citizens' liberties are a matter of state law and that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not designed to modify the holding in Barron v.
Baltimore do not fit well with a doctrine of selective application.
Still, Slaughter-House was cited in 1947 in Adamson v. California, 324
in which, by a bare majority, the Court rejected the claim that the
privilege against self-incrimination limited the states. Justice Black and
three other dissenting justices concluded that all the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights should limit the states. 325
 As Justice Black put it,
I cannot consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th
Century "strait jacket" as the Twining opinion did. Its provi-
sions may be thought outdated abstractions by some. And it
is true that they were designed to meet ancient evils. But they
are the same kind of human evils that have emerged from
century to century wherever excessive power is sought by the
few at the expense of the many. In my judgment the people
of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a Bill of Rights
like ours survives and its basic purposes are conscientiously
interpreted, enforced and respected so as to afford continu-
322
 Palk() v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (citations omitted).
323
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
324 332 U.S. 46, 51 (1947).
325 Id. at 68, 124 (Black, J., dissenting).
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ous protection against old, as well as new, devices and prac-
tices which might thwart those purposes. 326
In the years that followed, most guarantees of the Bill of Rights were
held to limit the states under the Due Process Clause, and less and
less attention was paid to the Slaughter-House Cases.
It is natural to assume that both the refusal to apply Bill of Rights
limits to the states and the broad application of the state action doc-
trine were, at the time at least, inevitable readings of Section I. By this
view, criticisms of the Court are anachronistic."27 Before Slaughter-
House, however, some judges had found that Bill of Rights liberties
limited the states under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
federal government had power to punish Klan assaults on individual
rights."28 Professor John N. Pomeroy, in his 1868 Introduction to Consti-
tutional Law, believed that the Fourteenth Amendment had corrected
the result: in Barron v. Baltimore. 329 Dean Richard Aynes has argued that
several other scholars writing before the decision in Slaughter-House
agreed.'" Thomas Cooley, the premier legal scholar of the age, seems
not to have spoken on the subject before the Supreme Court's Slaugh-
ter-House decision and was more sympathetic with the result reached."'
It is also natural to assume that, of course, Supreme Court justices
who had lived through the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
would give us a correct exposition of its meaning. Why would a Court,
most of whose members had been appointed by Republican presidents,
326 Id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
327 See generally Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Mite
Court, 1978 SUP. Cr. REV. 39 (1979).
328 .3re United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282); Cuirms, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 160, 171-72; ROBERT RACZOROWSIO, THE POLITICS Or
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, THE Couwrs, THE DEPARTMENT OFIUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1866.-
1876) 125-26, 129, 131 (1985); Letter from Justice Bradley to Justice Woods (Mar. 17, 1871) (on
file with Bradley Papers New Jersey Historical Society).
329 See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 3, at 172-73.
""Ayues, supra note 62, at 85 (quoting TIMOTI IY FERRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION
OE THE UNITED STATES 546 (3d ed. 1872)).
831 Cf GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITIMON 01 ,"11 I E UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CARE-
FULLY ANNOTATED 290 (1868); FERRAR, supra note 330, at 546 (positing Barron and its progeny
had been "entirely swept away" by Fourteenth Amendment). Michael I.es Benedict. emphasizes
the strength of conceptions of dual sovereignty among legal scholars. Benedict, ,victirct note 327,
at 52-53 n.39. The view is not necessarily in conflict with limits on state authority as the Ex Post
Facto Clause and the Contracts Clause show, See id. It is, however, entirely in conflict with the
broad power that the Slaughter-House plaintiffs claimed courts possess to judge the reasonableness
of state legislation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See id.; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1937 (Thomas Cooley, ed. 1873)
(generally supporting Slaughter-House-type analysis).
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get it so very wrong? Dean Richard Aynes suggests that most members
of the Slaughter-House majority were hostile to the basic goals of the
Fourteenth Amendment because of reservations about racial equality
and concerns for federalism."' If so, that fact offers some explanation
for the majority's extraordinary liquidation of the Privileges or Imuni-
ties Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION: SLAUGHTER-HOUSE AND ECONOMIC "LIBERTIES"
The Civil Rights Act gave all citizens the same right to contract as
enjoyed by white citizens. The Act was not designed to affect substan-
tive contract rules in the states, but to eliminate racial and similar
discrimination against citizens. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Equal Protection Clause obviously reached beyond racial
discrimination. Section 1 prohibited denial of privileges or immunities
to citizens and denial of equal protection to any person. Although
admittedly there is some disagreement in the debate, the primary focus
of the Fourteenth Amendment was on personal liberties for all Ameri-
can citizens and equal protection for groups like blacks, unionists and
people of a particular national origin or political or religious faith. The
better reading is that it simply does not prohibit laws such as those
requiring a minimum wage or an eight-hour work day. Such laws do
affect Fundamental interests of the Article IV sort. But the basis of
classification is not race, national origin, religion, political opinion or
a similarly invidious basis. To the extent that the anti-discrimination
provisions of the Amendment are read in light of the general approach
of the Civil Rights Act and in light of the types of problems Republicans
and the nation focused on in connection with drafting and ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment, many classifications affecting wages,
hours, job safety, etc. would not be suspect. The Act, Representative
Shellabarger said, "does not prohibit you from discriminating between
citizens of the same race . as to what their rights ... shall be." 3" The
Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, did reach some classifica-
tions affecting people of the same race, but pretty clearly not all such
classifications were suspect.
Because they typically have exemptions—exemptions that may be
required to get any law on the subject through the legislature—wage,
hour and job safety laws could be treated as discriminating. There is,
"2 Aynes, supra note 72, at 655-70.
333 Corto. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866); cf.  id. at 1832 (statement of Rep.
Lawrence) ("It does not confer any civil right, but so far as there is any power in the States to
limit, enlarge, or declare civil rights, all of these are left to the States.").
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however, little indication in debates on the Fourteenth Amendment
that such regulations were the concern either of Congress or the
nation or that they were among the constellation of evils epitomized
by the slave power.
In many ways Republicans advocated expanded opportunity—sub-
sidized education, generous homestead laws, and land-grant colleges
for those with limited resources. They financed the Civil War in part
by a modestly progressive income tax. Radicals insisted on dividing up
estates of former slaveholders—forty acres and a mule—but the party
refused to follow their lead."' As Akhil Amar puts it, with his charac-
teristic eloquence, Republicans believed "property is such a good thing
. . . so constitutive, so essential for both individual and collective self=
governance," that "every citizen should have some."335
Slavery used the market economy to buy and sell human beings.
Slavery produced great concentrations of economic power which in
turn produced political power. As Republicans saw it, the concentrated
economic and political power spawned by slavery was a major threat
to democratic institutions. As Abraham Lincoln noted in 1860:
[A]bout one sixth of the whole population of the United
States are slaves! The owners of these slaves consider them
property. The effect upon the minds of the owners is that of
property ... it induces them to insist on all that will favorably
affect its value as property, to demand laws and institutions
and a public policy that shall increase and secure its value,
and make it durable, lasting, and universal . . . . Whether the
owners of this species of property do really see it as it is, it is
not for me to say, but if they do, they see it as it is through
2,000,000,000 dollars, and that is a pretty thick coating. 3n
"The slave power," recalled Representative Farnsworth in 1864,
got the control of the government, of the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial departments. [T]hey got possession of the
high places of society. They took possession of the churches.
They took possession of the lands. Then it became criminal
334 See MCPHERSON, supra note 107, at 193, 443, 450-51; William E. Forbath, Why is This
Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and 1?eimagining the Constitu-
tion, 46 STAN, L. Riiv. 1771, 1794-95 (1994).
331 Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimum Entitlements,
13 HAnv. J.L. & Pun. POLY 37 (1990); see Forbath, supra note 334, at 1795.
336 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES, LETTERS, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, THE LINCOLN-
DouGLAs DEBATES (1859-1865) 134 (Library of America 1989).
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for a man to open his lips in denunciation of the evil and sin
of slaveholding. 337
Slavery, as Republicans saw it, had caused the Civil War. In his
message to Congress in December, 1861, Abraham Lincoln warned
that "the insurrection is largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first
principle of popular government—the right of the people." 338 He cited
"labored arguments" advanced by Confederates "to prove that large
control of the people in government, is the source of all political
evil." 339 In the next paragraph of his message he warned of "the effort
to place capital on an equal footing with, if not above labor, in the
structure of government." 340 "Labor," Lincoln insisted, "is the superior
of capital, and deserves much higher consideration."341 He noted with
satisfaction that most men neither worked for others nor had others
working for them, and he noted those hired by the capitalist could
reasonably hope in time to become independent, and perhaps even
hire others themselves. 342 In 1864 one Republican warned that slavery
"makes the laborer the mere tool of the capitalist." 343 Senator Henry
Wilson insisted that "we have advocated the rights of the black man
because the black man was the most oppressed type of the toiling men
in this country . The same influences that go to keep down . the
right of the poor black man . . . bear down and oppress the poor white
laboring man."34" When President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Freed-
man's Bureau Bill which provided aid and security for newly freed
slaves, he insisted that the newly freed slaves would be amply protected
by the law of supply and demand. Senator Lot Morrill of Maine noted
that southern courts were not protecting newly freed slaves. He re-
sponded:
In a condition of destitution and suffering and want, the
black man cries to the nation for recognition of his manhood,
for protection; the nation answers back, there is for you, no
protection, no courts, no rights civil or political; in the Ian-
337 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2979 (1864) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
338 LINCOLN, supra note 336, at 295.
:1.39
346 Id.
Sat
	 at 296.
342 Id. at 297.
'343 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2948 (1864) (statement of Rep. Shannon), in Lea S.
VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. Rliv. 437, 471 (1989).
344 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866) (statement of Sen. Wilson); see Van-
derVelde, supra note 343, at 483-84.
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guage of the chief Executive, you are left to "the great law of
supply and demand." 3'15
Translation of Republican values to the economic consolidation
and monopoly power that began to accelerate in the later nineteenth
century is far from a simple matter, but there is little in the record to
suggest that huge concentrations of economic power were to be pro-
tected from regulation by the Fourteenth Amendment. The free labor
ideology emphasized the labor theory of value and insisted that eco-
nomic independence was essential for a free society. It would be ironic
indeed if an ideology that emphasized the importance of economic
independence was translated into a tool to secure domination by a
corporate capitalism that threatened and threatens the independence
of corporate employees and the existence of the small and inde-
pendent artisans, farmers, and independent business people that the
free labor ideology cherished. It would be ironic to read it as denying
workers the minimum standards of compensation essential to the dig-
nity and independence so many Republicans found essential. Indeed,
Lea VanderVelde even suggests that the Thirteenth Amendment leads
in the opposite direction. "Since the framers considered token wages
to be merely a perpetuation of slavery under another guise, all laborers
should have a legitimate claim to a certain minimal wage levei."" 4 " The
Gilded Age Republican party that became closely identified with big
business was a far different party than the one that captured the
presidency in 1860.
In the years after the Civil War, as business became consolidated
in trusts and monopolies and economic power became more central-
ized, many Americans saw a new political and economic power, similar
to the "slave power" threatening the independence of the small busi-
ness person, the farmer and the worker. As economic change trans-
formed people from farmers, small business people and independent
artisans to regimented workers in vast industrial empires, Populists
believed both liberty and democracy were at risk. "The unholy and
lawless determination to acquire wealth and personal comfort at the
expense of a weaker and less fortunate race, was the underlying spirit
of slavery," wrote Populist James B. Weaver.m 7 But "in the very midst of
the struggle for the overthrow of the slave oligarchy, our institutions
345 CON G. GLoisE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. in, 156 (1866) (statement of Sen. Murrill); see.
VanderVelde, .supra note 343, at 485.
sallVanderVelde, supra note 343, at 499.
347
 JAMES WEAVER, CALL To AcI'toN, quoted in NORMAN POLLACK, TILE JUST POLITY 63 (1987).
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were assailed by another foe mightier than the former, equally cruel,
wider in its field of operation, infinitely greater in wealth, and immeas-
urably more difficult to control."848 Weaver said, "lilt will be readily
understood that we allude to the sudden growth of corporate power
. .""8 "Slavery was restricted within narrow geographical limits and
the visible manifestations of the evil were repulsive . . . Not so with
the present foe of justice and social order. It assails the rights of man
under the most seductive guise."85"
You meet it in every walk of life. It speaks through the press,
gives zeal and eloquence to the bar, engrosses the constant
attention of the bench, organizes the influences which sur-
round our legislative bodies and courts of justice, designates
who shall be the Regents and Chancellors in our leading
Universities, determines who shall be our Senators, how our
legislatures shall be organized, who shall preside over them
and who constitute the important committees. It is imperial
in political caucuses . . . has unlimited resources of ready
cash, is expert in political intrigue and pervades every com-
munity from the center to the circumference of the Repub-
lic. 3"
Some nineteenth century large corporations paid workers only in
script redeemable only at the company store. Corporations used their
market power to tie one transaction—employment—to another, the
duty to shop at the company store. The employment contract guaran-
teed the large corporation a monopoly on purchases by their workers.
Some nineteenth century state courts struck down, as a violation of
freedom to contract, legislation requiring workers to be paid in legal
tender.n2 The free market, as defined and understood by these courts,
allowed corporations to use their market power greatly to restrict
worker freedom in the market place and to disadvantage competitors
of the company store. For many workers and employees the question
was not between freedom and regulation. The question was between
rules imposed by corporate power as to which they had no say, and
rules imposed by government. As to government imposed rules, the
348 Id.
34"Id.
35"Id. at 93-94, quoted in POLLACK, supra note 347, at 77.
Hi lit
"2 See, e.g., Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886). On Lochner era jurisprudence, see
WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE
Couwrs, 1890-1937, at 1-48 (1994).
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citizen has a voice, but only the option of moving to another state or
nation. As to corporate rules, employees do have the right to resign
and seek employment elsewhere, but often have no voice in shaping
the rules.
In the 1930s, Lochner was repudiated in part because of a growing
belief that a rule which gave equal freedom to contract to the huge
corporation and the lone individual was not in fact a neutral rule. 353
Many insisted that individuals should be able to regulate huge corpo-
rations through the collective action of the democratic process.
Of course, the problem is complex. Government power can also
be used by the powerful to create rules that economically disadvantage
the less powerful. But it is difficult to create vast federal judicial power
over economic legislation without also enabling federal courts to use
it to protect the economically powerful against regulation on behalf of
the less fortunate.
Lochner and laissez-faire constitutional jurisprudence suggest that
much of the program advocated by labor, populists, and Theodore
Roosevelt and, later, by the New Deal, is unconstitutional. Of course,
such a ruling was not unprecedented. Dred Scott held that the center-
piece of the platform of the Republican party, which called for banning
slavery in the territories, was unconstitutional. Whatever one thinks of
the Populists, the Progressives and the New Deal, to declare many ideas
embraced by generations of major political leaders and which have
become part of the fabric of American law unconstitutional is an
extreme reduction of the scope of the democratic process.
To allow judges to put popular dissatisfaction with how the "mar-
ket" is operating outside the ordinary democratic process is unwise,
even though the market has many virtues. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, properly interpreted, does not prohibit most government regu-
lations of the economy. Most regulations aimed at protecting individu-
als from exploitation by concentrated economic power offend neither
its letter or spirit. State courts under state constitutions may be freer
to protect economic liberty. Mistakes made by such courts are easier
to correct.
Most Republicans in Congress were committed to preserving a
substantial role for the states and were not willing to follow a path that
could lead to total federal preemption of state legislation. Because of
the Enforcement Clause of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
many Republicans feared that an excessively broad definition of the
353 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: TUE RISE AND FALL Or LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS .JURISTRUDENCE 147-92 (1993).
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interests protected by Section 1 would grant Congress equally broad
powers to preempt state legislation.
If the Supreme Court revives the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
and if the Court adheres to precedents suggesting the Clause protects
individuals and not corporations,55" the Clause might transform consti-
tutional analysis. Exactly how it might do so is hard to say. Regulatory
and other takings of corporate property might be relegated to state
constitutional law, though the more likely result is that citizen share-
holders would have standing to complain. Those who oppose letting
corporations spend millions on ballot measures might have a slightly
stronger case for state regulation. If so, corporate executives might be
forced to spend their own resources rather than those of the corpora-
tion."55
 Because the Court interprets the First Amendment as guaran-
teeing a right to receive corporate messages as well as a right of the
corporation to send them,""" without other changes in the law, a revival
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause here would probably make little
difference.
Right to reply statutes might get a somewhat warmer hearing. Now
statutes that require newspapers to provide a right to reply to those
they attack are held a violation of the First Amendment. The news
corporation is said to be a person, and people cannot be forced to
express ideas with which they disagree."7
 Similarly, public utilities have
been allowed to disseminate their pro-nuclear power views to custom-
ers in billing envelopes while closing the space to public interest
groups with opposing views, even in the face of a state order opening
the forum to opposing views."' If the privilege of free speech and press
applied to real people—including those speaking through corpora-
tions—and not to corporations as such, then the corporate claims of
sst Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,98-99 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting); Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. 168 (1868).
"' I intend here merely to raise the question, not to answer it. For an extended discussion,
see generally Charles R. O'Kelley Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and
Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. LT 1347
(1979); William Patton & Randall Bartlett, Corporate 'Persons' and Freedom of Speech: The Political
Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. Rim 494 (1981).
"'See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
357 See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); see also Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, at 83-89 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (maintaining that word "person" in Fourteenth
Amendment does not include corporations).
35" See, e.g., Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. 1.
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a right to silence might be impaired. 33° The change, if it occurred at
all, would come about because of expanded power to the government
to regulate economic corporations, not because the rights of citizens
to a right to reply, for example, had grown.
Under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, aliens would not have
a right to bear arms, but, as the Supreme Court reads the Second
Amendment, no one else has a personal right to bear arms either. To
the extent that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects citizens,
its somewhat narrower scope might allow greater regulation of the
ability of artificial persons created for economic objectives to translate
economic into political power. Citizens could still retain the ability to
use corporations organized for free speech and association purposes
for communication.
Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause would no doubt have
other implications as well. Exactly what it would mean, of course, no
one can say. What the revival of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
should not do is protect the "market" from the democratic process.
For all its virtues, the market has its limits. First, as with pollution
or destruction of wetlands, the unregulated market pervasively dumps
costs on parties who are not parties to the bargain. Second, consumer
decisions are often made with grossly inadequate information. Indeed,
one characteristic effort of concentrated economic power is to keep
information prejudicial to its interests from the public. Often the
market is far from perfectly competitive. The market short-changes
some collective and spiritual interests. 360 It does so by focusing on short
term individual advantage and failing to consider long term effects on
others. Large concentrations of economic power can be used to stifle
competition. For example, without strong regulation of the market, an
55"Consider the following analogy. Assume that the right to bear arms is a personal right of
citizens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. A citizen hires aliens as security guards and
arms them, A state statute prohibits aliens from beating arms. Although the citizen would have
a personal right 1m bear arms, he would not, it seems, have the right. to use aliens to hear arms
on his behalf. Similarly, a natural person would have a right. against compelled expression, but
the artificial corporation would not. On the other hand, one might argue that the right of reply
wtmld in effect be an unconstitutional condition, conditioning the use of the corporate [Orin on
relinquishing a constitutional right.
.`"qhe problem is complex because the market has many great virtues, A pressing problem
is how to preserve the virtues while remedying its vices. Compare SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS
BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED (1973), with ANDREW BARD SCHMOOKLER, THE
ILLUSION OF CHOICE: How THE MARKET ECONOMY SHAPES OUR DESTINY (1993), Romirr
KIITTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS (1997), and CHARLES
DICKENS, HARD TIMES (Everyman 1994). See also DoneIla H. Meadows, The Industrial System Is
the Problem, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Aug. 13, 1995, at F4.
104	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:1
oil company might buy and shelve patents for solar energy. The result
would be to dump greater and potentially catastrophic costs from
global warming on future generations to protect current profits from
oil.'"' Finally, there is the problem of unequal bargaining power.
There is a paradox in proscribing regulation of the economy and
leaving decisions to the "free" market. The market produces concen-
trations of economic power, and as James Harrington362 and Alexis De
Tocqueville 363
 have noted, economic power tends to shape the political
system. The political system then shapes the market. Witness, for ex-
ample, the rash of legislation seeking to stifle news media reports on
problems with pesticides in the food supply. 3" Consider the suggestion
by the House Speaker Newt Gingrich that corporations use their ad-
vertising dollar leverage to keep ideas they dislike out of the public
press;365
 and consider the legislative limits on citizens' rights to sue for
defective products and negligence recently achieved by economically
powerful groups. The market provides economic power which in turn
is converted into political power, which in turn seeks to redefine the
market to suit its desires.
Mi See Ross Gelbspan, The Heat Is On: The Warming of the World's Climate Sparks a Blaze of
Denial, HARPER'S, Dec. 1995, at 32 (reporting that in September 1995 the 2500 scientists on
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued unambiguous announcement "that the earth
had entered a period of climatic instability likely to cause 'widespread economic, social and
environmental dislocation over the next century.' The continuing emission of greenhouse gases
would create protracted, crop-destroying droughts in continental interiors, a host of new and
recurring diseases, hurricanes of extraordinary malevolence, and rising sea levels that could
inundate island nations and low-lying rims on the continents."). Meanwhile, Gelbspan further
reports that one of the leading oil industry public relation outlets has spent more than a million
dollars to downplay the threat of climate change. 'The people who run the world's oil and coal
companies," Gelbspan says, "know that the march of science, and of political action, may he
slowed by disinformation." Id. at 33.
362jAmEs HARRINGTON, THE ART OF LAWGIVING IN THREE BOOKS (1659), reprinted in part in
DIVINE BIGHT AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY OE POLITICAL WRI'rING IN STUART ENGLAND
397 (David Wooten ed., 1986).
363 1 AtExis	 TOCIVEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 48-56 (Knopf 1973), reprinted in
STEN IEN B. PREssEit Aisin JAmn. S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY
258 (3d ed. 1995).
See, e.g., ALA. Com.: § 6-5-621 (1994) (punishing false reports that foods arc unsafe).
"'The inlOrmation shall be deemed to be false if it is nut based upon reasonable and reliable
scientific inquiry, facts, or data." Id. The Alar report was based on a substantial body of scientific
opinion, but of course, others contested the danger. See Michael Kent Curtis, Monkey Dials:
Science, Defamation, and the Suppression of Dissent, 4 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 535-38 (1995);
Elliot ,leggin, Myths: The Alar Scare Was for Real; and So Is That Veggie. Hate Crime Movement,
725 No. 3 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 13 (1996).
365 See Howard Kurtz & Ann Devroy, Speaker Rails Again,st Media 'Socialists'; Gingrich Offers
Advice On Buying Advertising, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1995, at A4.
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Because of the very serious danger that government regulation
may be captured by the regulated, one might seek to turn the matter
over to the courts. But that solution assumes that courts, appointed by
politicians, are somehow immune from selection to advance particu-
larly powerful interests while the politicians who appoint them are not.
Significantly, the political institution we have that is staffed by ordinary
Americans from all walks of life, that has very short term limits, and
that cannot accept campaign contributions or gifts from those who
seek to influence its decision, is under massive attack from concen-
trated economic power. That institution, of course, is the jury.
On re-reading the Slaughter-House Cases, I have come to three
conclusions. First, Justice Miller was right in seeking an interpretation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that did not risk total destruc-
tion of state power. Second, he was also right in not removing subjects
from the democratic process because they fall loosely under the rubric
of economic liberty. Finally, his decision to liquidate the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in service of these goals was both unnecessary and
one of the signal disasters of American judicial history.
Reflecting on the Bred Scott36" case, the Slaughter-House Cases, 5"7
United States v. Cruiltshank, 368 the Civil Rights Cases, 3"9 Maxwell v. Dow,"'
and Patterson v. Colorado,"lone can better understand the bitter reflec-
tions of a North Carolina carpetbagger named Albion Tourgee. Tour-
gee grew up in Ohio, fought in the Civil War and emigrated to North
Carolina, where he became Republican, an advocate of equality for
Americans of African descent, a leading member of the State Consti-
tutional Convention of 1868, and a Republican Superior Court Judge.
After living through Reconstruction in North Carolina, Tourgee re-
turned to the North and wrote powerful novels about his experience." 12
Tourgee represented Plessy without a fee in the 1896 case of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 373
 which unsuccessfully challenged state mandated segrega-
tion of railroad cars. The Supreme Court, Tourgee said, "has always
been the consistent enemy of personal liberty and equal rights."374
31 '6 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
3083 U.S. 36 (1872).
31 '8 92 U.S. 542 (1875). The cases that foil
Court said.
'/449 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
37° 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
371 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
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a short biographical essay, see Michael Kent Curtis,
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Tourgee considered an era that stretched from Dred Scott, through
the Slaughter-House Cases, to cases rejecting application of the Bill of
Rights to the states, to the Civil Rights Cases that struck down the first
national public accommodation law, and to the decision in Plessy up-
holding state-imposed racial segregation. From our present vantage
point, we can see that the Supreme Court has not always been an
enemy of personal liberty or a supporter of the more against the less
powerful, even if, as a matter of history, this has too often been the
case.
Albion Tourgee, Remembering Plessy's Lawyer on the 100th Anniversary of Plessy v. Ferguson, 13
CoNsT. COMMENTARY 187 (1996).
